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INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of Palestinian statehood should be seen in terms of other 
developments in the Middle East. One of the most important developments 
in the context of the Middle East are the events that have been characterized 
as the “Arab Spring.”1 The Arab Spring was an assertion of unilateral 
initiative for popular democratic change on the part of the peoples of 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and most recently, Syria.2 The Arab Spring has, on 
                                                          
  1  See generally Jacqueline S. Ismael & Tareq Y. Ismael, Globalization and the Arab 
World in Middle East Politics: Regional Dynamics in Historical Perspective, 21 ARAB STUD. 
Q. 129 (1999). 
  2 Id. 
NAGAN - MACRO(FINAL) JCI (1).docx (DO NOT DELETE) 10/25/2012  2:15 PM 
2012] Palestinian Statehood 345 
the whole, received the support of the United States, in where policy makers 
have supported the unilateral peaceful demands of the peoples in these 
states. However, although these people assert their universal rights to human 
dignity, the Palestinian people have been denied by the international 
community these same universal rights.3 In this sense, if Palestinian 
statehood is packaged as essentially an aspect of the Arab Spring, the timing 
of the unilateral assertion of these claims would seem to be appropriate. 
Conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis may be traced back prior 
to the events of the Second World War (“WWII”). On the one side, the 
people of Israel succeeded in creating a de facto and de jure nation state 
flowing from the United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) Resolution 
(Decision) directing a partition of the territories between Israelis and 
Palestinians.4 However, the territory that now comprises both Israel and the 
occupied Palestinian territories was vested, in the aftermath of the defeat of 
the Turkish Empire in World War I, with a unique international legal status 
created and administered by a new international organization, The League of 
Nations (“the League”).5  
Under the Charter of the League of Nations a dispensation was made 
that the territories occupied by the European powers would remain under the 
control subject to a legal regime called the League of Nations Mandate 
System, which imposed obligations on the conquer states on how to 
administer these territories.6 In this sense, the European powers could keep 
their conquests, but mandate obligations required them to administer these 
territories in the interest of the inhabitants.7 One of the assumptions behind 
the mandate system was that the international mandate responsibilities 
allocated were to be discharged in the interests of the inhabitants of the 
                                                          
  3 Human rights are commonly understood as “inalienable fundamental rights to which a 
person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being,” and as such are 
conceived as universal, or applicable everywhere, and egalitarian which means that are the 
same for everyone. See generally James Nickel, Human Rights, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010). See generally JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2005); MAGDALENA SEPÚLVEDA ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 
REFERENCE HANDBOOK (3rd ed. 2004). 
  4  The Partition Plan, G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947) 
(approved in Lake Success, N.Y., November 29, 1947 with 33 votes in favor, 13 against, 10 
abstentions and 1 absent). 
  5 See generally F.S. NORTHEDGE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ITS LIFE AND TIMES, 1920–
1946 (1986) (a concise story regarding the creation of the League of Nations focusing on the 
reasons for the failure of the League as a system of collective security). 
  6 See generally Nele Matz, Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of 
Nations as Origin of Trusteeship, in MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF U.N. LAW 47 (2005). 
  7 Id.; see also Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: 
Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 513, 514-15 (2002). 
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territory included within the mandate.8  Specifically, the mandatory power 
should support the aspirations of self-determination sought by the 
populations subject to international mandate responsibility.9 
Under the League, Palestine was juridically a “Class A Mandate”.10 The 
legal status of this international mandate suggested international 
responsibility for its proper management, which meant that the Palestinian 
population had a claim to some measure of development for self-
determination and autonomy.11  That autonomy, however, was not realized 
under the British-controlled mandate.12 The problem, in part, lay in an 
alternative arrangement that Britain had made prior to the establishment of 
the League of Nations and the system of mandates. That arrangement 
involved Britain entering into an understanding with members of the Jewish 
community in the Diaspora that Britain, as a controlling power, would 
permit Jewish immigration to Palestine for the purpose of establishing a 
homeland. The famous Balfour Declaration, declared in 1916, recorded this 
understanding.13 
It is now accepted that the quid pro quo for the Declaration came from a 
commitment by Jewish Americans that they would exercise influence 
through President Woodrow Wilson to secure U.S. involvement in the First 
World War (“WWI”) on the side of the Allied Powers.14 When the mandate 
system was established for Palestine, Britain (the mandatory power) was 
confronted with two seemingly incompatible expectations: (1) the creation 
of a homeland for Jewish people in Palestine, and (2) self-determination for 
                                                          
  8 Id. 
  9 Id. 
  10  See also CHARLES HOWARD ELLIS, THE ORIGIN STRUCTURE & WORKING OF THE 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS 493 (2003). See generally League of Nations Covenant art. 22, available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dd8b9854.html (last visited April 17, 2012) (The 
Class A mandates were territories formerly controlled by the Ottoman Empire that were 
deemed to “... have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent 
nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and 
assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these 
communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.”). 
  11 Matz, supra note 6, at 72-74; see also Anghie, supra note 7, at 571-72. 
  12 See generally Stefan Brooks, British Mandate for Palestine, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 770 (Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2008). 
  13 Balfour Declaration (1917), MILESTONE DOCUMENTS, available at 
http://www.milestonedocuments.com/documents/view/balfour-declaration/text; see also Mayir 
Vereté, The Balfour Declaration and Its Makers, 6 MIDDLE E. STUD. 48, 48 (1970). See 
generally Avi Shlaim, The Balfour Declaration And its Consequences, in YET MORE 
ADVENTURES WITH BRITANNIA: PERSONALITIES, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN BRITAIN 251 
(William Roger Louis ed., 2005). 
  14 Vereté, supra note 13, at 55-56. 
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the Palestinians in the same territory.15 Britain was unable to reconcile these 
expectations and when the United Nations (“UN”) was created after 
WWII,16 Britain resolved to submit the problem to the UN for resolution.17 
The result was a UNGA Resolution stipulating that there would be a 
Jewish and an Arab state in the territory along the lines of a partition 
understanding.18 What emerged from this process was an independent Israeli 
state.19 However, the Palestinians never achieved statehood. Since 1947, a 
multitude of wars have been fought. Between the periods of hostilities, the 
parties have developed strategies to strengthen their claims in the region.20 
Meanwhile, developments inside Israel brought to power interest groups that 
                                                          
  15 See generally JONATHAN SCHNEER, THE BALFOUR DECLARATION: THE ORIGINS OF 
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (2010) (analyzing the passionate and fascinating controversy 
between the non-Zionist and the Zionist Jews that preceded the Balfour declaration, and 
explaining how the Zionists spoke in the name of Jewish nationhood while their Jewish 
opponents denied that Jews even constituted a separate nation). 
  16 U.N. DEP’T OF PUB. INFO., BASIC FACTS: ABOUT THE U.N., U.N. Sales No. E.04.I.7 
(2006). The U.N. officially came into existence on October 24, 1945, when the Charter was 
ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and a 
majority of other signatories. U.N. Day is celebrated on October 24 each year. 
  17 G.A. Res. 106 (S-1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/106(S-1) (May 15, 1947) (The problems facing 
the General Assembly in connection with the commission of inquiry centered on its 
composition, the scope of its investigation, and the role of the Great Powers. While the U.S. 
wanted to exclude the Great Powers, the Soviet Union argued for their inclusion. The Soviet 
delegate, Andrei Gromyko, asked that the commission consider immediate independence for 
Palestine. On May 15, 1947, the Assembly resolved to create an 11-nation committee on 
Palestine (UNSCOP). The Resolution was adopted by 47 in favor, 7 against (Egypt, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Afghanistan and Turkey), and one abstention (Thailand)); see 
also U.N. Special Committee on Palestine, Recommendations to the G.A., U.N. Doc. A/364 
Add.1 (Sept. 3, 1947) [hereinafter Special Committee on Palestine Recommendations] (In the 
summer of 1947 UNSCOP traveled to Palestine and held hearings in Jerusalem, while 
Palestine Arabs boycotted the hearings. After completing its work in Palestine, the Committee 
drew up its recommendations in Geneva. The majority report recommended the partition of 
Palestine into Arab and Jewish States and an international regime for Jerusalem, all three 
linked in an Economic Union. The minority report recommended the creation of a federal 
unitary State, with Jerusalem as its capital. Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII follow.). 
  18 G.A. Res. 181 (II), supra note 4. 
  19 The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 L.S.I. 3 
(1948) [hereinafter Declaration of the Establishment of Israel] (On May 14, 1948, the day in 
which the British Mandate over Palestine expired, the Jewish People’s Council gathered at the 
Tel Aviv Museum, and approved the following proclamation, declaring the establishment of 
the State of Israel. The new state was recognized that night by the U.S. and three days later by 
the U.S.S.R.). 
  20 See also Rulers of Palestine: Chronology Factsheet, SADAKA, THE IRELAND 
PALESTINE ALLIANCE (2009), http://www.sadaka.ie/Articles/Factsheets/FACTSHEET-
Chronology.pdf. See generally Tomis Kapitan, Violence and Self-Determination in the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict, 36 PEACE & CHANGE 494 (2011). 
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were committed to the idea of an “Eretz Israel,” which refers to the “Whole 
Land of Israel” or “Greater Israel.”21 
A “Greater Israel” would, however, in effect extinguish any territorial 
claims of the Palestinian people and by implication extinguish any claims to 
self-determination, independence, and statehood. The Palestinian people 
have continued to insist that the implications of such territorial claims are 
incompatible with their legal rights under international law,22 and they have 
moved incrementally towards a posture where they now are seeking the 
recognition of Palestinian statehood.23 A “Greater Israel” remains a 
centerpiece of the agenda of the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who 
has sought to justify the Eretz Israel idea on the basis that the ancient 
boundaries of Israel, or “boundaries of antiquity,” are legitimate boundaries 
that may trump Palestinian claims.24 
A reliance on the “boundaries of antiquity”25 would also conflict with 
the mandate of international law, which imposed the responsibility on the 
mandate powers to administer the territories in the benefit of its habitants.26 
To soften the conflict, the Netanyahu administration contends that expanded 
                                                          
  21 See generally Solomon Zeitlin, Jewish Rights in Eretz Israel (Palestine), 52 THE 
JEWISH Q. REV. 12 (1961) (Eretz Israel or “Eretz Yisrae” refers to the “Whole Land of Israel” 
or “Greater Israel.” It is an Israeli ideology that believes Israel should expand to take up all of 
the “historic” land of Israel, sometimes viewed as all of Palestine west of the Jordan river, 
sometimes including all the land of the original Palestine Mandate, including Transjordan, and 
sometimes including all of Israel as promised by God, and never fulfilled, which includes from 
Homs in Syria in the North and from the Euphrates River in Iraq to the Mediterranean.). 
  22 JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 75 (2010). 
  23 Id. 
  24 Uri Avnery, Bibi and the Yo-Yos, ANTIWAR.COM (May 26, 2011), 
http://original.antiwar.com/avnery/2011/05/25/bibi-and-the-yo-yos/; see also Yoel Marcus, 
Has Netanyahu Given Up on Greater Israel?, HAARETZ (Sept. 7, 2010). See generally EFRAIM 
KARSH, FROM RABIN TO NETANYAHU: ISRAEL’S TROUBLED AGENDA (1997); Occupied 
Jerusalem, Netanyahu vows no concessions on ‘Eretz Israel,’ AL ARABIYA NEWS  (Aug. 30, 
2010), http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/08/30/118062.html. 
  25 See G.A. Res. 181(II), supra note 4. See generally WILLIAM ROGERS RICHARDS, FOR 
WHOM CHRIST DIED 64 (1902) (“We have always recognized the hand of divine providence in 
the growth of Rome’s power as preparatory to the spread of Christianity. As in Palestine God 
had been dealing with His own chosen people of Israel through the ages, revealing His will 
through their prophets till at last the Christ was born among them; so in Italy He had been 
raising up another people, and making them strong to fight and wise to organize and skillful to 
build, that they might break down the narrow national boundaries of antiquity, and bind the 
many nations together by bonds of a common law and common language…” Boundaries of 
antiquity may also refer to the territorial limits delimited in the Partition Plan by the UN in 
1947 to replace the British Mandate on Palestine.). 
  26 See G.A. Res. 181(II), supra note 4; see also Gideon Biger, The Boundaries of Israel – 
Palestine Past, Present, and Future: A Critical Geographical View, 13 ISRAEL STUD. 68, 73 
(2008). 
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boundaries are a necessary dimension of critical Israeli security interests.27 
This approach, focusing on the centrality of the state, attempts to weaken the 
force of international law by suggesting that international law has a residual 
interest in the reasonable security interest of the state. Another approach to 
the expanded boundaries problem has been the controversial support of 
Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian Territories.28 In this sense, the 
demographic settlement by Israelis creates the impression that the 
demographic reality has changed and that the letter of international law must 
be modified to accept social and demographic reality of settlement 
expansion. Therefore, the longer the settlements endure, the greater the 
social dislocation and conflicts around efforts to unsettle the settlements. 
The settlement issue has been a major flashpoint of conflict between the 
Israeli authorities and Palestinian leadership.29 While the parties are 
negotiating, Israeli authorities have continued to support settlement 
expansion in Palestinian territories.30 The Palestinians have analogized this 
approach to the metaphor of the parties sharing a pizza and, as one party 
continues to eat while the negotiations continue, the pizza radically 
diminishes in size.31 This has impressed a state of urgency upon Palestinian 
                                                          
  27 Netanyahu’s peace is a cynical evasion, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2009), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7f7b1c42-91a3-11de-879d-00144feabdc0.html. See generally 
ALLAN GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1978); Kurt Rene 
Radley, The Palestinian Refugees: The Right to Return in International Law, 72 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 586, 613 (1978). 
  28 WILLIAM W. HARRIS, TAKING ROOT: ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST BANK, THE 
GOLAN, AND GAZA-SINAI, 1967-1980, at 223 (1980); see also Allan C. Brownfeld, Israel and 
Judaism: Finally, Israel’s Settlements Policy, Turn Toward Extremism Making Impact on 
Jewish Opinion, WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE E. AFF. 50, 50 (2011). 
  29 See generally MARK A. HELLER & SARI NUSSEIBEH, NO TRUMPETS, NO DRUMS: A 
TWO-STATE SETTLEMENT OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT (1993) (The authors are 
two scholars, one Israeli and one Palestinian, who engaged in a nonpolemical and serious 
effort to spell out the details of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. This book is the product of 
intense and often uneasy discussions between them over a period of months. The authors 
provide an example of what is possible through dialogue by proposing that settlement is a 
compromise that represents the best judgment of the minimal requirements of each side for a 
durable peace and outlining a two-state solution. They propose a state of Israel living 
eventually alongside a small Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with constraints on 
the Palestinians’ exercise of sovereignty within their state.). 
  30 Jerome Slater, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace 
Process, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 171, 177 (2001); see also Israel announces huge settlement 
expansion, OCCUPIED PALESTINE (Mar. 13, 2011), 
http://occupiedpalestine.wordpress.com/2011/03/13/maan-news-agency-israel-announces-
huge-settlement-expansion/; Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Rocky road to Middle East peace, 
ALERTNET (Aug. 10, 2011) http://www.trust.org/alertnet/crisis-centre/crisis/israeli-palestinian-
conflict. 
  31 Philip Weiss, Let’s Negotiate Over How We Divide the Pizza While I Eat the Pizza, 
MONDOWEISS (Sept. 27, 2011), http://mondoweiss.net/2011/09/lets-negotiate-over-how-we-
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leadership to move their agenda forward for a declaration of independence 
towards more well-defined, clear international protection for the boundaries 
of a recognized Palestinian state.32 Israelis are divided on the question of 
recognition of a Palestinian state.33 Israeli citizens who adhere to right-wing 
                                                          
divide-the-pizza-while-i-eat-the-pizza.html; see also Richard Becker, The Palestine Papers 
and the Egyptian revolutionary uprising: Connecting the struggles in the Middle East, 
LIBERATIONNEWS.ORG (Feb. 3, 2011), http://pslweb.org/liberationnews/assets/downloads/psl-
statement-palestine-papers.pdf; Yes to Palestinian statehood: Efforts to stop the Palestinians 
from winning statehood at the U.N. are misguided and self-defeating, ECONOMIST (Sept. 24, 
2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21530117; THEOLOGY IN THE VINEYARD, 
Palestinian Pizza (Sept. 21, 2011), http://theologyinthevineyard.wordpress.com/2011/09/21/ 
palestinian-pizza/. 
  32 Letter from the Permanent Rep. of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/43/827-S/20278, at 13 (Nov. 18, 1988); see John Quigley, 
Palestine’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination and the Right of the Palestinians 
to Statehood, 7 B.U. INT’L L.J. 2, 31 (1989) (On November 15, 1988, the Palestine National 
Council (PNC) proclaimed the establishment of the state of Palestine. Its Declaration of 
Independence relied on the right of self-determination as a norm of international law. The 
Declaration claimed territory in that portion of Palestine which is known as the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip based on longstanding occupation.). 
  33 Israeli Leftists Urge Europe to Recognize Palestinian State, JERUSALEM POST (May 27, 
2011), http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=222459; Leo Rennert, 
Crisis Over Palestinian Statehood Bid Is All Israel’s Fault, AMERICAN THINKER (Sept. 16, 
2011), http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2011/09/crisis_over_palestinian_ 
statehood_bid_is_all_israels_fault.html; see also  Amnon Kapeliok, Israel and the Peace 
Process, in 3 LEADERSHIP AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
SERIES 143 (Adel Safty ed., 2003); Shlomo Avineri, A Special Issue On Arab-Israeli Conflict; 
Israel and the new left, 7 SOCIETY 79, 79 (1970); Farooq Abbasi, Israeli Jews Divided Over 
Removal of Settlements: Poll, DAWN.COM (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.dawn.com/2010/10/28 
/israeli-jews-divided-over-removal-of-settlements-poll.html; Saed Bannoura, Settlers Disrupt 
Israeli Left Wing Protest Calling For Palestinian Statehood, OCCUPIED PALESTINE (Apr. 22, 
2011), http://www.imemc.org/article/61115. See generally MORDECHAI BAR-ON, IN PURSUIT 
OF PEACE: A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT (1996) (Telling the story of the 
Israeli peace movement and the role it played in the pursuit of peace. Providing intimate 
portraits about his own experiences in the movement of groups like Peace Now, Yesh Gvul, 
and the Women in Black and a sweeping historical synthesis of the course of the Israeli-Arab 
conflict with an especial emphasis in the period between 1967 and 1993.); BENJAMIN GIDRON, 
STANLEY NIDER KATZ & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, MOBILIZING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND, ISRAEL/PALESTINE, AND SOUTH AFRICA (2002) (An in-
depth study of thirty-three peace/conflict organizations in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and 
Israel/Palestine. The authors provide a demonstration of how the sociopolitical and cultural 
context of the conflict in each region has shaped the type of organizations that have emerged, 
their conception of the conflict and its resolution, and how they have successfully galvanized 
previously weak or non-existent pro-peace political forces to become important players in the 
political struggle for peace.); TAMAR HERMANN, THE ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT: A 
SHATTERED DREAM (2009) (chronicling the major ideological and personal disputes that added 
to the failure). 
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political discourse are utterly opposed to a Palestinian state.34 In effect, such 
a development would capture the ambitions of right wing interest groups for 
an Eretz Israel.35 On the other hand, a large number of liberal and peace 
activist Israelis see Palestinian statehood as an important step toward a 
permanent peace between the two people.36 
The Israeli right wing has tremendous assets to advocate in Europe and 
the U.S. and has sought to mobilize those assets to block a decision in favor 
of Palestinian statehood.37 The Palestinians have managed to develop 
sympathy, good will, and diplomatic ties in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America.38 Those assets appeared to favor a speedy recognition of 
Palestinian statehood. Between these two postures, there is a revived level of 
international legal concern.39 In such a historically heated and contentious 
international political minefield, it is important to identify and clarify the 
legal concerns presented by the current political dynamics, and to ensure that 
they are understood in terms of what the objective interests of all the 
stakeholders are with regard to this issue. 
In this Article, we hope to contribute to the clarification of the role of 
international law in properly assessing the legal foundations of the claims of 
the respective parties. In Part I, we address the relevant aspects of the 
historical background of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. Part II addresses the 
recent developments in the law of self-determination from an international 
and comparative jurisprudential perspective. In Part III, we address specific 
aspects of continued repressive and discriminatory policies and practices the 
state of Israel has engaged in against the Palestinian population in the region. 
Part IV provides an overview of the Palestinian process for securing 
statehood recognition. In Part V, we review the central interests of the major 
parties involved in the conflict, completing the article with a brief 
conclusion and recommendations on how the major stakeholders in the 
ongoing conflict can proceed to secure a more peaceful outcome. The 
                                                          
  34 Kapeliok, supra note 33, at 143. 
  35 Id. 
  36 Id. 
  37 See Carta Maior, U.S. Promises to Block Palestinian State; Europe Is Divided, 
WATCHING AMERICA (Sept. 17, 2011), http://watchingamerica.com/News/122155/united-
states-promises-to-block-palestinian-state-europe-is-divided/; see also Harriet Sherwood, 
Israel launches campaign before Palestinian statehood vote, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/10/israel-plan-block-un-palestinian-state. 
  38 Thalif Deen, Will Asia, Africa Follow Latin America on Palestine?, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 13, 2011), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54122; see also 
Palestinians admitted to UNESCO as full member, CHANNELNEWSASIA.COM (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/1162726/1/.html. 
  39 Robert Blecher, Palestine’s Rocky Path to the U.N., FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept. 19, 
2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68277/robert-blecher/palestines-rocky-path-to-
the-united-nations?page=show. 
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Article seeks to provide enough contextual background to provide a clearer 
picture of the interests of key stakeholders with regard to this issue, with a 
necessary exploration of the complex internal political dynamics in both the 
political state of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
I. THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT: RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
A. Conflicts Relating to Territory, Population and the Claims of 
Eretz Israel 
Prior to WWI, Palestine was a part of the Ottoman Empire.40 That 
Empire was multiethnic, incorporating territories and populations throughout 
the Middle East that had largely become culturally Arabic.41 In WWI, 
Palestine was subject to British conquest. Prior to the Versailles Peace 
Treaty, international law held that territorial conquest was a valid means of 
territorial acquisition.42 The Versailles Peace Treaty generated the League of 
Nations.43 The League likewise created a Mandate System, which 
established that the territories conquered by the Ally powers, did not fall 
within the sovereignty of the conquering powers.44 Instead, the territories’ 
legal status was made subject to the regime of the League of Nations 
Mandate System.45 In this sense, the Peace Treaty at Versailles challenged 
the colonial expectation that the European powers invariably owned the 
territories they conquered. In short, these new territorial conquests, while 
under the control of the conquering powers, were nonetheless subject to a 
                                                          
  40 Mim Kemal Oke, The Ottoman Empire, Zionism and the Question of Palestine (1880-
1908), 14 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 329, 330 (1982). 
  41 See generally NICHOLAS BETHELL,  THE PALESTINE TRIANGLE: THE STRUGGLE 
BETWEEN THE BRITISH, THE JEWS AND THE ARABS, 1935–48 (1979) (describing the history of 
what Zionists call “War of Liberation,” and supplementing and complementing the many 
partial accounts of the war that were already available at the time). 
  42 LAWRENCE MARTIN, THE TREATIES OF PEACE 1919-1923 (1924) (this is the source of 
the complete text of the 1919 Treaty). See generally GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE, THE 
TREATY OF VERSAILLES: A REASSESSMENT AFTER 75 YEARS (Manfred Franz Boemeke, 
Gerald D. Feldman & Elisabeth Gläser eds., 1998); Ruth Henig, Versailles and Peacemaking, 
BBC HISTORY (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/versailles_01.shtml. 
  43 Leland M. Goodrich, From League of Nations to United Nations, 1 INT’L ORG. 3, 6 
(1947); see also P.E. Corbett, What is the League of Nations, 5 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 119, 119 
(1924). 
  44 Pitman B. Potter, Origin of the System of Mandates under the League of Nations, 16 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 563, 565-66 (1922). 
  45 Matz, supra note 6, at 72-74; see also Anghie, supra note 7, at 571-72; Ernst B. Haas, 
The Reconciliation of Conflicting Colonial Policy Aims: Acceptance of the League of Nations 
Mandate System, 6 INT’L ORG. 521, 535-36 (1952). 
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new international legal regime under the authority of the League. Palestine 
was a League of Nations Mandate territory.46 Britain, the conquering power, 
was granted the mandate to administer Palestine.47 This reflected the 
political reality that the conquering powers could retain their conquests 
subject to a weak form of international concern under the League’s mandate 
system. 
One of the obligations of the mandatory powers – the sovereign states 
in charge of administering the territories transferred from one sovereign state 
to another after WWI on behalf of the League – was to secure the wellbeing 
and interests of the people under its control and authority. Complicating this 
international obligation was Great Britain’s Balfour Declaration, articulated 
in 1917, prior to the end of the war, a document which favored Zionist 
nationalist interests.48 These interests included Jewish immigration and 
                                                          
  46 The Palestine Mandate, League of Nations, pmbl. (1922). 
  47 Brooks, supra note 12, at 770. 
  48 Jehuda Reinharz, The Balfour Declaration and Its Maker: A Reassessment, 64 J. 
MODERN HIST. 455, 495 (1992) (“Cecil drew attention to the importance of the Zionist 
organization in the U.S., whose support would substantially assist the cause of the Allies. ‘To 
do nothing was to risk a direct breach with them.’ In the end it was decided that the views of 
President Wilson should be obtained on the desirability, in principle, of a pro-Zionist 
declaration, without reference to the wording of any of the drafts. As instructed, Cecil cabled 
to Colonel House the following day: ‘We are being pressed here for a declaration of sympathy 
with the Zionist movement and I should be very grateful if you felt able to ascertain 
unofficially if the President favours such a declaration.’”); see also Bulov, 
Why…Germany…Lost…WWI? Ask No More!, WAR IN IRAQ (Dec. 11, 2008, 2:37 AM), 
http://iraqwar.mirror-world.ru/article/180819 (According to Benjamin Freedman, a Jewish 
American who worked in the highest levels of the Zionists organizations and the U.S. 
government, the Balfour Declaration was employed as a quid pro quo for using American 
Zionists’ influence to get the U.S. and President Wilson into the war against Germany and on 
the side of the Allies. According to Freedman the Zionist community “saw the possibility of 
getting Palestine, went to England and they made this deal. At that time, everything changed, 
like a traffic light that changes from red to green. Where the newspapers had been all pro-
German, where they had been discussing the difficulties that Germany was having fighting 
Great Britain commercially and in other respects, all of a sudden the Germans were no good. 
They were villains. They were Huns. They were shooting Red Cross nurses. They were cutting 
off babies’ hands. They were no good. Shortly after that, Mr. Wilson declared war on 
Germany. 
 The Zionists in London had sent cables to the U.S., to Justice Brandeis, saying ‘Go to work on 
President Wilson. We’re getting from England what we want. Now you go to work on 
President Wilson and get the U.S. into the war.’ That’s how the U.S. got into the war. We had 
no more interest in it; we had no more right to be in it than we have to be on the moon tonight 
instead of in this room. There was absolutely no reason for World War I to be our war. We 
were railroaded into — if I can be vulgar, we were suckered into — that war merely so that the 
Zionists of the world could obtain Palestine. That is something that the people of the U.S. have 
never been told. They never knew why we went into World War I.”). 
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settlement in Palestine.49 This fact was to shape the future in important 
ways.50 
In recent history, the United Kingdom’s broader lack of support for 
self-determination of Palestinians continues to remain a salient issue.51 
Palestine was, originally, a Class A Mandate.52 This Class A Mandate would 
remain somewhat distinctive in the sense that it contained a cláusula that 
was not expressed in Article 22 of the League Covenant. This cláusula 
involved the encouragement of Jewish immigration for the establishment of 
a natural home for Jewish people, who were a minority in Palestine at that 
time.53 Even at the time the Covenant was ratified, there was an ostensible 
incompatibility between the British Balfour Declaration for promoting 
immigration to Palestine and the requirements of Article 22.54 
Balfour was very explicit about the problem of assuming mandate 
responsibility and the British commitment regarding Jewish immigration. In 
correspondence with Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Balfour wrote in 
1919 that “the weak point of our position of course is that in the case of 
Palestine we deliberately and rightly declined to accept the principle of self-
determination.”55 He stressed that the position of Jews outside of Palestine 
was a matter of global importance and added that he believed that Jews had 
a historic claim to a home in their ancient land.56 Thus, the Palestinian 
mandate was originally administered by Great Britain with equivocal 
objectives; unfortunately, the conflict between these objectives would never 
clearly be rationally reconciled with the precise terms of the original 
mandate. 
There is evidence that under the original mandate Palestine was treated 
as a constitutional proto-state because Britain, the mandatory power, was 
                                                          
  49 See generally SCHNEER, supra note 15. 
  50 See generally Shlaim, supra note 13. 
  51 See generally EDWARD W. SAID, THE POLITICS OF DISPOSSESSION: STRUGGLE FOR 
PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION, 1969-94 (1995). 
  52 See Matz, supra note 6, at 72-74; see also Anghie, supra note 7, at 571-72. See 
generally Eli E. Hertz, Mandate for Palestine; The Legal Aspects of Jewish Rights, MYTHS 
AND FACTS (2007). 
  53 Mark Rosenblit, International Law and the Jewish People’s Collective Rights of 
Settlement and Self-Determination in the Land of Israel (2006), 
http://www.rosenblit.com/Law.htm. 
  54 QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 75 (“The contradiction 
between the letters of the Covenant and the policy of the allies is even more flagrant in the 
case of ‘independent nation’ of Palestine than in that of ‘independent nation’ of Syria. For in 
Palestine we do not propose to even go to the form of consulting the wishes of the present 
inhabitants of the country.”). 
  55 ISAIAH FRIEDMAN, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE: BRITISH-JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS, 
1914-1918, at 325 (2d ed., 1992). 
  56 Id. 
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never recognized as exercising sovereign authority over Palestine.57 Indeed, 
for a multitude of purposes, Palestine was viewed as a State.58 For example, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concession’s Case59 clearly regarded Palestine as a State.60 As a result, there 
is a strong view among jurists that the locus of authority in Class A Mandate 
Territories was vested in the population of the territories themselves.61 
The general conclusions that we might draw from the British-
administered Palestinian Mandate is that, unlike the Mandates in Syria and 
Iraq, there was no progression of indigenous self-determination to 
statehood.62 However, there is considerable consensus in scholarship and 
practice that Palestine was a proto-state and that its latent sovereignty was 
rooted in the Palestinian inhabitants of the territory.63 Attributes of 
sovereignty resided in the body politic and the Mandate administration.64 
The fact that statehood was not achieved for the Palestinians could be found 
in Great Britain’s commitment to the Balfour Declaration for the creation of 
a homeland for the Jewish Diaspora, which would occupy the boundaries of 
the ancient state of Israel. The United Kingdom therefore found itself in a 
profound decisional dilemma: fulfilling the Mandate’s obligations required a 
repudiation of Balfour – and the Balfour Declaration’s promise repudiated 
the Mandate. This was a dilemma that was never resolved. 
 
                                                          
  57 QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 75. 
  58 John Quigley, Palestine Statehood: A Rejoinder to Professor Robert Weston Ash, 36 
RUTGERS L. REC. 257, 262 (2010) (“Those who deny Palestine statehood base their position 
on abstract concepts relating to the [*263] definition of statehood. They ignore the practice of 
the international community in relation to Palestine. As indicated in my piece to which 
Professor Ash has responded, Palestine has been regarded as a state since it was set up as a 
Class A mandate under the supervision of the League of Nations. That statehood was never 
extinguished, despite a variety of control arrangements that have intervened in regard to 
segments of its territory, and despite the fact that independence remains elusive.”). 
  59 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3 
(Aug. 30). 
  60 QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 75. 
  61 See generally Yoram Rabin & Roy Peled, Transfer of Sovereignty over Populated 
Territories from Israel to a Palestinian State: The International Law Perspective, 17 MINN. J. 
INT’L L. 59 (2008). 
  62 Tomas Hopkins Primeau & Jeff J. Corntassel, Indigenous “Sovereignty” and 
International Law: Revised Strategies for Pursuing “Self-Determination”, 17 HUMAN RIGHTS 
Q. 343, 348 (1995). 
  63 Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, The 
International Status of the Palestinian People (Jan. 1, 1980), available at 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/548E6E5758E89588852575A0004F1054. 
  64 Id. 
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B. Israel: A Successful Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
When Britain requested, in 1947, that the UN consider the future 
dispensation of the territory defined within the Palestinian Mandate, the 
UNGA created a special committee to investigate the international legal 
status of the Palestinian territory.65 The committee determined that the 
British Mandate should be terminated and that independence should be 
granted to Palestine at the earliest possible time.66 Despite the 
recommendation of “independence,” the Committee, of which a majority 
was committed to a partition of the Palestine territory with a Jewish state and 
an Arab state, stipulated that the relinquishment of the territory to its 
populations was nevertheless to be linked in an economic association.67 The 
status of Jerusalem, it was recommended, should be a separate entity under 
international supervision.68 
Of particular interest are the terms of Resolution 181(I)(A) which 
indicate that two states “shall” come into existence after the termination of 
the Mandate.69 This seems to suggest that, by decision of the UNGA, there is 
a legal expectation that the two communities within the territorial space of 
Palestine, which are the Palestinian people and Israel, shall, according to the 
boundary delimitations of partition, establish sovereign states under the 
authority of the UN Charter. This is an unusual approach to either the 
creation or recognition of an entity with sovereign status under international 
law.70 
                                                          
  65 G.A. Res. 106, supra note 17. 
  66 Id. 
  67 Special Committee on Palestine Recommendations, supra note 17. 
  68 Id.; see also G.A. Res. 181 (II), supra note 4, at Plan of Partition with Economic Union, 
Part 1 (The UNG.A., after lengthy debate, decided with more than 2/3 of a majority to accept 
the partition recommendations. Of particular importance is paragraph 3 of Resolution 181, 
which provides: “…3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International 
Regime for the City of Jerusalem shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the 
evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not 
later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of 
Jerusalem shall be as described in Parts II and III below.”). 
  69 G.A. Res. 181 (II), supra note 4; Special Committee on Palestine Recommendations, 
supra note 17. 
  70 See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2006) (Discussing the relation between statehood and recognition and the criteria for 
statehood in view of evolving standards of democracy and human rights, as well as the 
application of such criteria in international organizations and between states; clarifying the 
mechanisms by which states may be created, including devolution and secession, international 
disposition by major powers or international organizations, and the institutions established for 
Mandated, Trust, and Non-Self-Governing Territories.). 
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When we come to the question of the recognition of statehood, we can 
see how the international system functions on two parallel tracks.71 First, 
recognition is decentralized and remains a matter of state sovereign 
discretion.72 That is, other states may or may not recognize the entity, 
regardless as to whether the entity meets the minimal indicia of statehood. 
There are circumstances in which there is an obligation at international law 
not to recognize a state that has met the minimum criteria, if that state seeks 
to establish itself in violation of the UN Charter.73 Second, a state may be 
recognized as a member of an international body where membership is 
restricted to sovereign states only.74 Such recognition does not require that 
the sovereign formally recognize the government of another state, although 
the system provides for de facto recognition of a state that acknowledges 
that a government and a state exist.75 Such recognition could be targeted as 
recognizing a state, but not necessarily recognizing the current 
government.76 
Recognition by an organization like the UN is also influenced by the 
fact that UN recognition of a state is premised on the state’s ability to uphold 
UN Charter values, including its commitment to peace. These principles are 
more explicitly expressed in The Declaration of Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
                                                          
  71 Id. 
  72 Id. 
  73 See also Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and 
International Law, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 51, 82 (1988-1989); Anthony Carroll & Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal, The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 653, 679 (1992-1993); David O. Lloyd, Succession, Secession, and State Membership 
in the United Nations, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 761, 764, 793-94 (1994)(suggesting that 
only the first two criteria for statehood should be met ((1) having the traditional characteristics 
of a state; and, (2) expressing the willingness to abide by the Charter; discussing traditional 
decolonization processes and declarations of independence under the UN Charter); Musa 
Mazzawi, Self-Determination in International Law - A study of the Rhodesian Case, 1 POL’Y 
L. REV. 15, 20-21 (1975). See generally Parris Chang & Kok-ui Lim, Taiwan’s Case for 
United Nations Membership, 1 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 393, 398-402 (1996-1997). 
  74 Yuen-Li Liang, Recognition by the UN of the Representation of a Member State: 
Criteria and Procedure, 45 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 689, 689-707 (1951). See generally Crawford, 
supra note 70. 
  75 See generally discussion supra note 74. 
  76 See, e.g., Herbert W. Briggs, Non-Recognition in the Courts: The Ships of the Baltic 
Republics, 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 585 (1943) (regarding the non-recognition by the United States 
of the Soviet Union’s absorption of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania); Stefan Talmon, The 
Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice, 2001 EUR. J. INT’L L. 727, 734 (2001) 
(regarding the Cyprus question); Gregory H. Stanton, Address at Yale Law School: The 
Cambodian Genocide and International Law (Feb. 22, 1992) (regarding the search for a 
recognized human rights or legal group to sponsor an investigation of the Cambodian 
Genocide). 
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Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.77 The principles are as 
follows:  
(1) states shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state; (2) 
states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means; 
(3) states shall not intervene in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state; (4) states have a duty to cooperate with 
another in accordance with the Charter; (5) equal rights and self-
determination of peoples; (6) sovereign equality of states; and, 
(7) states shall fulfill in good faith their obligations under the 
UN Charter.78  
With these principles in mind, we review the claim of the Palestinians to the 
recognition of statehood in international law. 
In this sense, and according to the Montevideo Convention, the 
conventional approach to achieving statehood would begin with a 
community, acting as a people, with discernible leadership and 
representation, expressing a claim to self-determination and independence.79 
The claim for recognition of sovereignty and statehood may then be further 
supported by facts relating to the expression of territorial control, or some 
dimensions thereof, as well as an organized political authority, sufficient to 
give coherence to the claim for self-determination and independence.80 This 
claim would typically be followed by a degree of structured organization of 
the authority components of the claimants so that the elements of basic 
governance within such a context become discernible.81 Sometimes such an 
internally created entity will initiate the development of a future transitional 
or tentative framework of constitutional governance, which would be the 
factual precondition for a declaration of independent statehood. 
Resolution 181 seems to have influenced the Jewish community in the 
partitioned part of Palestine to declare, on May 14, 1948, the existence of the 
state of Israel.82 This declaration was followed by other sovereign states 
bilaterally recognizing the state of Israel as a sovereign nation-state.83 This 
indicates that the declaration not only met certain factual preconditions but 
also that those preconditions proceeded from the expectation in Resolution 
                                                          
  77 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
  78 Id. 
  79 See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 
Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. 
  80 Id. 
  81 Id. 
  82 Declaration of the Establishment of Israel, supra note 19. 
  83 See generally Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Background Notes: Israel, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3581.htm. 
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181 that each community would establish the preconditions for a declaration 
of statehood. In this case, the Israeli declaration came after the UNGA 
decision, which established the territorial contours of the state of Israel 
under the terms of a partition resolution. 
Moreover, the Resolution gave a quasi-judicial imprimatur that the 
international community expected communities within the partitioned 
territories to seize the opportunity to declare statehood. It would seem rare 
that the creation of a state and a declaration by its people would be preceded 
by a legal fact setting out certain preconditions and suggesting that there is 
an expectation that, from these factual preconditions, the community will 
seize upon the legal “green light” of statehood. Usually the entity that has 
itself established core minimum facts substantiating a claim to statehood will 
seek recognition from an organization, like the UN, to enjoy recognition as a 
sovereign state.84 
 
C. The Partition Resolution, the Emergence of the Conflict, and 
the International Response 
As previously discussed, by 1948, Britain had lost patience, because of 
the internal unrest and acts of terrorism directed at British forces by Zionist 
militias in Palestine, and ceded to the UN the Palestinian mandate and 
attendant responsibilities.85 As a result, the UN generated a resolution that 
provided for a partition of Palestine in order to establish a Jewish state (fifty-
seven percent of the land) and an Arab state (forty-three percent of the 
land).86 Generally, UNGA resolutions are not legally binding, although they 
suggest that they are – as a matter of good faith – politically binding.87 It 
was the expectation of the international community, specifically of the 
parties involved, that the partition lines constituted a legally-binding 
definition of respective territorial claims. In addition, the Resolution did not 
declare the existence of two states. Rather, it declares that the territorial 
partition is expected to constitute the boundaries of a Jewish and Arab state, 
subject to further conditions.88 This critical junction theoretically permitted 
                                                          
  84 Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its 
Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403, 412 (1999). 
  85 See generally sources cited supra note 51. 
  86 G.A. Res. 181 (II), supra note 4 (thirty-three votes in favor, thirteen against, ten 
abstentions and one absent). 
  87 DAKAS C.J. DAKAS, THE JURIDICAL CHARACTER OF UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
RESOLUTIONS ON PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL WEALTH AND RESOURCES 
(1996). 
  88 G.A. Res. 181 (II), supra note 4, Part I(A)(3) (“Independent Arab and Jewish States and 
the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in Part III of this Plan, 
shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of 
the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The 
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the removal of the colonial power and ostensibly transferred control to the 
UN, which sanctioned the occupancy of Palestinian territories by growing 
numbers of Jewish immigrants.89 
To a large extent, the new Jewish settlers were refugees from 
elsewhere90; but the Jewish settlers also staked their claim to Palestinian 
lands based on a “right of return” to what is considered by many Jews to be 
their religious and historical birthright.91 For the resident Palestinians, it was 
overwhelming and threatening to see such an influx of outsiders claiming the 
best pieces of land; it was equally overwhelming for Palestinian residents to 
experience limited access to development of the immigration, taxation, and 
property policies, which gave preference to the Jewish settlers.92 More 
challenging to the indigenous Palestinian population, perhaps, may have 
been the claim that these settlers, many of whom had never set foot in 
Palestine, claimed a “superior,” ancient ancestral heritage to the land.93 
Nevertheless, Jewish culture – shaped in many ways by the exile from 
Palestine and the recurring experiences of extreme marginality and 
persecution from majority cultures everywhere – solidified around the 
identity of a community united in the Diaspora and destined to return.94 
Arguably, it was this strength of identity – tied to a geographic location – 
that permitted the Jewish settlers to assert and achieve independent 
statehood after the Partition in 1948, when the Palestinian residents could 
not. 
                                                          
boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described 
in Parts II and III below.”). 
  89 VICTOR KATTAN, THE PALESTINE QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xxix-xxxi 
(Victor Kattan ed. 2008); see also Rashid Khalidi, International Law and Legitimacy and the 
Palestine Question, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 173, 174 (2006-2007). 
  90 Sari Hanafi, Targeting space through bio-politics: The Israeli colonial project, 10 
PALESTINE REP. 1 (Feb. 18, 2004). Compare Gideon Bohak, Ethnic continuity in the Jewish 
diaspora in antiquity, in JEWS IN THE HELLENISTIC AND ROMAN CITIES (John R. Bartlett ed., 
May 15, 2002), with Press Release, U.N. Dep’t of Pub. Info., Ten Countries Reply to the U.N. 
on Jewish Immigration into Palestine, U.N. Press Release PAL/39 (June 19, 1947). 
  91 See also Nils A. Butenschon, Accommodating Conflicting Claims to National Self-
Determination, the Intractable Case of Israel/Palestine, 13 INT’L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP 
RTS. 285, 297 (2006). See generally NUR MASALHA, THE BIBLE AND ZIONISM: INVENTED 
TRADITIONS, ARCHEOLOGY AND POST-COLONIALISM IN ISRAEL-PALESTINE (2007). 
  92 John Quigley, Living in Legal Limbo: Israel’s Settlers in Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, 10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1998); see also Stacy Howlett, Palestinian Private 
Property Rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 117, 123 
(2001); Assaf Likhovski, Is Tax Law Culturally Specific? Lessons from the History of Income 
Tax Law in Mandatory Palestine, 11 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 725, 745-46 (2010). 
  93 Kathryn Westcott, Settlers: Claiming the ‘Promised Land’, BBC NEWS (Feb. 18, 2003), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/981554.stm. 
  94 William Safran, The Jewish Diaspora in a Comparative and Theoretical Perspective, 
10 ISRAEL STUD. 36 (2005). 
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The Partition Resolution prescribed the creation of two states, each 
guaranteeing certain (new) standards of normative state behavior; however, 
the Partition Resolution was only partially carried out. The partition 
expectation requires each community to create a constituent assembly of 
each “state” for the purpose of drafting “a democratic constitution for its 
state.”95 Such a drafting would be guided by an international mandate 
“guaranteeing all persons equal and nondiscriminatory rights in civil, 
political, economic, and religious matters, and the enjoyment of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of religion, 
language, speech, and publication, education, assembly, and association.”96 
Israel unilaterally declared itself a sovereign state in 1948 without 
having drafted or adopted a constitution consistent with the expectations of 
Resolution 181 and therefore becoming officially a Jewish state with no 
constitution.97 Although there was a Declaration of the Establishment of the 
State of Israel, which announced that the new state “will ensure complete 
equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of 
religion, race, or sex,”98 this declaration was not passed by the Knesset and 
therefore has no legal efficacy within Israel.99 In short, one state was created 
– although it failed to adhere to the prescribed state behavior required by the 
Partition Resolution – and one state failed to be born. 
Armed conflict broke out between the newly-born Jewish state and 
surrounding Arab states. To the historians of Israel, the resulting conflict 
became the War of Independence.100 To the Palestinians’ historians, these 
events were catastrophic and the “Nakba Day,” or the displacement that 
accompanied the creation of the State of Israel, symbolized them.101 The 
                                                          
  95 G.A. Res. 181 (II), supra note 4, Part 1(B)(10). 
  96 Id. 
  97 Justice Dalia Dorner, Does Israel Have a Constitution?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1325, 
1325-26 (1999). See generally DAFNAH SHARFMAN, LIVING WITHOUT A CONSTITUTION: 
CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL (1993) (Tracing the historical evolution of civil rights in Israel as a 
consequence of the lack of a constitution and demonstrates the connection between the 
collective of the Zionist founding fathers and the relative lack of Israeli consensus sensitive to 
the issue of civil rights; describing the reluctance of Israeli politicians to give up power and 
authority for the abstract notion of civil rights and accounts for the unique role of religion in 
Israeli public life.). 
  98 Declaration of the Establishment of Israel, supra note 19. 
  99 See generally Ruth Gavison, Legislatures and the Quest for a Constitution: The Case of 
Israel, 11 REV. CONST. STUD. 345 (2006). 
  100 See generally CHAIM HERZOG & SHLOMO GAZIT, THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS: WAR 
AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM THE 1948 WAR OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE PRESENT 
(2005). 
  101 See also DAVID W. LESCH & BENJAMIN FRANKEL, HISTORY IN DISPUTE: THE MIDDLE 
EAST SINCE 1945, at 102 (2004) (“The Palestinian recalled their “Nakba Day”, their 
“catastrophe” — the displacement that accompanied the creation of the State of Israel — in 
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official Israeli state view is that the Arab initiation of conflict was, in effect, 
a violation of international law; however, Israeli armed forces repelled Arab 
attacks and occupied territories beyond the partition line.102 The question 
that emerged is whether or not, since official Israel state historical narratives 
tend to view Israelis as victims, and since Israel was somewhat victorious, 
there was a feeling that such victims were entitled to the territorial ground 
gains from the conflict.103 Unfortunately for Israel, modern international law 
is not as generous regarding the acquisition of territory through the use of 
force.104 Thus, there was – and remains – a concern about the extension of 
Israeli sovereignty beyond its lawfully declared partition borders.105  
These new borders were somewhat stabilized by the Armistice 
Agreements – a set of agreements signed during 1949 between Israel and 
neighbor Arab States, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, to put an 
end to the official hostilities of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and to establish 
Armistice Demarcation Lines, also known as the Green Line, between Israeli 
forces and the forces in the West Bank held by Jordan.106 The U.S. 
                                                          
1948.”). See generally AHMAD H. SA’DI & LILA ABU-LUGHOD, NAKBA: PALESTINE, 1948, 
AND THE CLAIMS OF MEMORY 5-9 (2007) (“The Nakba is often reckoned as the beginning of 
contemporary Palestinian history, a history of catastrophic changes, violent suppression and 
refusal to disappear.”); Ronit Lentin, The Contested Memory of Dispossession: 
Commemorizing the Palestinian Nakba in Israel, in THINKING PALESTINE 206 (2008). 
  102 Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and 
Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L. REV. 286, 286 (1968) (The Arab States’ reliance on Chapter VIII of the 
U.N. Charter to justify their armed intervention in Palestine was shown by the United States 
delegate to be devoid of any legal merit. Senator Austin stated that: 
“[t]heir statements are the best evidence we have of the international character of their 
aggression… They tell us quite frankly that their business is political… Of course, the 
statement that they are there to make peace is rather remarkable in view of the fact that they 
are waging war. We find that this is characterized on the part of King Abdullah by a certain 
contumacy towards the United Nations and the Security Council. He has sent us an answer to 
our questions addressed to him as a ruler who is occupying land outside his domain by the 
Security Council, a body which is recognized in the world to ask these questions of him… The 
contumacy of that reply to the Security Council is the very best evidence of the illegal purpose 
of his government in invading Palestine with armed forces and conducting the war which it is 
waging there. It is against the peace. It is not on behalf of peace. It is an invasion with a 
definite purpose… Therefore, here we have the highest type of international violation of the 
law. The admission by those who are committing this violation.”). 
  103 Daniel Bar-Tal, Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict, 9 INT’L J. CONFLICT 
MGMT. 22,  29 (1998). 
  104 See generally HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 
(2007) (providing an analysis to the study of human rights within its wider social and cultural 
context by presenting a diverse range of carefully edited primary and secondary materials 
alongside extensive text, editorial commentary and study questions). 
  105 See generally JOE CLEARY, LITERATURE, PARTITION AND THE NATION-STATE (2002). 
  106 See U.N. Doc. S/1353 (July 20, 1949); U.N. Doc. S/1302/Rev.1 (Apr. 3, 1949); U.N. 
Doc. S/1296 (Mar. 23, 1949); U.N. Doc. S/1264/Corr.1 (Feb, 23, 1949). See generally Louis 
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delegation to the UN was instructed to support Israel’s request to keep the 
Negev, which is a desert and semidesert region of southern Israel.107 The 
U.S. considered that, as a matter of practical reality, the Israeli borders were 
now a non-issue. 
After 1948, there was the Suez invasion of 1956, the Six-Day War of 
1967, the October War of 1973, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the 
most recent War in Lebanon in 2006, and “Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza 
during the winter of 2008-2009.108 On May 28, 1964, in response to the 
emerging conflicts, the first Palestinian National Council (“PNC”) convened 
in Jerusalem with 422 representatives. At the conclusion of this meeting, on 
June 2, 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) was founded 
with a Statement of Proclamation of the Organization and the adoption of a 
Palestinian National Covenant.109 Their Statement of Proclamation of the 
Organization declared: 
. . . the right of the Palestinian Arab people to its sacred 
homeland Palestine and affirming the inevitability of the battle 
to liberate the usurped part from it, and its determination to bring 
out its effective revolutionary entity and the mobilization of the 
capabilities and potentialities and its material, military and 
spiritual forces.110 
The original 1964 PLO Charter stated in short that, “Palestine with its 
boundaries that existed at the time of the British mandate is an integral 
                                                          
Rene Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, Palestine, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 71, 90 (1992); Howard S. Levie, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice 
Agreement, 50 AM. J. INT’L L. 880 (1956). 
  107 See generally STEVEN L. SPIEGEL, THE OTHER ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: MAKING 
AMERICA’S MIDDLE EAST POLICY, FROM TRUMAN TO REAGAN (1986) (discussing the 
controversial course of U.S.-Middle East relations, challenging the belief that U.S. policy in 
the Middle East is primarily a relation to events in the region, motivated by bureaucratic 
constraints or the pressures of domestic politics). 
  108 Rulers of Palestine, supra note 19 (Some historians including the Israeli historian Ilan 
Pappe hold that the war was more than simply a matter of Israeli independence; some note that 
a specific strategy existed to drive out the indigenous Palestinian population, seize the land, 
and create the conditions for a Jewish majority state.); see ILAN PAPPE, A HISTORY OF 
MODERN PALESTINE: ONE LAND, TWO PEOPLES (2003); ILAN PAPPE, BRITAIN AND THE 
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: 1948-51 (1988); ILAN PAPPE, THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF 
PALESTINE (2006); ILAN PAPPE, THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST (2005). 
  109 Moshe Shemesh, The founding of the PLO 1964, 20 MIDDLE E. STUD. 105, 123 (1984); 
see also MOSHE SHEMESH, ARAB POLITICS, PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM AND THE SIX DAY 
WAR (2008); David Th. Schiller, A Battlegroup Divided: The Palestinian Fedayeen, 10 J. 
STRATEGIC STUD. 90 (1987). 
  110 Statement of Proclamation of the Organization, PALESTINE LIBERATION 
ORGANIZATION (May 28, 1964), available at 
www.crethiplethi.com/download/Palestine_national_charter_1964.pdf. 
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regional unit,” and sought to “prohibit . . . the existence and activity” of 
Zionism.111 Although the original Covenant did not expressly mention 
“statehood,” it called for a right of return and self-determination for 
Palestinians. In 1968, the Covenant was amended to stipulate more clearly 
the Palestinians’ intentions that (1) Israel be removed from its role as the de 
facto occupying power in the West Bank and Gaza; (2) that a Palestinian 
self-governing entity be established in the West Bank and Gaza; and (3) that 
the state of Israel be dismantled.112 Later, in 1974, the PLO adopted a 
program that clarified the intention to declare an independent state in the 
territory of the Palestinian Mandate.113 That program, in the search for other 
strategies to advance its interests, sought to secure maximum diplomatic 
recognition,114 stressing that the foundations of Palestinian claims to 
statehood were founded on the principle of self-determination; there was 
substantial international commitment to this goal at the time.115  
The PLO also secured recognition of its role as representative of the 
Palestinian people in their quest for self-determination116 by gaining 
recognition from the Arab League and the majority of UN Members.117 In 
short, this process resulted in more than 122 states recognizing the PLO and 
                                                          
  111 The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council: 
Articles 2 and 23, PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (signed May 28, 1964 and 
amended July 1-17, 1968), available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/The+Palestinian+N
ational+Charter.htm (“Article 2: Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British 
Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.” “Article 23: The demand of security and peace, as 
well as the demand of right and justice, require all states to consider Zionism an illegitimate 
movement, to outlaw its existence, and to ban its operations, in order that friendly relations 
among peoples may be preserved, and the loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands 
safeguarded”); see also Freedom for Palestine, Palestine Liberation Organization (Mar. 5, 
2011), available at http://www.palfreedom.ps/?page=details&newsID=8&cat=12. 
  112 See generally discussion id.; YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI, THE PALESTINIAN COVENANT 
AND ITS MEANING (1979). 
  113 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 12th Palestinian National Council Political 
Programme, June 9, 1974, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since
%201947/1974-
1977/3%2012th%20Palestinian%20National%20Council%20Political%20Prog. 
  114 See generally ARYEH YODFAT & YUVAL ARNON-OHANNA, P.L.O. STRATEGY AND 
TACTICS (1981). 
  115 Vereté, supra note 13, at 55-56. 
  116 MADIHA RASHID AL MADFAI, JORDAN, THE U.S. AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE 
PROCESS, 1974-1991, at 21 (1993) (“On 28 October 1974, the seventh Arab summit 
conference held in Rabat designated the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people and reaffirmed their right to establish an independent state of urgency.”). 
  117 Sanford R. Silverburg, The Palestine Liberation Organization in the U.N.: Implications 
for International Law and Relations, 12 ISR. L. REV. 365, 367 (1977). 
NAGAN - MACRO(FINAL) JCI (1).docx (DO NOT DELETE) 10/25/2012  2:15 PM 
2012] Palestinian Statehood 365 
over sixty states providing it with full diplomatic status.118 Additionally, 
fifty states recognized the PLO but had not authorized the establishment of 
PLO embassies, although some permit PLO offices to function under the 
name of the Arab League.119 These developments did not indicate the 
existence of a Palestinian state or government in exile, but instead focused 
on the PLO as the sole representative of Palestinian self-determination 
rights.120 
As early as 1969, the UNGA began adopting Resolutions that 
recognized the Palestinian right to self-determination as well as the 
recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.121 The 
PLO secured an invitation to participate in UN deliberations and conferences 
organized under the authority of the UNGA as well as the United Nations 
Security Council (“UNSC”).122 The PLO has thus far had observer status at 
the UN123 Israel, however, has resisted the idea of “creeping” – increment 
steps toward international recognition with multilateral and bilateral degrees 
of diplomatic recognition124 – recognition of Palestinian institutions because 
they suggest a “creeping” validation of their claims.125 
                                                          
  118 Recognizing the Palestinian State on the 1967 border & Admission of Palestine as a 
Full Member of the U.N., P.L.O. NEGOTIATIONS OFFICE (2011) (up to this moment 122 UN 
Member States recognized Palestine). 
  119 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (structure), KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG 
(2010); see also James Crawford, Israel (1948-1949) and Palestine (1998-1999) Two Studies 
in the Creation of States, in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
IAN BROWNLIE 95, 95–100, 110–15 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gilland & Stefan Talmon eds., 1998) 
(“Declaration [of the PLO] was quite widely recognized by states, although often in equivocal 
terms . . . It is of interest to note that most States that have recognized the ‘State of Palestine’ 
after its proclamation on 15 Nov. 1988 have elevated the PLO office in their country to the 
status of embassy.”). 
  120 See also Antonio Cassese, The Israel-PLO Agreement and Self-Determination, 4 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 564, 570 (1993); Santiago González Vallejo, Recognition of the State of Palestine 
and the hypocrisy, ARAB CAUSE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE (2011), 
http://www.nodo50.org/csca/agenda11/palestina/arti42.html. See generally STEPHEN D. 
KRASNER, PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 
(2001) (Attempts to answer some of the most pressing issues in the contemporary international 
order, which revolve around the frequently invoked but highly contested concept of 
sovereignty. To answer those and multiple other questions the book takes into account the 
numerous and sometimes contradictory components of the concept of sovereignty and provide 
a case law to illustrate how the disaggregation of sovereignty has enabled political actors to 
create entities that are semiautonomous, semi-independent, and/or semi-legal in order to solve 
specific problems stemming from competing claims to authority.). 
  121 Vereté, supra note 13, at 55-56. 
  122 G.A. Res. 3375 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/2399 (Nov. 10, 1975). 
  123 G.A. Res. 3237 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/2296 (Nov. 22, 1974). 
  124 By “creeping” we mean incremental steps toward international recognition with 
multilateral and bilateral degrees of diplomatic recognition. See Wasim I. Al-Habil, 
Occupations, a Diaspora, and the Design of Local Governments for a Palestinian State (July 
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Two of the critical UNSC decisions concerning the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict are Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967,126 and Resolution 338 of 
October 22, 1973.127 Pursuant to Resolution 242, there is the recognition of 
the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to 
work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in 
the area can live in security.”128 Thus, the Resolution stipulates that a form 
of “creeping” annexation of the West Bank and Gaza is effectually a 
violation of Resolution 242 and general international law. The Resolution 
also stipulates that the Charter require a “just peace,” which includes some 
of the following principles: (1) that the Israeli armed forces withdraw from 
occupied territories; (2) an end to the claim of belligerency; and (3) a respect 
for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all 
states in the area.129 The Resolution also stipulates, for example, that 
freedom of navigation in international waters be respected and refers to a 
just settlement of the refugee problem.130 In Resolution 338, the Security 
Council called upon all relevant parties to implement UNSC Resolution 242 
after a cease-fire.131 These Resolutions imply that the right to self-
                                                          
1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Al-Aqsa University), available at 
http://etd.ohiolink.edu/view.cgi?acc_num=csu1226688053. 
  125 Denis J. Sullivan, NGOs in Palestine: Agents of Development and Foundation of Civil 
Society, 25(3) J. PALESTINE STUD. 93, 93-100 (1996). 
  126 S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967) (Termination of all claims or 
states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of every State in the area. Calls on Israel’s neighbors to 
end the state of belligerency and calls upon Israel to reciprocate by withdraw its forces from 
land claimed by other parties in 1967 war. Interpreted commonly today as calling for the Land 
for peace principle as a way to resolve Arab-Israeli conflict.). 
  127 S.C. Res. 338, U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (Oct. 22, 1973) (“‘calls’ for a cease fire” in Yom 
Kippur War and “the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its 
parts”, and “decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall 
start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and 
durable peace in the Middle East”). 
  128 See S.C. Res. 242, supra note 126 (The third line of the Preamble states the following: 
“Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work 
for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security…”). 
  129 See id. Article (1) and (2). 
  130 Id. at 2(a)(b)(c) (affirming further the necessity (a) for guaranteeing freedom of 
navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) for achieving a just settlement of 
the refugee problem; and (c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political 
independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of 
demilitarized zones). 
  131 S.C. Res. 338, supra note 127 (“Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all 
firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment 
of the adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption of this 
decision, in the positions they now occupy; Calls upon all parties concerned to start 
immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) 
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determination implicates rights that accrue, at a minimum, to a de facto state 
regarding claims to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence—all 
of which necessarily call for an end to Israeli occupation.132 
 
D. U.S. Influence and Role in the Conflict 
The U.S, which has been a strong supporter of Israel,133 has been 
reluctant to recognize Palestinian identity in the international arena.134 The 
Sinai Agreement of September 4, 1975, bespeaks this position.135 In this 
Agreement, the U.S. pledged not to negotiate with the PLO or to recognize it 
so long as it refused to recognize the right of Israel to exist and so long as 
the PLO refused to accept Resolutions 242 and 338.136 Additionally, the U.S. 
Congress added a further element to the U.S. commitment – namely, that the 
PLO must renounce terrorism.137 In short, the U.S. position has been that, 
once the PLO publicly accepted these Resolutions, recognized Israel as a 
sovereign state, was prepared to negotiate peace with Israel, and renounced 
terrorism, the U.S. would have a certain degree of negotiating flexibility 
with the PLO. 
It should be noted that the U.S. has also refused to recognize Palestinian 
claims to self-determination because it would lead to the creation of a 
separate state, which the U.S. has historically opposed. In November 1998, 
the PLO issued a declaration of independence proclaiming “the 
establishment of the state of Palestine, in the land of Palestine, with its 
capital in Jerusalem.”138 The Palestinian communiqué implicitly recognized 
Israel’s right to exist.139 Later, President Yasser Arafat, representing the 
PLO, explicitly accepted Israel’s right to exist, accepted UN Resolutions 242 
                                                          
in all of its parts; Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations 
start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and 
durable peace in the Middle East.”). 
  132 Winston Nagan & Aitza Haddad, Sovereignty in Theory and Practice, 13 SAN DIEGO 
INT’L L.J. 429 (2012). 
  133 CAROL MIGDALOVITZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ISRAEL: BACKGROUND AND 
RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. 24 (2009). 
  134 JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE PALESTINIANS: BACKGROUND AND U.S. 
RELATIONS 3-4 (2010). 
  135 Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt, Sept. 4, 1975, available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/egypt_interim_eng.htm. 
  136 MARK CLYDE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PALESTINIANS AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE: 
ISSUES FOR THE UNITED STATES 3 (2002), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/Mideast/IB92052.pdf. 
  137 Id. 
  138 Palestinian National Council Declaration of Independence, 27 I.L.M 161 (Nov. 14, 
1988). 
  139 Id. 
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and 338, and renounced all forms of terrorism.140 In the meantime, as 
Palestinians sought recognition before the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) and the World Health 
Organization (“WHO”), President George H. W. Bush declared that any UN 
agency recognizing the PLO would face a threat of a cut-off in U.S. 
funding.141 
The 1993 Oslo Accords initially generated promising signals that a 
peaceful settlement was achievable. The principal understanding that 
emerged from this process was the creation of a Palestinian National 
Authority (“PA”), which would administer the territory under its control, 
and the withdrawal of Israeli defense forces from the West Bank and parts of 
Gaza Strip.142 This arrangement was envisioned to last for five years, with 
the understanding that further negotiations would cover the issues of 
Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security, and borders. As different political 
forces began to emerge within Israel and as its politics veered toward ultra 
nationalism, these final status issues never became matters for conclusive 
decision. 
The not-quite-obvious subtext of Oslo was the concession that a PA 
without an ostensible claim to sovereignty would, in effect, concede that the 
1988 declaration of Palestinian independence was premature.143 On the other 
hand, the PA’s future would be tied to a final status settlement agreement. 
Having structured the legal expectations in terms of Israel and the PA, the 
Oslo Accords ultimately provided Israeli negotiators a practical veto over 
Palestinian claims to self-determination, independence, and sovereignty. 
Therefore, so long as Israel was reluctant to settle these issues, there could 
be no final settlement and no hope of an independent state. It thus became 
apparent to the Palestinians that the new governing authorities in Israel, led 
by ultranationalist Prime Minister Netanyahu, were not committed to 
advancing the peace process because they opposed the creation of a 
Palestinian state.144 
We now turn to the U.S. role in the question of a possible recognition of 
an independent sovereign status for the Palestinian people and the current 
impediments. The status of Palestine draws sustenance from recent 
developments in international law; it is also influenced by its rather unique 
                                                          
  140 BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 450 (1991). 
  141 Id. 
  142 NATHAN J. BROWN, PALESTINIAN POLITICS AFTER THE OSLO ACCORDS: RESUMING 
ARAB PALESTINE 12-13 (2003); see also JOHN G. HALL, THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL 
AUTHORITY (CREATION OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST) 96 (2d ed. 2008). 
  143 James L. Prince, The International Legal Implications of the November 1988 
Palestinian Declaration of Statehood, 25 STAN. J. INT’L L. 681 (1988-1989). 
  144 Ira Chernus, Israel and the Palestinians through the looking glass, CBS NEWS (May 
27, 2011), www.cbsnews.com/2100-215_162-20066760.html. 
NAGAN - MACRO(FINAL) JCI (1).docx (DO NOT DELETE) 10/25/2012  2:15 PM 
2012] Palestinian Statehood 369 
history as a Class A Mandate under the League of Nations. The evidence of 
practice under the League demonstrates that Palestine was not subject to an 
alien sovereignty; it was considered a state on a pathway to independence. 
We explored these issues earlier by first setting out the basic law as it 
currently clarifies the definition of statehood and the process of recognition. 
The definition of a state at international law it is still influenced by Article I 
of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.145 In this 
view, and as already discussed, a state is a territorially defined or definable 
entity, which engages, or has the competence to engage, in formal and 
diplomatic relations with other states and entities in the international 
environment, with a relatively stable population; that is, a population and 
territory under the control of its own government.146 An aspect implicit in 
the criteria of statehood is that the entity should make outward claims that it 
is, indeed, a state. 
 
E. The League of Nations Mandate and the Process for 
Palestinian Statehood 
We now come to the clarification and application of international law 
criteria relating to statehood and recognition. The criteria of statehood have 
special effects and implications for different aspects of recognition. These 
are complex matters in international law. This complexity has been 
compounded since WWII, when, under the UN Charter, statehood and 
recognition became tied to a broader framework of issues and values.147 
Among these issues is the question of an entry into the International 
Constitutional System,148 as well as any exclusion from it. This issue is tied 
to the emergence of self-determination as a peremptory norm of 
international law149 and the strength accorded to traditional principles of uti 
                                                          
  145 Montevideo Convention, supra note 79. See generally Crawford, supra note 70; Grant, 
supra note 84. 
  146 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 201 (1987). 
  147 See generally Crawford, supra note 70. 
  148 Marc Weller, The reality of the emerging universal constitutional order: Putting the 
pieces of the puzzle together, 10 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 40, 47 (1997); see also Susan C. 
Breau, The Constitutionalization of the International Legal Order, 2008 LEIDEN J. INT’L L., 
545, 548, 557 (2008) (“In spite of this minor point these norms certainly seem to be essential 
elements of the international legal order and thus values of an emerging constitution. It must 
represent the first element of the international constitution: that these norms are values that are 
considered binding on the international community as a whole.”). 
  149 Ediberto Roman, Reconstructing Self-Determination: The Role of Critical Theory in the 
Positivist International Law Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 943, 943 (1998); see also 
UNESCO, Rep. of the Int’l Conference of Experts held in Barcelona, The Implementation of 
the Right to Self-Determination as a Contribution to Conflict Prevention, Nov. 21-27, 1998 
(Michael C. van Walt van Praag & Onno Seroo eds. 2008). See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, 
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possidetis, a Latin term which means “as you posses” and which generally 
discourages secession from a sovereign state.150 
The criterion of statehood that requires a definable body politic has 
been more generally referred to as a permanent population.151 There is a 
permanent Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza.152 However, 
the population issue in Palestine has been contentious since the initiation of 
the Class A Mandate. The mandate recognized a population of Palestinians 
under Article 22 of the League Mandate.153 This recognition was influenced 
by the Mandate’s purpose: to secure the population’s right to self-
determination.154 However, Britain, as the mandatory power, prior to 
assuming mandate responsibilities, had announced a policy for Palestine to 
                                                          
SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1997); John W. Meyer et al., 
World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144 (1997); Alain Pellet, The Opinions of 
the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 178 (1992); Gerry Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination 
in the Post-Colonial Age, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255 (1996). 
  150 See also  J.D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
9, 34-35 (1991). See generally SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN A 
CONFLICTED WORLD: THE ROLE OF UTI POSSIDETIS (2002) (Examining the origins of the uti 
possidetis principle, its evolution and colonial roots as well as more recent applications, to 
determine whether it merits the overriding importance now attributed to it; this expression is a 
principle in international law that establishes that territory and other property remains with its 
possessor at the end of a conflict, unless otherwise provided for by treaty and if such a treaty 
does not include conditions regarding the possession of property and territory taken during the 
war the principle of uti possidetis will prevail -- in short, this principle enables a belligerent 
party to claim territory that it has been acquired by war). 
  151 See generally Crawford, supra note 70. 
  152 See also Sulayman S. Al-Qudsi, Profiles of Refugee and Non-Refugee Palestinians 
from the West Bank and Gaza, 38 Int’l MIGRATION 79, 79-80 (2000); Nadim N. Rouhana & 
Daniel Bar-Tal, Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Ethnonational Conflicts: The Israeli–
Palestinian Case, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 761, 762 n. 1 (1998) (“At the end of 1996, Israel’s 
citizens numbered 5,759,400, 80% of whom were Jewish; the rest were mainly Arabs (Israel, 
Central Bureau of Statistics, 1997). The Arab citizens in Israel mostly call themselves 
“Palestinians in Israel” (Rouhana, 1997). The Palestinian population in the West Bank 
(including East Jerusalem) and Gaza is estimated at 2,390,000 (Zureik, 1996)”); Kavitha 
Giridhar, Legal Status of Palestine, DRAKE UNDERGRADUATE SOC. SCI. J. (2006), available at 
http://escholarshare.drake.edu/bitstream/handle/2092/379/giridhar.pdf?sequence=1. See 
generally Gwyn Rowley, Palestinian refugees: empirical and qualitative considerations, 27 
GEOJOURNAL 217, 218 (1992); Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid & Michael L. Wise, The 
Million Person Gap: The Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza, BEGIN-SADAT CENTER 
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 9 (2006). 
  153 Francis A. Boyle, The Creation of the State of Palestine, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301, 301 
(1990). 
  154 Quigley, Palestine’s Declaration of Independence, supra note 32, at 9. 
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secure a homeland in Eretz Israel for the Jewish people in the Jewish 
Diaspora.155 This was expressed in the Balfour Declaration.156 
Foreign Secretary Balfour, in confidential correspondence, expressed 
the view to the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, that the major purpose 
of Article 22, namely self-determination for Palestinian inhabitants, could 
not be implemented because of the political undertaking to promote a Jewish 
homeland in Palestinian territory.157 As it turned out, Britain was never able 
to emerge with a successful solution to this problem and passed the matter 
on to the UNGA158 Article 22, which juridically established a right of self-
determination for the Palestinians then, was left unimplemented.159 The 
critical question is how much of this right has survived to strengthen the 
claim to statehood under international law for the people of Palestine. 
One factor that has influenced the development of extreme 
ultranationalist perspectives is the claim that the Palestinians are not 
“people” for the purpose of the population requirement of statehood.160 
Careful research, however, demonstrates a continuity of Palestinian national 
identity.161 Ultra-conservative nationalist factions in political power and 
                                                          
  155 Nils Butenschon, Accommodating Conflicting Claims to National Self-Determination, 
the Intractable Case of Israel/Palestine, 13 INT’L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 285, 295 
(2006). 
  156 See generally Zeitlin, supra note 21. 
  157 QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 75. See generally JEAN 
ALLAIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CLOSER TO POWER THAN JUSTICE 
(2004) (examining international law through the lens of the Middle East and demonstrating the 
qualitatively different manner in which international law is applied in this region of the world 
because law, although it is intended to produce a just society, is ultimately a social construct 
that has travelled through a political process and cannot be divorced from its relationship to 
power). 
  158 See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 325. See generally Eugene V. Rostow, 
Palestinian Self-Determination: Possible Futures for the Unallocated Territories of the 
Palestine Mandate, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 147 (1978). 
  159 See generally Boyle, supra note 153. 
  160 See also In the Reference RE Secession of Quebec Case, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) 
(the Court in § I, ¶¶ 123, 124 & 125, explores and clarifies the problem of defining peoples in 
international law.  The Court further clarifies the notion of colonial or oppressed people in § 
III, ¶¶ 131, 133-37.); AVI SHLAIM, THE IRON WALL, 311 (2001) (“It is not as though there 
were a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came 
and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist.” - former 
Israeli prime minister Golda Meir”). See generally Committee on the Exercise of the 
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, The International Status of the Palestinian People 
(Jan. 1, 1980), available at 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/548E6E5758E89588852575A0004F1054.); generally 
I.M. Kane, Palestinians are not the Indigenous People of Palestine, MILLSTONE DIARIES 
(Aug. 8, 2011). 
  161 See generally RASHID KHALIDI, PALESTINIAN IDENTITY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
MODERN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS (2009) (Suggesting that the best way to approach the 
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leadership of the current Israeli state have promoted the argument that 
Palestinians are “simply Arabs” and therefore indistinguishable from other 
Arab peoples in surrounding states.162 Some Arab nationalists in fact 
supported this view in the early efforts to create a Pan-Arab Union.163 
However, the strength of nation-state national identity proved too strong for 
this innovation.164 What makes a final settlement complex is that there are 
now some 6.3 million (absentee) Palestinians whose citizenship rights were 
abrogated by internal Israeli legislative and administrative measures.165 Still, 
we can conclude that, at a minimum, there is at least a minimum Palestinian 
population inside the territories occupied by Israel to qualify as a permanent 
population.166 We therefore submit that Palestinians do comprise a national 
body politic, with a strong, defined national identity—and one that is 
historically continuous, particularly during the period of the League 
Mandate as well as under the UN Charter framework. 
We now come to the next important criterion of statehood: the body 
politic must be territorially determined or determinable.167 In general, we 
would suggest that boundaries indicated in relevant UNSC Resolutions 
established conditions that are determined or determinable.168 Factors exist 
in this context, which suggest that Israel, a key negotiator, may have broader 
territorial ambitions, and this may emerge at the expense of Palestinian 
statehood.169 One pressing issue is the dynamism of territories and the 
requirement under the traditional Montevideo state qualifications170 that, if 
                                                          
current Palestine-Israel conflict is by devising a way to reverse the powerful current dynamic 
in Palestine; predicting that the situation will become more and more untenable and more 
violently unstable as time goes on -- the author considers the future, expressing cautious 
optimism toward Israel’s recognition of a Palestinian political entity yet wondering whether 
such acknowledgement will lead to Palestinian statehood and independence.). 
  162 Talia Einhorn, The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Law Reform Perspective, 3 EUR. 
J.L. REFORM 149, 153 (2001). 
  163 C. Ernest Dawn, The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years, 20 INT’L 
J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 67, 81 (1988). 
  164 See generally KHALIDI, supra note 161. 
  165 Stephen Lendman, Israel’s Proposed Counterterrorism Law, PEOPLE’S VOICE (Sept. 3, 
2011), http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/ 
Voices.php/2011/09/03/israel-s-proposed-counterterrorism-law. 
  166 Zimmerman, et al., supra note 152, at 3. 
  167 Crawford, supra note 70; see also Lloyd, supra note 73; J.D. Van der Vyver, Statehood 
in International Law, 5 EMORY INT’L REV. 9 (1991). 
  168 See sources cited supra note 167. 
  169 See generally DANIEL J. CASTELLANO, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI 
CONFLICT (2007). 
  170 Montevideo Convention, supra note 79. 
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there is to be a Palestinian state, this state must have agreed-upon boundaries 
which provide a viable territorial base for a state.171 
The apparently interminable negotiations also form a basis by which 
Israel can change the facts regarding the appropriate reach of territory that 
may fall within any settlement. One of the ways that the territorial question 
can be effectually predetermined prior to negotiation is by a continuation 
and expansion of the Israeli settlement program. Politically, the expansion of 
settlements is a cornerstone of an ultranationalist program and policy 
advocated by extreme right-wing conservative factions, which currently 
constitute the governing majority of the Knesset in Israel.172 This policy 
goes hand in glove with an ultraconservative propaganda campaign which 
insists that only the Israelis make concessions and that the Palestinians “take 
and take.”173 It is worth remembering that the Oslo Accords, in which 
Foreign Minister Peres was a key player, involved President Yasser Arafat 
giving up on the 1947 UN boundaries to accept the territorial boundaries as 
defined in 1967.174 In so doing, Arafat gave up twenty-two percent of the 
Historic Palestine and Israel enlarged its territory by fifty-six percent to 
annex seventy-eight percent of the territorial landmass of Historic 
Palestine.175 
The Obama Administration had insisted that there be a freeze on 
settlement building projects on Palestinian land.176 Prime Minister 
Netanyahu agreed to a ten-month freeze in order to encourage the initiation 
of talks.177 However, the Israeli media maintains that, during these ten 
months, construction continued at the same pace as in the previous ten 
                                                          
  171 See generally Justus Reid Weiner & Diane Morrison, Legal Implications of Safe 
Passage Reconciling a Viable Palestinian State with Israel’s Security Requirements, 22 CONN. 
J. INT’L L. 233 (2007). 
  172 See generally NUR MASALHA, IMPERIAL ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS: THE 
POLITICS OF EXPANSION (2000). 
  173 Allan C. Brownfeld, Finally, Israel’s Settlements Policy, Turn Toward Extremism 
Making Impact on Jewish Opinion, WASHINGTON REP. (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.wrmea.com/component/content/article/364-2011-march/10322-israel-and-judaism-
finally-israels-settlements-policy-turn-toward-extremism-making-impact-on-jewish-opinion-
.html. 
  174 Henry Siegman, Netanyahu’s Freeze Scam, HUFF. POST (Oct. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/henry-siegman/netanyahus-freeze-scam_b_747292.html. 
  175 MJ Rosenberg, Remember these Digits: 78-22, COMMON GROUND NEWS SERVICES 
(Apr. 17, 2008), http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=22974&lan=en&sp=0. 
  176 Elise Labott, Obama Drops Demand that Israel Freeze Settlements, CNN STATE (Sept. 
22, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-22/politics/us.mideast_1_palestinian-president-
mahmoud-abbas-settlement-freeze-netanyahu?_s=PM:POLITICS. 
  177 Barak Ravid & Agencies, Netanyahu Declares 10-Month Settlement freeze to Restart 
Peace Talks, HAARETZ (Nov. 25 2009), http://www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-declares-10-
month-settlement-freeze-to-restart-peace-talks-1.3435. 
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months.178 The Obama Administration has pressed Netanyahu to give 
another two months for the freeze.179 The U.S. administration has, thus far 
then, had no influence on Netanyahu’s current settlement policies. 
Moreover, pressure on the White House by the ultraconservative Israeli 
nationalist and expansionist lobby in Washington, D.C. has weakened the 
U.S. administration’s position.180 
The question is, therefore, why is Netanyahu reluctant to stop the 
settlement expansion? The longer it continues, the more intractable the 
foundation of a viable peace becomes. In fact, the settlement strategy may be 
meant to be a deal breaker. Why would Netanyahu indicate to U.S. 
diplomats that he is in support of a settlement to the conflict, while his 
domestic political activities and policies all point to a political strategy 
designed to continue the conflict indefinitely with no final conclusion, 
except one that is created on the ground? The settlements are in fact creating 
the technical infrastructure which would restrict bilateral and multilateral 
capacity for negotiating the political boundaries, making it nearly impossible 
for future Israeli authorities to uproot the settlements and rewrite the 
territorial map. Netanyahu has further refused to give any assurance about 
the settlement freeze.181 
Netanyahu rules with a complex coalition of ultranationalist interests. 
Indeed, Netanyahu himself is deeply committed, politically as well as 
intellectually, to two pillars of ultranationalist idealism. The first principle 
posits that the only legitimate boundaries of the state of Israel are not 
defined by international law, but by the history and antiquity of Jewish 
culture.182 Balfour also stressed this point; the historical boundaries of Israel, 
therefore, include Ancient Sumeria and Judea.183 In short, the only 
                                                          
  178 Ethan Bronner, Despite Settlement Freeze, Buildings Rise, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/world/middleeast/15settlements.html. 
  179 Barak Ravid, Obama in Personal Appeal to Netanyahu: Extend Settlement Freeze for 
Two Months, HAARETZ (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
defense/obama-in-personal-appeal-to-netanyahu-extend-settlement-freeze-for-two-months-
1.316450. 
  180 Jim Lobe, Politics Throws Palestine Under the Bus, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Sept. 24, 
2011); see also Thomas McAdams Deford, Mac Deford: Obama (and US strategic interests) 
vs. the Israel lobby, THE FREE PRESS (Sept. 21, 2011) 
  181 Al Aribiya with Agencies, Netanyahu Freezes Settlement, Tells Officials to Stay Mum 
on Iran Ahead of U.S. Trip, AL ARIBIYA (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/24/196721.html. 
  182 Huma Khan, In Oval Office, Bibi Offers History Lessons to Obama, ABC NEWS (May 
20, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/05/in-oval-office-bibi-offers-history-
lessons-to-obama. 
  183 See George Berkin, Return Israel to Pre-1967 Borders? How about Returning U.S. to 
1844 (or 1802 or 1861) Borders?, NJ VOICES THE STAR-LEDGER (May 25, 2011), 
http://blog.nj.com/njv_george_berkin/2011/05/return_israel_to_pre-1967_bord.html. 
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boundaries acceptable to Netanyahu, according to this philosophical 
approach, are the boundaries of Eretz Israel (a greater Israel).184 In this 
conceptualization of Israel, there is no room for Palestinians. The boundaries 
of greater Israel direct us to the second principle of ultranationalist idealism: 
the idea that there will never be a Palestinian state.185 It has long been 
suggested by ultranationalist circles that the Palestinians are not a real 
national entity or people and thus, as the argument goes, the Palestinians 
may not claim, on the basis of national identity, that they are people 
qualified to carry the mantle of statehood.186 
We now come to the third criterion: the issue of governance.187 This 
issue is somewhat more problematic because the PA was created as an 
interim entity and not a permanent governing authority.188 The PA was 
established to serve as an interim governing entity for the Palestinian 
Territories under the Oslo Accords.189 The agreement left final status issues 
as matters to be negotiated between Israel and the PA.190 This implicitly left 
the PA with a certain measure of internal autonomy, and some measure of 
external competence, but the Oslo understandings suggest that final status 
includes Palestinian statehood.191 This understanding carries the assumption 
that the PA does not claim full sovereign independent status, since such 
status must be negotiated with Israel. 
To establish a promising claim for statehood, the Palestinians would 
have to repudiate any understanding that statehood is conditioned by an 
Israeli veto. The strategy of now seeking to secure the recognition of 
statehood must address this question. Yet more must be done to strengthen 
                                                          
  184 Nadav G. Shelef, From “Both Banks of the Jordan” to the “Whole Land of Israel”: 
Ideological Change in Revisionist Zionism, 9 ISR. STUD. 1, 125-48 (2004). 
  185 See generally Yossi Gurvitz, Netanyahu Says “No” to the Two-States Solution, +972 
MAGAZINE (May 21 2011). 
  186 Gingrich Describes Palestinian People as “Invented”, FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 10, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/12/10/gingrich-describes-palestinian-people-as-
invented/; see also I.M. Kane, Palestinians Are Not the Indigenous People of Palestine, THE 
MILLSTONE DIARIES (Aug. 8, 2011), http://imkane.wordpress.com/2011/08/08/palestinians-
are-not-the-indigenous-people-of-palestine/. 
  187 Montevideo Convention, supra note 79. See generally Jill Allison Weiner, Israel, 
Palestine, and the Oslo Accords, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 230 (1999-2000) 
  188 See also Lisa Hajjar, Law against Order: Human Rights Organizations and (versus) the 
Palestinian National Authority, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 59, 60 (2001-02). See generally BROWN, 
supra note 142. 
  189 Hajjar, supra note 188. 
  190 Id. 
  191 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (“Oslo 
Agreement”) (Sept. 13, 1993), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3de5e96e4.html (agreeing to commence negotiations on 
the permanent status of the disputed land in Gaza and Jericho). 
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the framework of governance by the PA, both internally and externally, to 
provide solid constitutional foundations for a future Palestinian State. Here, 
the Palestinians, by drafting a constitution and creating a government under 
that constitution, would unambiguously meet the third criteria of statehood. 
The PA does meet some of the criteria with regard to the capacity to enter 
into relations with other states; the PA has relations with other states that 
could qualify as meeting the minimum requirements of diplomacy. 
Additionally, the PA’s observer status at the UN192 and degree of 
participation in international organizations significantly enhances the claim 
that a future government has the capacity to enter into relations with other 
states and entities in the international environment. 
It would seem that the agreement to create the PA with a degree of 
internal autonomy goes a long way toward the requirement that there be a 
discernible form of governance with clear lines of authority.193 Yet it has 
been clearly understood that the PA was not really meant to be a governing 
body in an international sense.194 This means that the PLO and its allies must 
reconstitute the PA in the form of a recognizable government, with a 
working draft constitution, and with a framework of transparency, 
responsibility, and accountability. It would also be appropriate that such an 
organization draft a constitution that approximates international standards in 
order to show that the Palestinian governing authority is willing, ready, and 
able to meet its international responsibilities under the UN Charter. 
It could be argued that Resolution 181 at least implies the idea that 
international law supports the notion of “an Arab state” of Palestine as part 
of the Partition Plan.195 It could also be argued that the UNSC Resolutions 
recognizing the West Bank and Gaza as Palestinian territories is a de jure 
recognition that the boundaries of the Palestinian people are determinable 
and that the UNSC Resolutions provide the baseline for determining these 
boundaries. These resolutions form the foundation of the negotiations 
relating to the Oslo Accords, which essentially involved an acceptance by 
the parties of these boundaries. This means that Palestinians have already 
conceded a huge portion of Palestinian land to Israel in order to secure 
agreement to settlement. From the standpoint of the traditional criteria of 
what constitutes a state, Palestinian lands for a state are therefore 
determinable. Although Israel occupies those lands, occupancy vests no title 
                                                          
  192 G.A. Res 3237 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3237 (Nov. 22, 1974). 
  193 See Montevideo Convention, supra note 79. 
  194 See Hajjar, supra note 188 (“The PA is an ‘interim government,’ not a sovereign state.  
It lacks independence, control over borders, natural resources, trade, immigration, and other 
trappings of sovereignty.  It also lacks control over ‘national time.’ ”). 
  195 Montevideo Convention, supra note 79. 
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in the occupier via adverse possession; the trumping legal principle is the 
legally binding UN Security Council Resolution.196 
These are the criteria indicated in the Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States.197 Since the adoption of the UN Charter, there 
has been a modest change in the notion of sovereignty as the criterion of the 
legal personality of a state.198 That change additionally requires that a state, 
as a sovereign entity, is able and willing to accept the rights, as well as the 
obligations of a state, under UN Charter.199 Since this would include the 
fundamental purpose and values behind the UN Charter, it would be 
appropriate that the constitution of a Palestinian state and its practices reflect 
on issues of international peace and security, commitment to the “rule of 
law,”200 fundamental human rights, global security and democracy. These 
latter criteria bring an element of international “authority” to the expression 
of sovereignty. 
It could be argued that Israeli sovereignty is somewhat diminished by 
its unilateral declaration of independence and its parameters, its 
unwillingness to adopt the constitutional guidelines of Resolution 181, and 
its refusal to adopt its own declaration of independence as containing legally 
binding prescriptive norms.201 In this sense, Israeli objections to Palestinian 
statehood would appear to be objections to the mandate of international law 
itself. Our sense is that the only stumbling block on the pathway to the 
recognition of Palestinian statehood would be the U.S. exercising a veto over 
the process in the UN Security Council. Therefore, the U.S.’s vote is 
something that the Palestinians must strategically seek to overcome or 
minimize. 
Currently, more than 122 countries already recognize Palestinian 
statehood.202 Such recognition is a matter of state sovereignty, exercised 
bilaterally. It would therefore be to the advantage of the Palestinians, should 
they secure an overwhelming bilateral commitment to the recognition of 
Palestinian sovereignty. Already, important Latin American states have 
given their commitments to recognition. Additionally, it would be 
                                                          
  196 See S.C. Res. 242, supra note 126. 
  197 Montevideo Convention, supra note 79. 
  198 See generally Zohar Nevo & Tamar Megiddo, Lessons From Kosovo: The Law of 
Statehood and Palestinian Unilateral Independence, 5 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 89 (2009). 
  199 See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 70. 
  200 Winston P. Nagan & Garry Jacobs, New Paradigm for Global Rule of Law, 1(4) 
CADMUS 130, 130-146 (2012); see also Amir N. Lichta, Chanan Goldschmidta & Shalom H. 
Schwartz, Culture rules: The foundations of the rule of law and other norms of governance, 
35(4) J. OF COMP. ECON. 659, 659-88 (2007). 
  201 Clovis Maksoud, Diminished Sovereignty, Enhanced Sovereignty: United Nations-Arab 
League Relations at 50, 49 MIDDLE E. J. 582, 582-94 (1995). 
  202 See generally Boyle, supra note 153. 
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appropriate for the Palestinians to seek recognition of their statehood in 
regional international organizations such as the League of Arab States, the 
African Union, Organization of American States, European Union, and 
Asian Union. Regional recognition would be politically more feasible if the 
Palestinians are to develop their constitution to constitute their government. 
Under these circumstances, it may be vastly more difficult for the U.S. to 
exercise a veto in the face of an overwhelming international consensus. 
It would seem clear that the recognition of Palestinian statehood must 
meet the Montevideo criteria of statehood under the UN Charter.203 
Montevideo is modified by post-WWII developments regarding the criteria 
of statehood in international law. UNGA Resolution 181 develops the 
partition of land.204 The boundaries indicated in that Resolution were the 
boundaries adopted by Israel to define its territorial space; since the 
Palestinians were not organized into a formalized state entity at this time, 
they were not in a position either to adopt the UN partition scheme or even 
to repudiate it.205 
Nevertheless, Israel’s boundaries in part define Palestinian boundaries. 
Palestinian boundaries, in this sense, are determinable—and determinable 
boundaries would meet the criterion of territoriality for state recognition.206 
After the 1967 war, Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank. It still, as a 
practical matter, functionally occupies those territories. However, Israel has 
agreed to Resolutions 242207 and 338208; and the Palestinians have agreed to 
the territorial dispensation indicated in these resolutions. This means that 
Palestinians, in effect, accept less territory than originally envisioned in 
Resolution 181. Boundaries may be redefined by agreement; this means that 
                                                          
  203 Montevideo Convention, supra note 79. 
  204 See generally G.A. Res. 181 (II), supra note 4. 
  205 See generally Boyle, supra note 153. 
  206 See generally SUZANNE LALONDE, supra note 150; Gideon Biger, The Boundaries of 
Israel--Palestine Past, Present, and Future: a Critical Geographical View, 13 ISRAEL STUD. 1 
(2008). 
  207 See S.C. Res. 242, supra note 126 (“Termination of all claims or states of belligerency 
and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every State in the area . . . .”).  The resolution calls on Israel’s neighbors to 
end the state of belligerency and to reciprocate by withdraw its forces from land claimed by 
other parties in 1967 war; it is interpreted commonly today as calling for the Land for peace 
principle as a way to resolve Arab-Israeli conflict. Id. 
  208 S.C. Res. 338, supra note 127 (adopted at the 1747th meeting by 14 votes to none (22 
October 1973):  
“. . . ‘calls’ for a cease fire” in Yom Kippur War and “the implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts,” and “decides that, immediately and concurrently with 
the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate 
auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”). 
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Israel needs an agreement that will accommodate its settlement activity in 
Palestinian territory. 
Yet this kind of settlement activity flies in the face of UN Resolutions 
242 and 338, and is therefore unlawful. Here, the lawfulness of the 
boundaries under these resolutions is grounded in the UN Security Council’s 
power to make binding international law.209 The unlawfulness can be cured 
by an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. However, an effective 
agreement or understanding would probably need to be sanctioned or 
approved by the UN Security Council. 
 
F. The UN Decision Process: Current Assertions of Interest 
Presently, both Palestinian and Israeli diplomats are active within the 
UN either arguing for or against the idea of a Palestine State.210 The Israeli 
position seems to be that UN recognition of Palestinian statehood would 
undermine progress already achieved in the peace process.211 Palestinians 
argue that the achievement of a two state solution to the peace process would 
accelerate that process.212 Palestinian negotiators also claim that Israeli 
negotiating postures have been designed to avoid a settlement, and that 
recently, negotiations with the Israelis have been characterized by a lack of 
good faith.213 
As a technical matter, the recognition of Palestinian statehood by the 
UNGA does not mean that a Palestinian State would now be a juridical 
member of the United Nations. For that to happen, the Resolution of the 
                                                          
  209 See generally  Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 4, 901 2002). 
  210 Mohammed Daraghmeh, Palestinians Say They’ll Go to U.N. for Recognition, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 10, 2011), 
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/jan/10/palestinians-say-theyll-go-to-un-for-
recognition; see also Palestinian Statehood: Leaders Set Date for U.N. Membership Bid, 
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 13, 2011; Khaled Abu Toameh, Palestinian National 
Authority: Israel’s Reaction to U.N. Bid is “Hysterical”, THE JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 11, 
2011; AP Interview: Israel Lobbying Foreign Governments to Oppose Palestinian U.N. Bid, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 12, 2011. 
  211 Joanne Hill, PA National Authority Statehood Would Damage Peace Process: Jewish 
Parliamentarians, JEWISH TRIBUNE (Sept. 13, 2011), 
http://www.jewishtribune.ca/news/2011/09/13/pa-statehood-would-damage-peace-process-
jewish-parliamentarians. 
  212 Natasha Mozgovaya, Abbas: Palestinian Independence Bid Does Not Contradict Peace 
Process with Israel, HAARETZ (Sept. 16, 2011),  http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
defense/abbas-palestinian-independence-bid-does-not-contradict-peace-process-with-israel-
1.383118. 
  213 Press Release, Security Council, Israel’s Settlements, Intransigence, Lack of Good 
Faith Threatening Annapolis Process, Risking Middle East Peace, Saudi Arabia Tells Security 
Council, U.N. Press Release SC/9457 (Sept. 26, 2008). 
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UNGA would have to be passed on to the UN Security Council. The UNSC 
would then have to pass a resolution which indicates legally that the Council 
approves the membership of a Palestinian State in the United Nations. The 
specific problem here is that the U.S., under pressure from the 
ultranationalist Israeli Lobby, has taken a position to support the non-
recognition of a Palestinian State.214 It could express that position by 
exercising its veto in the UN Security Council. That would mean that, while 
the UNGA has given general recognition to a Palestinian State, that state 
cannot become a member of the UN without the removal of the UN Security 
Council veto.215 
There are two other possible strategies that Palestinians may invoke. 
First, Palestinians could promote a resolution before the UN as essentially a 
political, rather than legal, resolution. This would mean that the resolution 
itself, having the imprimatur of a political statement made in good faith by 
the Council, does not carry the quality of juridical enforceability because it 
is not legally binding. In short, such a Resolution would give additional 
credence to whatever juridical qualities repose in a UNGA Resolution, but it 
does not quite complete the process. It is unclear what such a posture would 
represent from the standpoint of continuing the peace negotiations. Given 
the asymmetrical nature of the respective bargaining positions of the parties, 
such a background would appear to strengthen the bargaining power of the 
Palestinians. 
The Palestinians could press for a binding resolution, in full knowledge 
that the U.S. will veto the Resolution. It could then prepare a controversial 
standby strategy; it could invoke the little used procedure drawn from the 
U.S. initiative, “Uniting for Peace Resolution.”216 This Resolution was 
effectually a constitutional amendment to, or mutation of, the UN Charter. It 
was used when the Security Council, due to a veto, was incapable of 
performing its primary functions concerning the protection and promotion of 
international peace and security. This Resolution assumed that, since the 
problem relating to peace and security remained, there was a residual 
competence in the UNGA to pass a Resolution by a supermajority, 
permitting UN action to be taken in the protection of international peace and 
security.  
                                                          
  214 Monica Lawrence, U.S. says it will veto Palestinian statehood bid at the UN, BNO 
NEWS (Sept. 8, 2011), wireupdate.com/wires/19969/u-s-says-it-will-veto-palestinian-
statehood-bid-at-the-un/. 
  215 See generally BARDO FASSBENDER, UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT 
OF VETO: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998); Michael Scharf, Musical Chairs: The 
Dissolution of States and Membership in the UN, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 29 (1995); Louis B. 
Sohn, Voting Procedures in UN Conferences for the Codification of International Law, 69 
AM. J. OF INT’L L. 2, 310 (1975). 
  216 G.A. Res. 377 (V). 
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In this context, the PA’s allies in the UNGA could certainly make the 
case that the recognition of Palestinian statehood is a major factor towards 
promoting international peace and security in the region. Moreover, the 
interminable state of occupancy, which Security Council Resolution 242 
stipulates must end, gives additional recognition to the importance for peace 
and security and the recognition of statehood for the Palestinian people. 
Judging from the support already generated for the recognition of statehood 
as an indispensable step to resolving conflict and crisis in the region, there 
should be more than a supermajority to overcome a U.S. veto in the Security 
Council. 
The legality of this initiative was challenged indirectly by an advisory 
opinion from the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the Expenses 
Case.217 The case arose out of the expenses of the UN for operations in 
which a veto had been exercised in the Security Council. However, the 
problem before the Council continued, in the terms of a threat or breach of 
international security. The Uniting for Peace Resolution suggested that there 
was a residual competence in the UNGA if the Security Council was 
blocked from responding to a continuing problem by a veto.218 The 
Resolution required a supermajority vote in the UNGA to overcome the 
veto, validate, and pay for UN intervention. At the time, the Soviet Union 
was a minority power in the UNGA and the U.S. had greater influence in 
that forum. Hence, the U.S. had confidence in its ability to prevail in the UN 
General Assembly.  
Later, due to decolonization, the composition of the UNGA changed 
dramatically and, as a consequence, the U.S. was less confident in using this 
procedure before the General Assembly. The Soviet Union remained without 
confidence in the UNGA and was partial, albeit for different reasons, to the 
U.S. position of not continuing to utilize the Uniting for Peace procedure.219 
It remains somewhat unclear whether Palestinians will seek to invoke the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution to overcome a U.S. veto in the Security 
Council, and if so, what policy implications might emerge. 
Currently the Palestinians share the support of approximately 120 UN 
Members in recognition of Palestinian statehood.220 It would appear, 
therefore, that they could easily muster a super majority to secure a UNGA 
override of a U.S. veto. However, the U.S. is an important sponsor of funds 
and technical resources to the Palestinian Authority. As a result, it is unclear 
whether the cost of such a confrontation with the U.S. is a matter that the 
                                                          
  217 U.N. Charter art. 17, para. 6. 
  218 U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 299th plen. mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. A/PV.299 (Nov. 1, 1950). 
  219 Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/377 (Nov. 3, 1950). 
  220 Gwynne Dyer, Back Door to Palestinian Statehood, LONDON FREE PRESS (Sept. 15, 
2011), http://www.lfpress.com/comment/ columnists/2011/09/15/18688836.html. 
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Palestinians are currently willing to engage.  Yet it would be appropriate to 
clarify the juridical scope of a UNGA Resolution affirming sovereign 
statehood for the Palestinians. 
In general, and with some exceptions, UNGA Resolutions have a 
binding character of political obligations made in good faith.221 However, 
they are not generally legally binding obligations. UNGA Resolutions are 
not bereft of any juridical quality; the resolutions are, however, adopted by 
sovereign states voting publically and this would suggest that such 
resolutions could not impose affirmative obligations on the sovereign states 
that voted for them. Yet it has been urged that since the sovereign’s 
expression of its good faith intentions are reflected in the resolution, there is 
a weak juridical expectation that the sovereign will not act to repudiate that 
for which it has voted. In short, there appears to be a negative expectation 
not to act, so as to repudiate the good faith public expression of the 
sovereign’s vote.222 Additionally, there is a more complex argument about 
the legal currency of UNGA Resolutions in the context of Palestinian claims 
to statehood.223 
We have seen that under international law, as developed under the 
League of Nations System, the Palestinians had the status in international 
practice of a “proto-state.”224 An explicit legal obligation of the Mandate 
was the right of peoples within the Mandate to have their self-determination 
respected.225 This issue was one acknowledged by the mandatory power that, 
while nominally respecting this claim also in virtue of its own unilateral 
Balfour Declaration, had commitments to support Jewish immigration and 
interests in the same mandated territory. These issues could not be resolved 
by Britain, the mandatory power, and the matter was transferred to the UN, 
                                                          
  221 Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in 
Determining Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L.J. 876, 
892 (1983); see also The General Assembly, U.N. CYBERSCHOOL BUS, 
http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/untour/subgen.htm (last visited April 11, 2012) (“The 
General Assembly is not a world government – its resolutions are not legally binding upon 
Member States. However, through its recommendations it can focus world attention on 
important issues, generate international cooperation and, in some cases, its decisions can lead 
to legally binding treaties and conventions.”). 
  222 Kerwin, supra note 221; The General Assembly, supra note 221; see also D. H. N. 
Johnson, The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 32 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 97 (1955-1956). 
  223 JOHN B. QUIGLEY, THE CASE FOR PALESTINE: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 
53 (2005). 
  224 See generally QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE, supra note 22 
  225 Nele Matz, Civilization and the Mandate System Under the League of Nations as 
Origin of Trusteeship, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. LAW 47, p. 85 (2005). See generally 
Anghie, supra note 7. 
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the successor institution to the League of Nations.226 The UN process 
emerged with a Resolution, which ostensibly would not necessarily be a 
legally binding determination. 
The UN had already inherited a preexisting set of legal expectations and 
its Resolution 181 was simply an interpretative clarification of preexisting 
legal expectations; in this sense, Resolution 181 was not an instrument with 
no juridical effects. The Resolution appears to be an accepted one, both 
multilaterally and bilaterally; Resolution 181 called for an Arab State and a 
Jewish State.227 The Resolution also provided boundary demarcations. 
Israeli authorities characterized this Resolution as providing the legal 
imprimatur for the Declaration of the existence of the sovereign State of 
Israel.228 The issue with regard to the Palestinians is more convoluted. 
Nevertheless, Palestinians came to recognize the Resolution as 
providing them with a legal foundation to assert their claims to self-
determination and independence. A resolution that supports the claim to 
sovereign independent state for the Palestinians would appear to be a 
declaratory statement of a preexisting juridical position taken, in perhaps 
atypical circumstances, by the UNGA in 1947. The Security Council was not 
involved in the precise determination of the call for the right to establish two 
states within mandatory territory of Palestine. The question is whether, with 
this historical and legal background, recourse to Security Council approval is 
necessary in the present circumstances. 
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF SELF-
DETERMINATION: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
The right of peoples to self-determination has evolved by virtue of a 
framework of complex international agreements and international practices. 
While there is not a clear-cut, formal definition of the idea of “peoples,” 
there is sufficient identity, coherence, and visible indicators of who may be a 
                                                          
  226 See G.A. Res. 106 (S-1), supra note 17, ¶ 7,  
  227 G.A. Res. 181 (II), supra note 4 (recommending a Partition Plan for Palestine: Plan of 
Partition with Economic Union, Part 1: Future constitution and Government of Palestine, Art. 
10 – “The Constituent Assembly of each [of the Arab and Jewish] State shall draft a 
democratic constitution for its state . . . guaranteeing all persons equal and nondiscriminatory 
rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, 
education, assembly and association.”). 
  228 Eli E. Hertz, U.N. Resolution 181 – The Partition Plan: A “Green Light” for Jewish 
Statehood – A ‘Dead’ Blueprint for Peace, Myths and Facts (2009), 
http://mythsandfacts.org/conflict/10/resolution-181.pdf. 
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Palestinian that, as a practical matter, it would be quite counter-intuitive to 
regard the Palestinians as “not” a people entitled to self-determination under 
international law. The nature of the right to self-determination is expressed 
in a multitude of international instruments. For example, Article 1(2) of the 
Charter expresses the idea of respect for the principle of self-determination 
of peoples.229 The principle is reiterated in Article 55230 and two significant 
conventions – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)231 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)232 – both of which state that “all people have the 
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”233  
The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations also affirms the principle of 
self-determination of peoples and stipulates that every state has a duty to 
respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.234 In 
1993, the World Conference on Human Rights adopted the Vienna 
Declaration and Program of Action.235 This document stresses its affirmation 
of the right of self-determination of all peoples. The Helsinki Final Act also 
stresses the salience of the right to self-determination.236 It seems clear that 
the processes by which Israel exercises occupancy control over the 
                                                          
  229 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2. 
  230 U.N. Charter art. 55 (With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the UN shall promote: 
Higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress 
and development; 
Solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international 
cultural and educational cooperation; and 
Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.). 
  231 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNT.S. 
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
  232 International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 UNT.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 30 (1967) [hereinafter ICESCR] (“[a]ll people have the right of self-
determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”). 
  233 Id. 
  234 Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 
2625, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/5217, at 121 (Oct. 24, 
1970). 
  235 World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993). 
  236 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki 1974. 
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Palestinians undermines most of the central elements of the scope of the 
right of self-determination.237 
The modern form of self-determination is tied to the emergence of the 
idea of the “nation” as a critical element in the establishment of sovereign 
independent statehood.238 This reflects the influence of the settlement of the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which established the idea that, in the 
European context, the state that coincided with its occupancy, a population 
that approximated the idea of a relatively homogenous nation, would be the 
legal sovereign representatives of that nation-state in the international legal 
arena.239 Sometimes, however, the term “nation” is simply a synonym for 
the idea of a human aggregate defined in terms of ethnicity.240 
Developments in the nineteenth century generated ideas that look at 
nationality in terms of race and racial identity.241 Given that there is some 
uncertainty as to what a nation is for the purpose of self-determination, this 
uncertainty remains a factor that might constrain or limit the Palestinian 
claim to self-determined sovereignty. It should also be noted that the claim 
to self-determination by a people or nation does not require that the claim be 
for sovereign independent status. Instead, it could be a claim for a complex 
                                                          
  237 THE HAGUE APPEAL FOR PEACE, THE HAGUE AGENDA FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY (2000), 
http://www.haguepeace.org/resources/HagueAgendaPeace+Justice4The21stCentury.pdf (“The 
denial of the right to self-determination has led to numerous long-term conflicts, most of 
which remain unresolved. It is important to recognize that it is not the right to self-
determination which leads to conflict, but rather the denial of this right. It is therefore 
imperative that the recognized right to self-determination be actively promoted as a tool of 
conflict prevention and conflict resolution”); see also ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995); Rep. of Int’l Conf. of Experts, 
Nov. 21-27, 1998, The Implementation of the Right to Self-Determination as a Contribution to 
Conflict Prevention (“The concept of self-determination is a very powerful one. As Wolfgang 
Danspeckgruber put it: ‘No other concept is as powerful, visceral, emotional, unruly, as steep 
in creating aspirations and hopes as self-determination.’ It evokes emotions, expectations and 
fears which often lead to conflict and bloodshed. According to one participant to the 
conference, 50 conflicts in the world today are related to antagonism between claims to self-
determination and to state sovereignty. Conference participants were convinced that in most 
cases it is not the assertion of claims by oppressed communities but the denial of self-
determination by state authorities which cause armed conflicts.”). 
  238 See generally Liang, supra note 74. 
  239 Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty, 21 
INT’L HIST. REV. 569, 569-91 (1999). 
  240 J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the 
Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 NAT’L ORG. 107, 116-17 (1994). 
  241 Id. 
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political affiliation with a federation, confederation, or any relationship or 
affiliation that it freely chooses to establish and maintain.242 
During the twentieth century, the political forces opposed to colonial 
and imperial rule drove the expansion of the international community of 
nation-states. This opposition was fueled by a strong commitment to making 
the principle of self-determination a positive rule of international law—a 
rule that had superior or preemptive status.243 The Atlantic Charter, adopted 
initially by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in 1941, was a 
statement about the war aims of the Allied Powers.244 The principle of self-
determination was included in this Charter.245  
In January 1942, twenty-six states signed on to this Declaration and 
accepted the Atlantic Charter Principles, including the principle of self-
determination.246 In 1945, when the UN Charter was adopted, the principle 
of self-determination was given high importance in it as an “International 
Constitution,” becoming an important part of the post-war development of 
international law.247 The principle of self-determination was also given 
                                                          
  242 W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International 
Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 866-76 (1990). 
  243 Robert Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 691 (1957); see 
also Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary 
International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 523-553 (2004) 
(“Finding customary law means knowing how the law is formed. Customary law is not written 
and has no ‘authoritative’ text, which has an inherent ‘thereness’ and whose meaning need 
only be ‘extracted.’ Therefore, the application of customary law involves a recreation of its 
genesis; one needs to show how it has come about and that the process has been consistent 
with the meta-law on custom.”); see also Philippe Nonet, What is Positive Law?, 100 YALE L. 
J. 667, 667-69 (1990) (“positive law (Nietzsche calls it Gesetz) is law that exists by virtue of 
being posited (gesetzt), laid down and set firmly, by a will empowered so to will. Such law 
‘exists’ in the sense that it has validity (Geltung). It has validity if the will (Wille) from which 
it issues has the power (Macht) to impose it, to demand and secure obedience to its command. 
Issuing from such power, the law valet: it is itself powerful, strong, effective. It has causal 
efficacy.”). 
  244 See generally DOUGLAS BRINKLEY & DAVID R. FACEY-CROWTHER, THE ATLANTIC 
CHARTER (1994). 
  245 Id. 
  246 BRINKLEY & FACEY-CROWTHER, supra note 244. 
  247 See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (places self-determination among the important 
purposes of the UN system. Article I, Part II states the following: “To develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal 
peace.”); id. art. 2.; see also Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter As Constitution of 
the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529 (1998); LELAND M. 
GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 290–309 (3d ed. 1969) (for a 
discussion of the history of the Charter of the United Nations and justifications as to why the 
Security Council is imbued with such power). 
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textual human rights stature in the ICCPR and the ICESCR, both covenants 
sharing the same language and textual definition of the right.248 
The international foundation of the right to Palestinian self-
determination, which is based on the League of Nations Mandate, thus 
predates the UN Charter. Defining the term would require adding further 
criteria to the concept of self-determination. One of the central objections 
that Israeli leaders and their supporters have used, is the idea that the 
Palestinians are not a people or nation for the purpose of utilizing the right to 
self-determination to achieve their political objectives. When a group has 
been subject to a form of paternal administration, as indicated in the mandate 
system, and later subject to dispersal and foreign military occupation, the 
claim that there are sufficiently articulated symbols of loyalty to constitute a 
people may be problematic. Notwithstanding the deficits that Palestinians 
have experienced, there is a widespread recognition that Palestinians are a 
people and that they cohere in terms of symbols of community and 
solidarity.249 Therefore, there is recognition that they constitute a people for 
the purpose of international law.250 
Some contemporary decisions, emanating from both national and 
international courts, would appear to confirm the international legal validity 
of Palestinian claims to self-determination. These decisions provide good 
and specific illustrations, in terms of background and context, and may be of 
help in shaping the structure of any decision determining the validity of a 
claim to self-determination under the law.251  However, the operational 
norms deployed by these decisions are complex because often these norms 
operate in latent conflict. International law protects the territorial integrity of 
the nation-state and does not generally favor claims for self-determination 
and independence that require the breakup of nation-states. The 
circumstances under which secession may succeed tend to be fairly 
situation-specific.252 
                                                          
  248 Supra notes 230-231. 
  249 See CENTER FOR ECONOMIC & SOCIAL RIGHTS, FACT SHEET #1 PALESTINE AND THE 
PALESTINIANS 1(1997), available at http://www.rainwiz.com/share/WhereAmI_handout.pdf; 
Rupert Sherman, Caught in Limbo: The Palestinian Authority and the Misunderstood State in 
International Law (2005), available at 
http://www.otago.ac.nz/law/oylr/2009/Rupert_Sherman.pdf; see also James Prince, The 
International Legal Implications of the November 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Statehood, 
25 STAN. J. INT’L L. 681 (1988-1989). 
  250 Supra note 249. 
  251 See In the Reference RE Secession of Quebec Case, supra note 160. See generally 
Maria J. Stephan, Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance in the East 
Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self-Determination Movements, 30 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 57 (2006). 
  252 See generally Lloyd, supra note 73. 
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There seems to be a salient formula relevant to this context. This 
formula presents a unified state in which one part of the state, defined by 
territory or the identity of the citizens, seeks to secede from the union and 
form a separate state. The consensus seems to be that, unless there is 
extreme ostracization or persecution of the separatist group by the unified 
state, secession should not be permitted. A question might arise as to 
whether the claim to self-determination of the Palestinians is analogous to a 
claim of secession from a preexisting unified state. The Security Council 
Resolutions make clear that Israel, the power that militarily occupies the 
Gaza and the West Bank, has no legal claim to those territories as unified 
state. As a consequence, Palestinian claims to self-determination would 
resemble more of a claim against a colonizing power, a claim that has a 
strong recognition in post WWII practice.253 It would be worth evaluating 
the Palestinian situation in comparison to the situation of the citizens of 
Quebec, Canada, who floated the idea of self-determination for the residents 
as a state separate from Canada. 
 
A. In Reference Secession of Quebec: Canadian Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in the case Reference RE Secession of 
Quebec,254 analyzed the scope of the right to self-determination with regard 
to the province of Quebec.255 The Court considered whether the legislature 
might, under international law, have the right to a unilateral secession from 
Canada. In an exhaustive analysis of the right to self-determination in 
international law, the Court ruled that, in effect, the population of Quebec 
was not an oppressed people and had not experienced attacks on their 
physical integrity or the massive violation of fundamental rights.256 The 
Court saw the international right of self-determination as being confined to 
situations of former colonies where there is oppression or situations which 
involve foreign military occupation. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected 
the possible unilateral secession claims advanced by the Quebecois, because 
the claims were not sustained by any sense of repression or disidentification 
by the state of Canada,257 which is in fact a state governed by the rule of 
law.258 
The decision of In re Quebec clarifies further the specific circumstances 
in which self-determination and secession are valid under international law. 
                                                          
  253 See Anghie, supra note 7. 
  254 See In the Reference RE Secession of Quebec Case, supra note 160. 
  255 See generally Johan D. Van Der Vyver, Self-determination of the Peoples of Quebec 
under International Law, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2000). 
  256 See In the Reference RE Secession of Quebec Case, supra note 160. 
  257 Id. at ¶¶ 135, 154. 
  258 For a definition of the term “rule of law” see supra note 199. 
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This clarification of circumstances favors the recognition of Palestinian self-
determination and potential statehood in its unique socio-historical context 
because it strengthens what constitutes a people for purposes of statehood 
recognition, the fact that Israel has no sovereign title to the territories it 
occupies and that the Palestinians are oppressed people that have 
experienced attacks on their physical integrity as well as massive violations 
of their fundamental rights.259 The case of Kosovo and its unilateral 
declaration of independence share various similarities which also strengthen 
the claims of the Palestinians. 
 
B. In Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo: The 
International Court of Justice 
The ICJ, in developing its recent jurisprudence, has also provided an 
important clarification about the specific circumstances under which a claim 
to self-determination might be vindicated. One relevant case shares some 
features that are analogous to the situation of the Palestinians, and may hold 
important guidance for the prospect of their claim to self-determination. In a 
groundbreaking 2010 Advisory Opinion, the ICJ determined that Kosovo’s 
unilateral claim for independence and statehood was valid under 
international law.260 In this case, the particular facts concerning Kosovo 
seemed to have influenced the determination that Kosovo could secede from 
Yugoslav sovereignty. Kosovo was, in fact, an autonomous region under the 
1974 Yugoslavian Constitution.261  
As the constitution became eroded, the Kosovo minority began to 
experience increasing repression and discrimination by the Serbs. In fact, 
international intervention was influenced by the prospect of a program of 
massive ethnic cleansing in the region.262 This established a provisional form 
of governance under UN authority.263 A further factor which supported the 
lawfulness of the declaration of independence for Kosovo was the fact that 
negotiations for an internal settlement toward a final status seemed to be 
carrying on interminably and aimlessly. It is possible that the reluctance of 
                                                          
  259 See In the Reference RE Secession of Quebec Case, supra note 160. 
  260 Dapo Akande, ICJ finds that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence not in Violation of 
International Law, EUR. J. INT’L L. BLOG (July 23, 2010). 
  261 Id.; see Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, February 21, 
1974. 
  262 See also Ruth Wedgwood, NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 828, 
828-34 (1999). See generally  HEIKE KRIEGER, THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: AN ANALYTICAL DOCUMENTATION 1974-1999 (July 12, 2001). 
  263 S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999); see also Daniel Fierstein, 
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: An Incident Analysis of Legality, Policy and Future 
Implications,  26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 417 (2008). 
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the Netanyahu regime to negotiate seriously, rather than interminably, and 
possibly aimlessly, makes the case of the Palestinians analogous to the case 
of the Kosovars. 
The situation in Kosovo and Palestine share other similarities. In both 
places, the framework for continued negotiations toward a final settlement 
actually took place under the authority of UNSC Resolutions.264 In Kosovo, 
the Security Council Resolution directly created the interim government 
mechanism. In the context of the occupied Palestinian territories, the Oslo 
Accords, which came under the broad authority of UNSC Resolutions, also 
created the PA as an interim governmental institution. In Kosovo, the ICJ 
held that the representatives of the Kosovar people were not limited in their 
residual claim to sovereignty and independence by the UNSC Resolutions. 
Similarly, UNGA Resolutions would seem to strengthen the residual 
competence of the Palestinian people to declare their sovereignty and 
independence.  The Palestinian claim remains closer to the case of Kosovo 
than the case of Quebec because the claim does not involve an issue of 
secession of titled territory from Israel. In this case, the State of Israel has no 
real sovereign title to the territories it occupies.265 
We would submit that the factual background of and reasoning of the 
Court in the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo provides support for Palestinian 
claims to statehood and independence under international law. In this case, 
the Court does not include a finding of Kosovo statehood. What makes the 
case relevant to the Palestinian situation is that the governance of Kosovo at 
the time of its declaration of independence was established under UN 
authority with provisional institutions of self-governance.266 Additionally, 
Serbia’s claim to territorial authority over Kosovo could be seen as stronger 
than Israeli claims to prevent the recognition of Palestinian statehood. 
Kosovo was actually territorially a part of Serbia, whereas Israeli claims 
over Palestinian territories are those of an external occupying entity.267 It 
would therefore appear that the case law and advisory opinions of the ICJ 
and the Canadian Supreme Court point toward the lawfulness of the claim of 
representatives of the Palestinian people to the recognition of statehood, 
independence, and sovereignty. 
                                                          
  264 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Statehood, Recognition and the U.N. System: A Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Kosovo, 12 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. LAW 1, 35 (2008). 
  265 See also Robert Home, An ‘Irreversible Conquest’: Colonial and Postcolonial Land 
Law in Israel/Palestine, 12 SOC. LEGAL STUD. 291, 291-310 (2003). See generally Geremy 
Forman, Israeli Supreme Court Doctrine and the Battle over Arab Land in Galilee: A Vertical 
Assessment, 40(4) J. PALESTINE STUD. 24 (2011). 
  266 See generally supra text accompanying note 198, 251, 260-64. 
  267 See generally supra text accompanying note 198, 251, 260-64. 
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III. THE PARTIES AND THEIR PERSPECTIVES OF REALITY 
Both Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have differing perspectives 
about the nature and causes of the conflict, and the scope of possible 
resolution. For the purpose of finding a possible resolution to the conflict, it 
is imperative that both develop a mutual or shared narrative of the conflict, 
making sure to acknowledge the reality of the divergent perspectives of the 
parties. In creating this narrative, there are many balancing factors to 
consider. 
One balancing factor to be considered is Palestine’s relationship with 
Hamas. The ambiguous nature of this relationship undermines the authority 
of the PA, and the anti-Semitic posturing Hamas has expressed in its public 
relations challenges the willingness of other states to recognize a Palestinian 
state that works on friendly terms with such an organization. 
Another balancing factor is the complexity of Israeli society, which 
includes a courageous community of human rights activists. This 
community, which supports the individual rights of Israelis as well as 
Palestinians, has gone mostly unheard in recent years as the forceful 
ultranationalist establishment came to power. Some fifty-two U.S.-based 
Jewish affinity groups, sometimes described as “The Lobby,” have 
continued to offer uncritical support to the extreme right, ultranationalist 
Israeli establishment.268 While these groups appear to support Israel, the 
reality is that they largely channel money to support the ambitions of an 
extremely militant right-wing political establishment in the country.269 Such 
distribution of outside funding serves to marginalize moderate and center-
                                                          
  268 Some of the groups considered to be included within this larger policy lobby include 
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Conference of Presidents of 
Major American Jewish Organizations, the National Association of Arab-Americans (NAAA) 
and the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). See also Robert C. Lieberman, The 
Israel Lobby and American Politics, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 235 (2009); Walter Russell Mead, 
Jerusalem Syndrome - Decoding the Israel Lobby, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 160 (2007); John 
Mearsheimer & Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby, 28 LONDON REV. BOOKS 3 (2006); John 
Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 13 MIDDLE E. 
POL’Y 29 (2006). See generally Mitchell Bard, The Israeli and Arab Lobbies, THE JEWISH 
VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/lobby.html (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2012). 
  269 Christopher Bollyn, The Real Cost Of U.S. Support For Israel - $3 Trillion, AM. FREE 
PRESS (Sept. 19, 2003); see also Jeffrey Blankfort, The Influence of Israel and its American 
Lobby over US Middle East Policy Explained, ISLAMIC HUM. RTS. COMM’N, available at 
http://www.ihrc.org.uk/060702/papers/jeffrey_blankfort.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2012); 
Jeffrey Blankfort, The Israel Lobby and the Left: Uneasy Questions, LEFTCURVE.ORG (2003), 
available at http://www.leftcurve.org/LC27WebPages/IsraelLobby.html (last visited Apr. 17, 
2012). See generally JONATHAN JEREMY GOLDBERG, JEWISH POWER: INSIDE THE AMERICAN 
JEWISH ESTABLISHMENT (1997). 
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left opinion in Israel.270 The influence of these groups is astonishing and 
raises grave concerns about U.S. involvement in the Middle East 
negotiations. 
The vastly ambitious “Clean Break” doctrine best reflects the influence 
of the ultranationalist political factions in Israel on American neo-
conservative political interests.271 The Clean Break Doctrine promoted the 
idea of regime changes for dictators in nations throughout the Middle East 
on the basis that one could not make peace with authoritarian despots,272 
instead replacing them with democratic governments. While events in 
Tunisia,273 Egypt,274 Libya,275 Yemen276 and Syria,277 indicate strong 
                                                          
  270 This position is a sensitive one among partisan supporters of the allegedly pro-Israeli 
ultraconservative nationalist lobby in the United States. For example, a former AIPAC 
functionary, Josh Block, has written to suggest that anyone in the United States who seeks to 
require a caution in getting into a war with Iran, which he believes violates Israel’s vital 
interests, is in effect an unreconstructed “anti-Semite.” This type of attack raises the delicate 
question of whether Mr. Block, who we presumed is an American citizen, considers the 
interests of a foreign state more important than those of his own country. According to Mr. 
Block, “no progressive Democrat should allow [any] room for… policy or political rhetoric 
that is hostile to Israel, or suggest that Iran has no nuclear weapons program.” He adds, 
“Progressive institutions have a responsibility not to tolerate such speech or arguments.” These 
statements are made in the face of the following facts: (1) the International Atomic Energy 
Association and the Director of the CIA are willing to sign on to the claim that Iran has 
certainly a nuclear weapons program. The Israeli press has reported, “Iran has not yet decided 
whether to make a nuclear bomb, according to the intelligence assessment of Israeli officials.” 
In the face of such facts, the claims that scholars and informed commentators want to clarify 
the situation in Iran and in doing so risk been labeled “racist” and “anti-Semitic”, may well 
have emerged from a conflation of politics and ethnic identity which serves to perpetuate a 
form of racism and extreme politics in and of themselves. See Eric Alterman, Of Semites and 
‘Anti-Semites’, THE NATION, Feb. 13, 2012, at 9. 
  271 A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm - prepared in 1996 by a study 
group led by Richard Perle for Benjamin Netanyahu, then the Prime Minister of Israel. The 
report explained a new approach to solving Israel’s security problems in the Middle East with 
an emphasis on “Western values”. It has since been criticized for advocating an aggressive 
new policy, including the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. INSTITUTE FOR 
ADVANCED STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES, A CLEAN BREAK: A NEW STRATEGY FOR 
SECURING THE REALM (2006). 
  272 Piki Ish-Shalom, “The Civilization of Clashes”: Misapplying the Democratic Peace in 
the Middle East, 122 POL. SCI. Q. 533 (2007–2008); see also Gerard Huiskamp, Minority 
report on the Bush doctrine, 26 NEW POL. SCI. 389, 389-415 (2004); Robert Jervis, 
Understanding the Bush Doctrine, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 365 (2003); Robert Jervis, Why the Bush 
Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 351 (2005). 
  273 Rania Abouzeid, Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire, TIME (Jan. 
21, 2011), available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html.; 
see also Brian Whitaker, How a man setting fire to himself sparked an uprising in Tunisia, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/28/tunisia-ben-ali. 
  274 Joshua Stacher, Egypt’s Democratic Mirage, FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67351/joshua-stacher/egypts-democratic-mirage; see 
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popular demands for democracy, it appears that as a matter of Machiavellian 
practical politics, Netanyahu may wish that they had not taken him so 
seriously on the democracy question.278 Numerous political commentators 
have speculated as to whether Netanyahu now misses the stability of an 
authoritarian friend in power, like Mubarak in Egypt.279 
Deeply rooted in the Israeli ultranationalist agenda is the idea of a 
return to an exclusively Jewish state, without Arabs, with the boundaries of 
Eretz Israel.280 The current state of negotiations has floundered on the rock 
of Israeli settlement activity, which is primarily driven by this agenda. The 
U.S. has now admitted that it is incapable of generating inducements to 
Prime Minister Netanyahu for a settlement freeze.281 However, the freeze is 
the essential precondition for Palestinian cooperation in the negotiation 
process.282 It is unclear what further steps the U.S. can take short of putting 
the squeeze on “the Lobby”283 – a squeeze that is beyond the capability of 
                                                          
also Popular Uprising in Egypt Topples Mubarak Regime, WORLD GEOGRAPHY (2011), 
available at http://hmcurrentevents.com/popular-uprising-in-egypt-topples-mubarak-regime/. 
  275 See also Libya’s uprising; Time to leave, ECONOMIST ONLINE (Feb. 22, 2011). See 
generally David Cutler & Maria Golovnina, Timeline: Libya’s uprising against Muammar 
Gaddafi, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/21/us-libya-events-idUSTRE77K2QH20110821. 
  276 Kareem Fahim, Yemeni Uprising Opens a Door to Besieged Rebels in the North, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2011); see also Tom Finn, Yemen uprising: Sana’a rocked by night of fierce 
fighting, GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2011); Aryn Baker, Yemen’s Uprising: The Families on the 
Front Lines, TIMES (Oct. 10, 2011). 
  277 Martin Chulov, Syria uprising is now a battle to the death, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2012); 
Syrian forces renew bombardment in Homs, USA TODAY (Feb. 9, 2012). 
  278 Yossi Gurvitz, How the Netanyahu government undermines the democratic level field 
(Feb. 11, 2012); see also Grand Hypocrisy: Netanyahu Slams ‘Anti-liberal’ Arab Spring, 
PALESTINIAN CHRONICLE (Dec. 1, 2011); Gideon Levy, Netanyahu is now the last hope for 
Israeli democracy, HAARETZ.COM (Nov. 17, 2011); Netanyahu: Democracy Crucial for Arab 
World, ISR. PROJECT (May 24, 2011); Barak Ravid, Netanyahu: Arab Spring pushing Mideast 
backward, not forward, HAARETZ.COM (Nov. 24, 2011). 
  279 Barak Ravid, Israel urges world to curb criticism of Egypt’s Mubarak, HAARETZ.COM 
(Jan. 31, 2011); see also Ben Lynfield, Israel worried as Mubarak teeters, GLOBAL POST (Jan. 
29, 2011). 
  280 See generally Gideon Biger, The boundaries of Israel--Palestine past, present, and 
future: a critical geographical view, ISR. STUD. (Mar. 22, 2008). 
  281 Jill Dougherty & Elise Labott, U.S. ends bid for renewed Israeli settlement freeze, CNN 
(Dec. 7, 2010). 
  282 Ashraf Khalil, Palestinians say full settlement freeze is precondition to new peace 
talks, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 27, 2009). 
  283 See generally sources cited supra notes 188, and 268-270; Uri Avnery, Israel Lobby 
Humiliates Obama Administration, COUNTER CURRENTS (Mar. 16, 2009) 
http://www.countercurrents.org/avnery160309.htm; Thomas McAdams Deford, Mac Deford: 
Obama (and U.S. strategic interests) vs. the Israel lobby, FREE PRESS (Sept. 21, 2011) 
available at 
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the Obama Administration.284 This has renewed the Palestinian interest in 
looking at alternative strategies to secure its claim to statehood. 
 
A. Current Discriminatory Policies and Practices of the State of 
Israel 
The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, which 
indicated that the new state “will ensure complete equality of social and 
political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex,”285 
as promising as it was, was never adopted by the Knesset, and no efforts 
have being made to draft a constitution along those lines.286 The Knesset 
delegated the task of drafting a constitution to its Constitution, Law, and 
Justice Committee, which, unfortunately, has never presented the Knesset 
with a draft constitution.287 On the issue of whether a Palestinian state can 
effectively and shrewdly manage and navigate foreign relations, the degree 
of recognition that Palestinian entities have already received suggests that 
the Palestinian leadership is capable of discharging these obligations. 
The state of Israel has unfortunately engaged in some forms of 
discriminatory treatment against Palestinians by enacting policies, which 
have the consequence of facilitating Palestinian refugee status. These 
policies accentuate Palestinian alienation – an alienation that fuels conflict. 
Unfortunately, the longer Palestinians remain stateless, the more difficult it 
will be to reach a settlement that might work. This section will provide a 
                                                          
http://freepressonline.com/main.asp?SectionID=50&SubSectionID=74&ArticleID=15074; Jim 
Lobe, Politics Throws Palestine Under the Bus, INTERPRESS SERVICE (Sept. 24, 2011) 
available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=105230; Beau Miller, Israel Lobby Drives 
America’s Palestine Veto, POLICYMIC (Sept. 26, 2011) available at 
http://www.policymic.com/articles/israel-lobby-drives-america-s-palestine-veto. 
  284 Uri Avnery, Israel Lobby Humiliates Obama Administration, COUNTER CURRENTS 
(Mar. 16, 2009) http://www.countercurrents.org/avnery160309.htm. 
  285 The Declaration of Israel’s Independence 1948, 5708 (1948) (Isr.) (“THE STATE OF 
ISRAEL will be open to the immigration of Jews from all countries of their dispersion; will 
promote the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; will be based on 
the precepts of liberty, justice and peace taught by the Hebrew Prophets; will uphold the full 
social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of race, creed or sex; will 
guarantee full freedom of conscience, worship, education and culture; will safeguard the 
sanctity and inviolability of the shrines and Holy Places of all religions; and will dedicate itself 
to the principles of the Charter of the U.N.”). 
  286 See also Shimon Shetreet, Resolving the Controversy over the Form and Legitimacy of 
Constitutional Adjudication in Israel: A Blueprint for Redefining the Role of the Supreme 
Court and the Knesset, 77 TUL. L. REV. 659, 674–75 (2003) (charting the rejection of a 
constitution and bill of rights from the First through the Tenth Knesset). See generally Ruth 
Gavison, Legislatures and the Quest for a Constitution: The Case of Israel, 11 REV. CONST. 
STUD. 345 (2006). 
  287 See generally Jonathan Cook, Israeli Constitutional Committee Faces Double Bind, 34 
MID. EAST REP. 231 (2004). 
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brief review of the discriminatory policies currently applied by Israeli 
authorities, and which appear on their face, to be a repudiation of the regime 
of humanitarian law that governs the conditions of belligerent occupancy. 
The Partition Plan, or Resolution 181, established criteria for 
citizenship without regard to religion or ethnicity, as it read:288 “Palestinian 
citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs 
and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside 
the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become 
citizens of the state in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and 
political rights.”289 Subsequent domestic Israeli legislation and practices 
have ignored the original citizenship requirement outlined in the Partition 
Plan, generating a huge Palestinian refugee crisis.290 Most recently, Prime 
Minister Netanyahu sought to affirm the validity of internal Israeli practices 
on citizenship and statelessness by demanding that the PA agree that Israel is 
primarily an ethno-religious “Jewish state.”291 
There are some—especially among Israeli ultranationalist political 
factions—who propagate the notion that there is no such thing as a 
“Palestinian”.292 By refusing to recognize “Palestinian” as an ethnicity, the 
political propaganda is laying the groundwork for rejecting the Palestinians’ 
claim to be a “people” under international law for the purposes of self-
determination.293 As discussed supra Part I.E, ultra-conservative nationalist 
factions in political power in the current Israeli state have promoted the 
argument that Palestinians are “simply Arabs” and therefore 
indistinguishable from other Arab peoples in surrounding states.294 
                                                          
  288 G. A. Res. 181, Ch. 3 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947). 
  289 G. A. Res. 181, Ch. 3 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947). 
  290 See Kurt Rene Radley, supra note 27; see also Lisa H. Malkki, Refugees and Exile: 
From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of Things, 24 ANNUAL REV. OF 
ANTHROPOLOGY 495 (1995); Elia Zureik, Palestinian Refugees and Peace, 24 J. PALESTINE 
STUD. 5 (Fall 1994). See generally Analysis: The Middle East’s “invisible refugees”, IRIN 
MIDDLE EAST: HUMANITARIAN NEWS AND ANALYSIS (Jan. 31, 2012); Yoav Peled & Nadim 
Rouhana, Transitional Justice and the Right of Return of the Palestinian Refugees, ISRAEL 
AND THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES; 189(2) BEITRÄGE ZUM AUSLÄNDISCHEN ÖFFENTLICHEN 
RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT, 141-157 (2007). 
  291 Haaretz Service & Natasha Mozgovaya, Netanyahu: Only when Palestinians recognize 
Israel as a Jewish state will they be ready for peace: PM tells Jewish leaders that peace 
requires security and that Israel’s security needs are growing more and more, HAARETZ.COM 
(Oct. 22, 2010), available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-
only-when-palestinians-recognize-israel-as-a-jewish-state-will-they-be-ready-for-peace-
1.320665. 
  292 See generally KHALIDI, supra note 161. 
  293 Id. 
  294 Id. 
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The Law of Return of 1970295 effectively defines who, by definition, is 
Jewish, and, by implication, who is not.296 This law compounded the 
Absentee Property Law of 1950 by defining most Palestinian Arabs as 
“refugees” from territories that Israel conquered in the 1948 war.297  The law 
denies Palestinian Arabs the citizenship rights envisioned in Resolution 181 
and the rights to their private properties inside Israel. The status of 
“absentee” is inherited as well, meaning that children of Palestinian Arabs 
will also be considered “absentees.”298 
In effect, then, the status of an absentee has become a status of 
statelessness.299 In 1949, an estimated 711,000 Palestinians were expelled or 
fled from Israel.300 The descendants of these refugees are registered with the 
UN as Palestinian refugees. In 2010, the total population of Palestinian 
refugees was about 4.7 million.301 Approximately a third of the refugees live 
in refugee camps in states adjacent to Israel,302 and the rest live on the 
peripheries of cities and towns of host countries.303 Some Israeli scholars 
maintain that the exodus of refugees from Israel was largely a response to 
the threats posed by the Haganah,304 Lehi305 and Irgun.306 
                                                          
  295 Law of Return, amend. No. 2, 1970, amending the Law of Return of 1950, 5730-1970, 
586 Sefer HaChukkim 34. 
  296 See generally Savir Yehuda, The Definition of a Jew under the Law of Return, 17 SW. 
L.J. 123 (1963). 
  297 Geremy Forman & Alexandre Kedar, From Arab Land to ‘Israel lands’: The Legal 
Dispossession of the Palestinians Displaced by Israel in the Wake of 1948, 22 ENV’T & 
PLANNING D: SOC’Y & SPACE 809, 816 (2004). 
  298 BADIL RESOURCE CENTER, PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CHILDREN: INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS (2006), available at 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4347FD59F8965672C12572C700403604
-Full_Report.pdf. 
  299 See also URI DAVIS, CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
CITIZENSHIP LEGISLATION IN ISRAEL, JORDAN, PALESTINE, SYRIA AND LEBANON (1997); 
Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective 
Nationality Under International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1141 (1998); Danielle C. Jefferis, 
Institutionalizing Statelessness: The Revocation of Residency Rights of Palestinians of East 
Jerusalem, 24 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 202 (2012). See generally LAURA VAN WAAS, 
NATIONALITY MATTERS: STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). 
  300 DAVID MCDOWALL & CLAIRE PALLEY, THE PALESTINIANS 10 (1987). 
  301 U.S. Contributes $40 Million to U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Feb. 4, 2010), http://m.state.gov/md136510.htm; see 
Press Release, The U.N. Refugee Agency, UNHCR annual report shows 42 million people 
uprooted worldwide (June 16, 2009). 
  302 See generally Rene supra note 26; sources cited supra notes 27, 152, 290 and 298-301. 
  303 See generally Rene supra note 26; sources cited supra notes 27, 152, 290 and 298-301. 
  304 The underground military organization of the yishuv in Eretz Yisrael from 1920 to 
1948. The Arab riots in 1920 and 1921 (q.v., see also Tel Hai) strengthened the view that it 
was impossible to depend upon the British authorities and that the yishuv needed to create an 
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The absentee status of Palestinians in Israel has had a major impact on 
the civil and socio-economic rights of Palestinians. One area particularly 
affected is that of land rights. Four cornerstones make up the legal basis of 
Israeli land policy;307 the Basic Law establishing the Israel Land 
Administration;308 the Israel Lands Law;309 the Israel Land 
Administration;310 and the Covenant between the State of Israel and the 
World Zionist Organization (Jewish National Fund) (1961).311 Together, 
these laws operate to exclude non-Jews from 92.6 percent of the land of pre-
1967 Israel.312 These and other administrative measures have engendered a 
great Palestinian sensitivity towards Israeli settlement activity in Palestinian 
lands since 1948 and in greater measure after 1967. 
The state of Israel has also discriminated against Palestinian civilians 
through a formidable array of defense regulations under a dual military-
                                                          
independent defense force completely free of foreign authority. In June 1920, the Haganah was 
founded. The Jewish Virtual Library (Extracted January 31, 2012). 
  305 Also known as Stern Gang, a self-proclaimed “terror group” organized against the 
British powers. See generally JOSEPH HELLER, THE STERN GANG: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND 
TERROR, 1940-1949 (1995). 
  306 Also known as Irgun Zevai Leumi, a Zionist paramilitary group that operated in 
Mandate Palestine between 1931 and 1948. It was originally the earlier and larger Jewish 
paramilitary organization haHaganah which was created when the group broke from the 
Haganah and it became known as the Haganah Bet, or alternatively as haHaganah haLeumit or 
Ha’ma’amad. Irgun members were absorbed into the Israeli Defense Forces at the start of the 
1948 Arab-Israeli war. The Irgun is also referred to as Etzel, an acronym of the Hebrew 
initials, or by the abbreviation IZL. See also Seth J. Frantzman, Review of the Ethnic 
Cleansing of Palestine by Ilan Pappe (2006), MIDDLE E.Q., 70-75 (2008). See generally J.B. 
BELL, TERROR OUT OF ZION: IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI, LEHI, AND THE PALESTINE 
UNDERGROUND, 1929-1949 (1977); JAMES L. FIELDS, IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI: THE JEWISH 
TERRORIST ELEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (1985); DAVID NIV, A SHORT 
HISTORY OF THE IRGUN ZEVAI LEUMI (1980). 
  307 Basic Law: Israel Lands, KNESSET (1960), 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic13_eng.htm (The basis of the law is the 
special relationship between the People of Israel and the Land of Israel and its redemption. The 
law ensures that the state lands, which constitute about 90 percent of the lands in the state, 
should remain national property. The law prohibits the transfer of ownership over lands owned 
by the state, the Development Authority or the Jewish National Fund, either by sale or by any 
other means, with the exception of types of land or transactions that have been specified in the 
law.). 
  308 Basic Law: Israel Lands, 5720, 14 LSI 48 (1960) (Isr.). 
  309 Israel Lands Law, 5720-1960, 14 LSI 49 (1960) (Isr.). 
  310 Israel Land Administration Law, 5720-1960, 14 LSI 50 (1960) (Isr.). 
  311 Special Reports: The Jewish National Fund Basic Documents, 2 PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L. 
L. 193, 214 (1985). 
  312 Stephen Lendman, Israel’s Discriminatory Land Policies, RENSE (July 31, 2009), 
available at http://www.rense.com/general86/landpol.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2012). 
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civilian system that is applicable to Palestinians only.313 The defense 
emergency regulations, which were inherited from Britain, include the 
power to detain, the power to deport, the power to take possession of land, 
the power to forfeit and demolish property, and the power to declare closed 
areas.314 Additionally, the Foundation of Legislation Law of 1980 further 
strengthened the powers of the Israeli state and weakened the rights of 
Palestinians as people without a state.315 As a result, a wide variety of goods 
are deemed to be “war goods,”316 such as sewing machines, and perishable 
Palestinian exports are delayed so that they are destroyed.317 Access to 
income for Palestinians is similarly restricted; Israeli law requires 
                                                          
  313 Moshe Lissak, The Unique Approach to Military-Societal Relations in Israel and its 
Impact on Foreign and Security Policy, in PEACEMAKING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY: ISRAEL 
AFTER RABIN 235-57 (Sasson Sofer ed., 2001). 
  314 David Kirshbaum, Israeli Emergency Regulations & the Defense (Emergency) 
Regulations of 1945, ISR. L. RES. CENTER (2007), 
http://www.geocities.com/savepalestinenow/emergencyregs/essays/emergencyregsessay.htm. 
  315 The Foundation of Law Act, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 181 (1980) (Isr.). 
  316 See S. Res. 102, 78th Cong. (1944); H. Res. 408, 78th Cong. (1944) (creating special 
committees on post-war economic policy and planning) (“The term ‘surplus movable war 
goods’ means any movable equipment, machines, accessories, parts, assemblies, products, 
commodities, supplies, and materials (raw, semifinished, and finished), including shipyard 
facilities, owned or controlled by any Government agency, whether new or used, in use or in 
storage, which are in excess of the needs of such agency and are not required for the 
performance of the duties and functions of such agency and which are determined to be 
surplus to the function, activity, or project in connection with which the goods were acquired 
or accrued [.…] However, That this term shall not apply to ships, water-borne craft, real estate, 
and permanent improvements to real estate.”). 
  317 Erik Schechter, Legal Scholars Weigh in on Gaza Blockade, Flotilla Deaths, CARNEGIE 
COUNCIL (June 28, 2010), 
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0055.html (“Following the 
diplomatic fallout over the MV Mavi Marmara killings, the Israeli cabinet drew up a new, 
expanded list of humanitarian items allowed into Gaza via border terminals. Previously, 
however, Israel kept transfers to a bare minimum. Innocuous items like toys, livestock, sewing 
machines parts, musical instruments, chocolate, and coriander had all been barred entry into 
the enclave, contends Gisha, an Israeli NGO that supports the ‘freedom of movement of 
Palestinians, especially Gaza residents.’”). On May 30, 2010, while in international waters and 
en route to Gaza, Israeli Naval Forces communicated that a naval blockade over the Gaza area 
was in force and ordered the ships to follow them to Ashdod Port or to be boarded, the ships 
declined and were boarded in international waters. The boarding started at 2 a.m. on May  31, 
2010 and was completed by 8 a.m. Reports from journalists on the ship and from the UN 
report on the incident concluded that the Israeli military opened fire with live rounds before 
boarding the ship. According to the U.N. Report, in the violent clash that followed, nine 
activists were killed, and several dozen activists were injured. See generally Hum. Rts. 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/21 (Sept. 27, 2010); Matti Friedman, Details emerge of 
bloodshed aboard Gaza-bound ship, SALON.COM (June 2, 2010) 
http://www.salon.com/2010/06/02/ml_israel_raid_reconstruction/.; Yaakov Katz, Navy 
commandos: ‘They came for war’, JERUSALEM POST (May 31, 2010) 
http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=177040. 
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Palestinian incomes to be twenty times less than that of Israelis.318 Illegal 
Israeli settlements and occupying forces also utilize military law to limit 
economic and entrepreneurial activity that may compete with Israel.319 For 
example, laws of military occupation disrupt Palestinian schooling,320 and 
the strategic road system makes the communications system a nightmare.321 
Additionally, Israeli military policy with regard to targeted assassinations 
has historically eliminated several educated and moderate Palestinian 
leaders, making it difficult to create a competent government authority.322 
Israel’s control over airspace and the waters further prevents consistent 
Palestinian fishing operations in the Mediterranean,323 as it fails to protect 
the rights of Palestinians in the demolition of tens of thousands of homes in 
the Occupied Territories,324 as well as the destruction of hundreds of 
thousands of fruit and nut trees.325 
                                                          
  318 Salem Ajluni, The Palestinian Economy and the Second Intifada, 32 J. PALESTINE 
STUD. 
64, 64-73 (2003); see also JEWS FOR JUSTICE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE ORIGIN OF THE 
PALESTINE-ISRAEL CONFLICT (3d. ed.), available at 
http://www.deiryassin.org/pdf/origin_booklet.pdf  (Last visited on Apr. 17, 2012).See 
generally Nadim Kawach, Real Per Capita Income of Palestine Plunges, INT’L SOLIDARITY 
MOVEMENT (Jan. 17, 2010), available at http://palsolidarity.org/2010/01/real-per-capita-
income-of-palestine-plunges/; Equal Rights for Palestinians: Apartheid and Occupation, 
SEATTLE MIDEAST AWARENESS CAMPAIGN, available at 
http://www.seamac.org/equalrights.htm (Last visited on Apr. 17, 2012). 
  319 See generally discussion supra note 318.  
  320 Ismael Abu-Saad, State-Controlled Education and Identity Formation Among the 
Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel, 49 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 8, 1085-1100 (2006). 
  321 Tom Selwin, Landscapes of Separation: Reflections on the Symbolism of By-pass 
Roads in Palestine, in CONTESTED LANDSCAPES: MOVEMENT, EXILE AND PLACE” (2001); see 
also ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ISRAEL VERSUS THE PALESTINIANS: THE “SECOND 
INTIFADA” AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 66 (2002) (“The IDF began fighting the Second 
Intifada by focusing on a strategy of containment and isolation rather than reoccupation. It 
isolated key Palestinian population centers, secured access roads and lines of communication, 
and improved the security of the settlements and military installations in the West Bank. Israel 
attempted to combine military isolation with economic measures like freezing financial 
operations and transit between Palestinian areas, cutting off communications, and limiting the 
shipment of goods. Israeli forces emphasized the use of helicopters and standoff precision 
weapons, while seizing and destroying key Palestinian strong points or facilities that could be 
used to attack Israel.”). 
  322 Gal Luft, The Logic of Israel’s Targeted Killing, 10 MIDDLE E. Q. 3 (2003). 
  323 Israel’s control of the airspace and the territorial waters of the Gaza Strip, B’TSELEM 
– THE ISRAELI INFORMATION CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (Sept. 
27, 2010), http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/control_on_air_space_and_ 
territorial_waters. 
  324 Brian Farrell, Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses as a Punitive Measure: 
Application of International Law to Regulation 119, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 871 (2002-2003). 
  325 Atyaf Alwazir, Uprooting Olive Trees in Palestine, INVENTORY OF CONFLICT & 
ENVIR. (Nov. 2002), http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/olive-tree.htm/; see also M. Kehat, 
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Under the authority of this arsenal of complex military laws, the critical 
question is the status of Palestinians in the territories that came under Israeli 
control after the 1967 war. In 1967, Israel launched an offensive attack 
against Syria and occupied the Golan Heights.326 It also occupied the West 
Bank in Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula to the Suez Canal.327 Technically, 
since WWII, international law does not validate the acquisition of territory 
by the use of force.328 However, the occupancy of such territory over time 
may generate new expectations if the legal status of the occupancy is not 
appropriately clarified. The Palestinians have reasserted their claim to 
statehood covering the territories now occupied by Israel—namely, Gaza 
and the West Bank. It is possible that some extremely conservative political 
interests in Israel may wish to change the facts on the ground by increasing 
settlement activity and strategically placing access routes for exclusive 
Israeli use, all while limiting Palestinian social, economic, political 
development in the process. 
Notwithstanding political positioning in domestic Israeli politics, the 
political and economic marginalization of Palestinians, however, is further 
exacerbated by the problem of racism. This is a problem that cuts both ways. 
In the context of Israel, domestic critics seriously lament “the filthy wave of 
racism that is engulfing us.”329 The charge that Israel generates strong racist 
constituencies is both serious and a matter of extreme concern to the Israeli 
authorities. Racism is, in large part, however, linked to the Israeli occupation 
of Palestinian territory. For evidence of this, one need only look to the actual 
practices utilized by occupying IDF forces. According to Avnery’s work 
analyzing and summarizing testimonies of ordinary Israeli soldiers dealing 
with the daily and nightly life of occupation: 
There are accounts of nocturnal incursions into quiet Palestinian 
villages as exercises—breaking into random houses where there 
were no “suspects”, terrorizing children, women and men, 
creating mayhem in the village—all this to ‘train’ the soldiers. 
There are stories about the humiliation of passers-by at the 
checkpoints (“Clean up the checkpoint and you will get your 
keys back!”), casual harassment (“He started to complain, so I 
hit him in the face with the butt of my weapon!”). Every 
                                                          
Threat to Date Palms in Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority by the Red Palm Weevil, 
Rhynchophorus ferrugineus, 27(3) PHYTOPARASITICA,  241-42, (1999). 
  326 WILLIAM W. HARRIS, TAKING ROOT: ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST BANK, THE 
GOLAN, AND GAZA-SINAI, 1967-1980, at 223 (1980). 
  327 Id. 
  328 See generally SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF 
TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1996). 
  329 Uri Avnery, The Darkness to Expel!, GUSH SHALOM (Dec. 25, 2010), http://zope.gush-
shalom.org/home/en/channels/avnery/1293276148/. 
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testimony is meticulously documented: time, place, unit.330 
According to Avnery, the matter-of-factness and the effort to avoid 
outrageous incidents strengthen the credibility of his most recent book 
compiling the experiences of IDF soldiers: 
The intention of the book is not to uncover atrocities and show 
the soldiers as monsters. It aims to present a situation: the ruling 
over another people, with all the high-handed arbitrariness that 
this necessarily entails, humiliation of the occupied, corruption 
of the occupier. According to the editors, it is quite impossible 
for the individual soldier to make a difference. He is just a cog 
in a machine that is inhuman by its very nature.331 
These reports should also be understood in the context of right-wing 
political elements in Israel seeking to depreciate the civic status and 
engagement of Arab citizens within Israel. Loyalty oaths, religious edicts 
that forbid Jews from renting apartments from Arabs, demonstrations in Bet 
Yam calling for the expulsion of all Arabs, and Tel Aviv’s Hatikva Quarter 
demanding the expulsion of foreign workers and refugees all contribute to 
increasing racial tension.332 Right-wing organizations, for example, often 
engage in what in other contexts would be classified as racist rhetoric, 
attempting to legitimize such rhetoric by claiming that the words are based 
upon the Hebrew Bible.333 Jews share a history as millennial victims of 
racism, and there is a great sensitivity within Israel and the Jewish Diaspora 
to the concern that some right-wing political elements in Israel seek to 
promote such a racist agenda.334 Our sense is that the occupation is a major 
contributor to the disturbing emergence of right-wing inspired racism in 
                                                          
  330 Id. 
  331 Id. 
  332 Id. 
  333 Id. However, according to Avnery: “[T]he Hebrew Bible is also a book of unequalled 
humanity. It starts with the description of the creation of man and woman, stressing that all 
human beings are created in the image of God - and therefore equal. ‘So God created man in 
his own image, in the image of God created he him, male and female created he him.’ The 
Bible repeatedly demands the treatment of ‘Gerim’ (foreigners living among the Israelites) as 
Israelites, ‘because you were foreigners in the land of Egypt.’” Id. 
  334 Wasim I. Al-Habil, Occupations, a Diaspora, and the Design of Local Governments for 
a Palestinian State (Nov. 5, 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cleveland State 
University), available at http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-
pdf.cgi/AlHabil%20Wasim.pdf?csu1226688053; see also William Safran, The Jewish 
Diaspora in a Comparative and Theoretical Perspective, 10(1) ISR. STUD. 36 (2005); Michel 
Wieviorka, Racism and Diasporas, 52 THESIS ELEVEN 69 (1998). See generally JASMIN 
HABIB, ISRAEL, DIASPORA, AND THE ROUTES OF NATIONAL BELONGING (2004) (discussing 
the Israeli Diaspora community). 
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Israel. Israelis would benefit, then, just as much as Palestinians would, from 
a just and peaceful settlement.335 
Viewed in the aggregate, discriminatory practices targeting the 
Palestinians may even suggest that the occupying power is purposely 
making life an impossible struggle for the residents of the West Bank and 
Gaza and further polarize both Palestinians and Israelis.  Palestinian 
resistance is often equated both within Israel and the U.S. with terrorism; if 
Palestinians resist with non-violence, however, they are arguably not 
considered to be a serious negotiating party.336 A forthright recognition, 
awareness, and the will to change this underlying reality on the part of 
Israeli diplomats and negotiators will dictate success or failure for future 
negotiations and understandings. 
 
B. International Relations Concerning the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict 
To some extent, Israel achieved statehood by first gaining support in the 
international community as a proto-state using formal legal tools, such as 
treaties, and then acting unilaterally to realize its sovereignty and recognition 
as a state.337 Israel was able to do this by throwing off the paternalistic yoke 
of the UN requirements for statehood and by going to war with the 
neighboring militants, unilaterally seeking to militarily assert the new state’s 
borders and existence.338 The ruling authority of Israel was able to do this at 
the time because it had the force of global opinion behind it.339 What seems 
to threaten the present leadership of the Israeli state, who oppose the creation 
of a Palestinian state, is the wave of global support for the emerging state of 
Palestine.340 Like Israel before it, the proto-state of Palestine must achieve 
                                                          
  335 See generally ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED (2003). 
  336 Assaf Moghadam, Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations 
and Organizational Aspects, 26 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM, 65 (2003); see also Tomis 
Kapitan, The Terrorism of ‘Terrorism’, in TERRORISM & INT’L JUSTICE 47 (James Sterba ed., 
2003); Ariel Merari, Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency, 5 TERRORISM AND POL. 
VIOLENCE,  213 (1993). 
  337 See generally JONATHAN ADELMAN, THE RISE OF ISRAEL: A HISTORY OF A 
REVOLUTIONARY STATE (2008). 
  338 Id. 
  339 See generally Davis Bobrow, International Public Opinion: Incentives and Options to 
Comply and Challenge, in HEGEMONY CONSTRAINED: EVASION, MODIFICATION, AND 
RESISTANCE TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 222 (David Bobrow ed., 2008) Frank L. 
Rusciano, Global Opinion and the English School of International Relations, 4 NEW GLOBAL 
STUD. 1 (2010). 
  340 See generally Paul Chamberlin, The Struggle Against Oppression Everywhere: The 
Global Politics of Palestinian Liberation, 47 MIDDLE E. STUD. 25 (2011). 
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sufficient independence to earn the appellation “self-determined,” even as it 
remains vulnerable to international opinion. 
On the assumption that the UNGA will vote to approve Palestinian 
statehood, the critical question is what next steps Palestinians might pursue 
in reaching a settlement with Israel. A vote overwhelmingly in favor of 
Palestinian statehood in the UNGA would diminish the legitimacy of Israel’s 
stance against the creation of a Palestinian state. From the Palestinian point 
of view, such a development would place it in a considerably stronger 
bargaining position and advance the process of reaching a settlement with 
Israel. 
Clearly, these scenarios are hard to predict. On the one hand, centrist 
politicians within Israel will undoubtedly see this development as an 
incentive to secure speedy settlement. On the other hand, right wing 
politicians are less likely to negotiate from a weakened position and may 
become even more inflexible. Recently, for example, there was serious 
discussion within Israel that, should the Palestinians receive a positive vote, 
Israel would essentially call off what remains of the Oslo Accords.341 In fact, 
ordinary Israeli voters are divided on this issue. Those who favor a 
denunciation of the Oslo Accords argue that the Oslo Accords implicitly 
require Israel to consent to Palestinian statehood and that the Palestinian’s 
unilateral initiative is effectually a repudiation of a major condition of the 
Oslo Accords.342 
In our view, it would be excessive for Israel to repudiate the entire Oslo 
Accords package. First, there are other international actors, such as the 
European Union, Russia, U.S., and the UN, involved in the facilitation of the 
peace process; these actors are vested in the important elements of the Oslo 
                                                          
  341 Barak Ravid, Israel Looking Into Revoking Oslo Accords In Response To Palestinian 
U.N. Bid, HAARETZ.COM (Jul. 25, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-
looking-into-revoking-oslo-accords-in-response-to-palestinian-un-bid-1.375060; see also Saud 
Abu Ramadan & Emad Drimly, Palestinians Say Israel’s Threats to Call Off Oslo Peace 
Accords “Not Surprising,” ENGLISH.NEWS.CN (Jul. 25, 2011), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-07/25/c_131008501.htm; Saed Bannoura, 
Netanyahu’s Office Denies Reports Regarding Voiding Oslo Deals, IMEMC & AGENCIES (Jul. 
26, 2011), http://www.imemc.org/article/61743. 
  342 See also Sonja Karkar, Is Palestine’s Bid for Statehood a Wise Move?, SIDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (Sept. 3, 2011), available at http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/the-
question/is-palestines-bid-for-statehood-a-wise-move-20110902-1jq0s.html. See generally 
Brett Schaefer, What Palestinian Membership Means for UNESCO and the Rest of the United 
Nations, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/12/what-palestine-membership-means-for-
unesco-and-the-rest-of-the-united-nations. 
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Accords.343 Although Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has 
suggested that he is thinking about doing away with Oslo Accords, there is 
considerable opinion in the Israeli foreign policy establishment that this is 
counterproductive. 
In the United States, Congress passed a resolution requiring the 
President to oppose Palestinian statehood.344 The United States Congress, in 
this resolution, is essentially stating that the statehood initiatives would be 
ineffective and that those initiatives are no shortcut to thawing the frozen 
negotiation process.345 
Another approach that does not involve international recognition of a 
Palestinian state would be to follow the South African model and reform the 
Israeli legal system to ensure the equality of all citizens.346 South Africa was 
a unified state in which the white descendants of Dutch colonists ruled the 
black pre-colonial population in a manner that violated the inherent dignity 
and self-determination of the pre-colonial citizens.347 In the end, although 
the state remained a united entity, the constitutional laws were reformed to 
ensure the equality of all citizens.348 
However, there are distinct differences between former apartheid South 
Africa and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. First, Jewish settlers have 
effectively ousted the former natives from the most valuable lands with 
historical monuments, urban development, and access to significant 
                                                          
  343 See generally MICHAËL EMERSON & NATHALIE TOCCI, THE RUBIK CUBE OF THE 
WIDER MIDDLE EAST (2003), available at http://www.ceps.be/book/rubik-cube-wider-middle-
east. 
  344 Concerning the Palestinian State, Unity Government and the Peace Process, S. Res. 
185, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Congress Opposes Palestinian Statehood Outside 
Negotiations, Calls on Palestinian National Authority to Return to Talks, NEAR EAST REPORT 
(Jul. 18, 2011); Congressional Resolutions Oppose Unilateral Palestinian State, JEWISH 
REPORTER (Jul. 8, 2011), http://thejewishreporter.com/2011/07/08/congressional-resolution-
opposes-unilateral-palestinian-state/;  Jennifer Rubin, Is J Street Still Relevant?, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 16, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/right-
turn/2010/12/house_opposes_unilateral_decla.html. 
  345 Lawrence, supra note 214; see also Steve Clemons, Obama Tells Palestinians to Stay 
in the Back of the Bus, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2011) (“The fact is that the status quo of 
frozen negotiations is benefiting the dominant, settlement-expanding Israel – and the U.S., in 
promising to veto at the United Nations Security Council Palestine’s bid for official state 
recognition, is playing guarantor to one side, undermining the aspirations of others on the other 
side of the equation.”), available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/print/2011/09/.../245487/. 
  346 See Winston P. Nagan, African Human Rights Process: A Contextual Policy-Oriented 
Approach, 21 SW. U. L. REV. 63 (1992); see also Winston P. Nagan, South Africa in 
Transition: Human Rights, Ethnicity and Law in the 1990s, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1139 (1990); 
Winston P. Nagan, Law and Post-Apartheid South Africa, 12 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 399 (1988) 
  347 See generally discussion supra note 346. 
  348 See generally discussion supra note 346. 
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resources like water.349  Moreover, the leadership of Israel seems intractably 
set against welcoming Palestinians into a secular state of Israel as citizens 
and equals.350 Furthermore, it is the sovereign right of a state, under 
international law, to determine who may become a citizen, who may be a 
resident, and what types of laws will govern the people within its borders. 
Unless the Israeli polity itself changes these standards in constitutive acts or 
international intervention becomes justified by egregious human rights 
violations, external forces cannot transform Israel into a unified, secular, 
equal rights-based state. 
Israel’s use of military force to acquire Palestinian lands seems to have 
effectively settled Israel’s legal claim to the land seized in the 1948 war and 
subsequent military combat fought over Jewish settlers’ lands. As a result, 
Israel has continued to gain land and extend its constructive borders through 
combat. Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories provoke protests and 
violent reactions of Palestinians, who, having no state, do not have a clear 
right to defend themselves militarily under international law. If they claim 
such a right, they risk being characterized as terrorists.351 This places 
Palestinians in a difficult, if not impossible, situation. 
IV. PALESTINE AND THE PROCESS FOR SECURING STATEHOOD 
RECOGNITION 
 
In the interest of achieving a just and sustainable peace in the contested 
lands under de facto Israeli control, we make a few suggestions on policy 
matters. Most of these suggestions require action by the Palestinian 
governing bodies. Nevertheless, transparency is crucial because all members 
of the world community – including Israel, members of the UNSC, 
                                                          
  349 Izhak Schnell & Shaal Mishal, Place as a Source of Identity in Colonizing Societies: 
Israeli Settlements in Gaza, 98 GEO. REV. 242 (2008). 
  350 D. Newman, The Geopolitics of Peacemaking in Israel–Palestine, 21 POL. GEO. 629 
(2002); see also Joseph H. Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARV. L. REV. 241 
(1923). 
  351 See generally MARWAN BISHARA, PALESTINE/ISRAEL: PEACE OR APARTHEID: 
OCCUPATION, TERRORISM AND THE FUTURE (2002);  MICHAEL STOHL, THE POLITICS OF 
TERRORISM, (1988); MC Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law 
of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98(3) J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY  711 (2008); D. 
Black, The Geometry of Terrorism, 22 SOC. THEORY, 14 (2004); Ronald E. Hall, Beyond the 
Stereotypical Implications of Terrorism: A Sociological Investigation of Arab Immigrants, 
20(2) INT’L REV. SOC. 243 (2010); Kevin Siqueira, Participation in Organized and 
Unorganized Protests and Rebellions,  19(4) EURO. J. POL. ECON., 861 (2003); Tuğçe Öztürk, 
Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process (Dec. 2010) (unpublished M.S. thesis, 
Middle East Technical University) available at 
http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12612774/index.pdf. 
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individual states, and members of state associations – have important parts 
to play in the process of achieving a viable Palestinian state. 
One of the two paths to Palestinian statehood requires the help and 
guidance of the Israeli state, to create the type of Palestinian state indicated 
in the UN Resolution on Partition and the Oslo Accords. Israel has long held 
the support of the world community, especially the United States, in its role 
preparing for the final agreement on Partition.352 However, the longer Israel 
delays this process while simultaneously refusing the Palestinian people real 
inclusion in a unified society, and as long as Israel defies agreements to 
remain within established borders with settlement activities, it risks isolating 
itself from the external powers that have thus far refused to support any 
“unilateral” recognition to a state of Palestine. 
The negotiations process overseen by the Obama Administration has 
completely broken down in recent months.353 This is due, in large part, to 
extraordinary contingencies that Israeli representatives have placed upon 
negotiation. For one, Israeli negotiators have demanded Palestinian 
recognition of Israel as an ethnically exclusive state, and have required 
acceptance of the premise that Jerusalem belongs to Israel, asking for the 
elimination of all restraints on settlement construction and expansion in East 
Jerusalem.354 Yet, precisely because Israelis continued to engage in 
settlement activity, Palestinians have refused to participate in ongoing 
negotiations as well.355 Both President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton 
have condemned these contingencies and the continuing settlements, 
explaining that they were unhelpful to the negotiations process.356 
                                                          
  352 See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, FATEFUL TRIANGLE: THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL, 
AND THE PALESTINIANS (1999); TRITA PARSI, TREACHEROUS ALLIANCE: THE SECRET 
DEALINGS OF ISRAEL, IRAN, AND THE UNITED STATES (2007). 
  353 Iyad Barghouti, Palestinian–Israeli Negotiations: An Objective in Themselves, 46(1) 
INT’L SPECTATOR 15 (2011); see also CAROL MIGDALOVITZ, ISRAELI-ARAB NEGOTIATIONS: 
BACKGROUND, CONFLICTS, AND U. S. POLICY, (2010); Joel Beinin & Lisa Hajjar, Palestine, 
Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Primer, MIDDLE E. RESEARCH & INFO. PROJECT, 
http://merip.org/Palestine-israel_primer/intro-pal-isr-primer.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2012). 
  354 See generally MIGDALOVITZ, supra note 353Document3 and Beinin & Hajjar, supra 
note 353. 
  355 Karin Laub, Peace Talks Stalled: Israeli Settlers Keep Building, So Palestinians Refuse 
Negotiations, HUFF. POST (Oct. 2, 2010 7:07 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/03/peace-talks-stalled-israe_n_748235.html. 
  356 Jamie Weinstein, The DC Analysis: Three Takeaways from Obama Admin’s 
Willingness to Support Israel Condemnation at the United Nations, DAILY CALLER (Feb. 21, 
2011), http://dailycaller.com/2011/02/21/thedc-analysis-three-takeaways-from-obama-
admin%E2%80%99s-willingness-to-support-israel-condemnation-at-the-united-nations/; see 
also Hillary Clinton: Israeli Settlements ‘Illegitimate’, ABC NEWS (Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hillary-clinton-israeli-settlements-
illegitimate/story?id=12952834#.T1J_63JSTns; Hillary Clinton Tells Israel to Stop ‘Settlement 
Activity’ and Provoking Palestine, TELEGRAPH (April 16, 2010), available at 
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A more skeptical view is that these activities are “deal breakers” and the 
Israeli government intends to disappoint by recklessly approving settlement 
activity, thus undermining legitimate expectations that the Israel state is 
engaged in good faith negotiations with the Palestinian people to bring about 
a resolution to the problem. If such an assessment is correct, then current 
Israeli leaders may be actively blocking Palestinians’ efforts to achieve 
statehood. If this is the case, then the body governing the Palestinian people 
in the West Bank and Gaza may consider moving forward “unilaterally”.357 
As long as the PA acts in compliance with contemporary standards of human 
rights and rule-of-law norms, the international community has an ethical 
obligation to support the Palestinians’ efforts. 
 
A. The Creation of a Palestinian Constitution and a Democratic 
Parliamentary Government 
The PA could create a model government to replace itself, because as it 
presently stands, the PA does not have sufficient control over Palestine – its 
authority is subordinate to Israel’s sovereign control under the Oslo Accords, 
and the Interim Agreement expressly prohibits the PA from conducting 
foreign relations.358 The PA should hold elections to form a newly 
parliamentary authority, and this parliament should act to create a 
constituent assembly for the purpose of drafting a constitution of the State of 
Palestine. We are uncertain whether the documents generated by the PA 
amount to a constitution, but we would suggest that, in preparation for 
recognition, the historic documents be integrated into a formal constitution 
of the State of Palestine.  
                                                          
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/7598527/Hillary-Clinton-tells-
Israel-to-stop-settlement-activity-and-provoking-Palestine.html. 
  357 See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1971(2004); Unilateralism at the UN, AIPAC Synagogue Initiative (2011), available at 
http://www.aipac.org/~/media/Publications/Policy%20and%20Politics/AIPAC%20Periodicals/
Middle%20East%20Spotlight/2011/08/MESAug11.pdf. 
  358 The Interim Agreement stipulates that: “In accordance with the DOP, the [Palestinian 
National Authority] will not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations, 
which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of 
foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the West Bank or the Gaza 
Strip, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, and the exercise of 
diplomatic functions.” Interim Agreement, art. IX, Isr.-P.L.O., Sept. 28 1995, 36 I.L.M 551, 
561, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/THE+ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN+INTERIM+AGREEMENT.htm. Under the Interim Agreement, the PLO may 
negotiate and enter into international agreements regarding certain economic development 
plans (as well as certain cultural, scientific and educational agreements), “for the benefit of” 
the Palestinian National Authority. See id. art. IX(b), 36 I.L.M. at 561. Nevertheless, these 
limited activities “shall not be considered foreign relations.” Id.   
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We recommend that the constitution meet contemporary normative 
standards. In other words, the form of governance should be democratic, 
transparent, accountable, responsible, and founded upon the rule of law.359 
Additionally, we would suggest that the PA examine the Badinter 
Arbitration Commission’s deliberations concerning the recognition of the 
statehood of the Balkan states, including Bosnia and Herzegovina.360 The 
Badinter Commission carefully reviewed the constitutions of these new 
states for the purpose of recognition by the European Union and, later, the 
United Nations. These states obtained recognition because they created 
constituent assemblies that debated over and adopted constitutions which 
made the rights and duties of individuals dependent upon their national 
citizenship, rather than solely upon their ethnicity or religious identity.361  
Additionally, recognition by the UN is dependent on a showing that the 
entity claiming sovereignty has the willingness and capability to uphold the 
principles of the UN Charter.362 The PA should reaffirm the 1988 
Declaration of Independence in light of the creation of a new government 
and a new constitution. This would both stress the consistent, continuing 
demand to recognize the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination 
and independence and strengthen the perception of the coherence and 
continuity in the development of Palestinian national identity. 
 
B. International Recognition 
The PA should secure international recognition of both the new 
government and the existence of a Palestinian state. The actual process of 
recognition is clearly complex. At one level, states usually claim as a 
function of their sovereignty that they have complete discretion to decide 
whether to recognize the existence of another state.363 However, recognition 
by regional associations of states tends to be less politicized and governed 
by a greater sense of obligation to conform to regional standards of 
international peace, security, and human rights. Thus, the PA should 
encourage regional organizations to recognize a new, more democratic 
Palestinian government and state similarly committed to these international 
                                                          
  359 Supra note 199. 
  360 See generally Peter Radan, The Badinter Arbitration Commission and the Partition of 
Yugoslavia, 25(3) NATIONALITIES PAPERS 537 (1997). 
  361 Winston P. Nagan, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia, 6 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 127 (1995); see also Winston P. Nagan, Stevan Lilić, 
Petar Šarčević & Nebojša Vujović, U.S. Security Interests and the War in Former Yugoslavia, 
87 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.: PROCEEDINGS 205 (1993). 
  362 See Orakhelashvili supra note 264. 
  363 See generally Montevido Convention, supra note 79; STEPHEN D. KRASNER, 
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999); Crawford, supra note 70. 
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obligations. These would include organizations such as the Arab League,364 
the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization 
(ALESCO), and the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League’s 
Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU).365 We would also recommend 
that the PA secure recognition from regional alliances of states, such as the 
League of Arab States, the African Union, the European Union, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and others. Our sense is that, if a 
sizable number of individual states recognize Palestinian statehood, it would 
ease recognition in regional associations, and this would strengthen the 
momentum of the sovereignty process before the United Nations. 
We would also recommend that the PA present its case to states that 
clearly would recognize it as a state on a bilateral basis – that is, as both a 
government and a state. At present, some 122 states in the UN General 
Assembly recognize Palestine as a state;366 therefore, it is possible that 
Palestinians could receive as much as 90 percent of the world’s countries 
support towards the recognition of Palestinian statehood. 
Finally, the PA should seek to secure a UN General Assembly 
Resolution recognizing the declaration of independence, constitution, and 
government of the newly independent Palestinian state. However, the PA 
should first seek the approval of the Security Council, which essentially 
makes a recommendation to the General Assembly regarding whether a state 
should be recognized. However, this may prove difficult because any one of 
the permanent members on the UN Security Council can exercise the veto 
power.367  
Even without the prior approval of the UN Security Council, it may still 
be of some value to have the UN General Assembly give a recommendation 
                                                          
  364 League of Arab States - regional organization of Arab states in North and Northeast 
Africa, and Southwest Asia. It was formed in Cairo on 22 March 1945 with six members: 
Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan (renamed Jordan after 1946), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. 
Yemen joined as a member on 5 May 1945. The Arab League currently has 22 members and 
four observers. The main goal of the league is to “draw closer the relations between member 
States and co-ordinate collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and 
sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. 
  365 Through these institutions the Arab League facilitates political, economic, cultural, 
scientific and social programs designed to promote the interests of the Arab world. It has 
served as a forum for the member states to coordinate their policy positions, to deliberate on 
matters of common concern, to settle some Arab disputes, and to limit conflicts such as the 
1958 Lebanon crisis. The League has served as a platform for the drafting and conclusion of 
many landmark documents promoting economic integration. One example is the Joint Arab 
Economic Action Charter which sets out the principles for economic activities in the region. 
  366 See generally PLO NEGOTIATIONS OFFICE, RECOGNIZING THE PALESTINIAN STATE ON 
THE 1967 BORDER & ADMISSION OF PALESTINE AS A FULL MEMBER OF THE U.N. (2011); 
discussion supra note 112. 
  367 See Bardo Fassbender, supra note 215. 
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to the Security Council presenting findings of fact and conclusions of law 
that the Palestinian claim to statehood is well founded. Generally, UNGA 
resolutions are nonbinding.368 However, the Israelis utilized Resolution 181 
to declare their independent status and treated Resolution 181 as a legally 
binding instrument.369 When the Palestinians present their case for 
statehood, they are simply asking for a reaffirmation of Resolution 181, 
which stipulated that Partition envisioned the creation of an “Arab State.”370 
It is possible that the issue could be referred for confirmation to the UN 
Security Council and, should this happen, it would be important for the PA 
to seek advance support of the permanent members of the Council. 
The PA faces an uphill battle to secure UNSC support. Because the 
Israeli lobby will remain active in working to secure a veto, Palestinians and 
their allies will have to expend enormous resources to reach out to the U.S. 
government and, if possible, to liberal Jewish groups in the U.S. to have a 
place at the table that has historically been dominated by interest groups like 
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and others.371 To 
this end, it would help Palestinians if they were to secure the support of the 
                                                          
  368 See Kerwin supra, note 221. 
  369 JOHN B. QUIGLEY, THE CASE FOR PALESTINE: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 
53 (2005). 
  370 G.A. Res. 181, supra note 4. 
  371 The American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is a registered Lobby in the 
United States. As Bard notes in his article: 
The organization that directly lobbies the U.S. government on behalf of the Israeli 
lobby is AIPAC. The lobby, originally called the American Zionist Committee 
for Public Affairs, was founded in 1951 by I.L. (Sy) Kenen to appeal directly to 
Congress for legislation to provide aid to Israel to circumvent State Department 
opposition. As recently as the late 1960s, the organization now considered the 
most powerful foreign policy lobby in Washington was essentially a one-man 
operation run by Kenen. In the late 1970s, AIPAC still had only a handful of 
staff based in Washington. Today, it has more than 100 employees with seven 
regional offices and a budget of more than $40 million and lobbies the Executive 
Branch as well as the Legislative. Because of its name, AIPAC is sometimes 
mistakenly thought to be a political action committee (PAC), but the 
organization does not rate, endorse or finance candidates. 
Bard, supra note 269. See also Youssef M. Ibrahim, Israeli Spying On U.S. Unravels - 
Franklin Sings Like Canary, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2004); Stephen Lendman, AIPAC’s Ugly 
Agenda, WARISACRIME.ORG (Sept. 25, 2011); Memorandum from AIPAC, With Israel 
Threatened, U.S. Must Stand Strongly By Ally (Sept. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.aipac.org/~/media/Publications/Policy%20and%20Politics/AIPAC%20Analyses/Is
sue%20Memos/2011/09/AIPAC%20Memo%20%20With%20Israel%20Threatened%20Strong
%20US%20Support%20Needed.pdf. See generally discussion supra notes 180, 211, 268, 270, 
283, 284, 371, 372, 410 and 415 (describing AIPAC’s influence). 
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very powerful peace lobby in Israel.372 Their support will be critical. There 
is also a vigorous and courageous human rights constituency in Israel and 
their voices would carry weight within the U.S. and with some Jewish lobby 
groups in the United States as well.373 The PA should also seek the support 
of liberal and labor elements in the Knesset; this would be useful in terms of 
solidifying public opinion behind their cause. 
One of the Likud-supporting lobby groups in the U.S. has already been 
aggressively working to get the U.S. government to exercise its veto power 
in the UNSC over Palestinian statehood.374 This suggests that an enormous 
amount of political work must be done to ensure that the U.S. does not 
exercise the veto and, at a minimum, remains neutral. In order to achieve 
this goal, the PA needs to generate some support inside the U.S. for the 
recognition of the Palestinian state. We believe the PA should argue that it is 
not for the Netanyahu government to decide to block Palestinian statehood, 
but rather it is a matter for the international community to resolve in 
consensus. Given the furious lobby activity by ultranationalist Israeli 
interests and the promises that the U.S. has made, there is a strong 
possibility that the U.S. will veto any resolution before the UNSC providing 
statehood for the Palestinian people.  
In general, a veto normally means that the matter is concluded before 
the United Nations. However, there is a procedure which was invented by 
the United States to get around the exercise of a UNSC veto, if that veto 
undermines the importance of protecting international peace and security. As 
mentioned supra Part I.F, this procedure is known as the “Uniting for Peace 
Resolution.”375 If it is clear that there is already a supermajority to support 
                                                          
  372 See Sharon Tells Arafat to End Violence, Palestinian Leadership Denounces 
Settlements Expansion, ALBAWABA NEWS (Apr. 8, 2001), 
http://www.albawaba.com/news/sharon-tells-arafat-end-violence-palestinian-leadership-
denounces-settlements-expansion. It should be noted that the driving force behind the Israeli 
peace lobby and human rights groups has a profound connection to the sacred literature of 
Judaism which stresses that justice is integral to every form of human relationship. 
  373 See Stephen Lendman, State of Human Rights in Israel , THEPEOPLE’SVOICE.ORG (Jan. 
3, 2012), http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2012/01/03/state-of-human-
rights-in-israe; see also DPA, Human Rights Watch Reports “Serious Violations” in Israel, 
Palestinian Territories, HAARETZ.COM (Jan. 22, 2012). 
  374 Rebecca Weiner, The Likud Party, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/LikudParty.html, (last visited Feb. 1, 
2012); see also Gideon Levy, With Settlement Resolution Veto, Obama has Joined Likud, 
HAARETZ.COM (Feb. 20, 2011) (“An America that understands that the settlements are the 
obstacle should have joined in condemning them”); CARTA MAIOR U.S. Promises to Block 
Palestinian State; Europe Is Divided, CORREIO DO BRASIL (Sept. 17, 2011), available at  
http://watchingamerica.com/News/122155/united-states-promises-to-block-palestinian-state-
europe-is-divided/. 
  375 G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/377(V) (1950).  
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the use of the “Uniting for Peace Resolution” to overcome a U.S. veto, the 
U.S. administration may be less enthusiastic about exercising the veto. 
Under that hypothetical scenario, the U.S. may simply abstain from the 
Security Council vote. 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s initiative to be admitted to the 
UN as an independent state was initially scheduled for consideration in 
September 2011.376 However, the U.S. was spared the headache of a veto in 
September 2011 because the Palestinians failed to gain a nine-vote majority 
in the Security Council.377 Some diplomats have stated that, at the present 
time, Palestinians would only get eight votes in favor of independence and 
that other countries would vote either against Palestinian independence or 
abstain.378 However, on October 31, 2011, Palestine became the 195th full 
member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) after a vote of 107 to 14, with 52 abstentions.379 
After that step was taken, the United States cut off its funds to UNESCO as 
a punitive action, calling the vote “premature”; as a result, the organization 
lost almost one-quarter of its yearly budget – which included 22 percent 
contributed by the United States plus another 3 percent contributed by 
Israel.380 
Notwithstanding the accomplishment of legitimate acceptance as a full 
member of UNESCO, the Palestinians decided to put their UN bid on hold 
in order to participate in informal Jordanian-sponsored talks with Israel at 
the beginning of 2012 in Amman.381 In light of these talks and with the goal 
of reaching an agreement, the Middle East “Quartet” – which includes the 
U.S., the European Union, the UN and Russia, along with the Former Prime 
Minister of the UK, Tony Blair, as the Quartet’s envoy to the region – urged 
                                                          
  376 Matthew Fisher, UN to Hear Palestinian Bid for Statehood, NAT’L POST (Sept. 16, 
2011), http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/09/16/un-to-hear-palestinian-bid-for-statehood/. 
  377 Ben Birnbaum, Palestinians to Renew Efforts for Bid to UN; Talks with Israel Delayed 
Attempt, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/19/palestinians-to-renew-efforts-for-bid-to-
un/?page=all. In the absence of a veto, a council resolution still needs nine votes to pass. 
  378 Patrick Worsnip, New UN Council No More Favorable to Palestinians: U.S., REUTERS 
(Jan. 23, 2012). 
  379 Steven Erlanger & Scott Sayare, UNESCO Accepts Palestinians as Full Members, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/world/middleeast/unesco-
approves-full-membership-for-palestinians.html?pagewanted=all; General Conference Admits 
Palestine as UNESCO Member, UNESCO.ORG (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-
view/news/general_conference_admits_palestine_as_unesco_member_state/. 
  380 Erlanger & Sayare, supra note 379; Harriet Sherwood, US Pulls UNESCO Funding 
after Palestine is Granted Full Membership, GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/31/unesco-backs-palestinian-membership. 
  381 See Birnbaum, supra note 377. 
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the parties to submit proposals on borders and security by January 26, 
2012.382  
In January 2012, U.S. and European players brought Palestinians and 
Israelis to five rounds of so-called exploratory talks in Amman.  The talks 
were scheduled in the hope of resuming the peace negotiations that had been 
stalled in September 2010, after Israel insisted on continuing settlement 
activities on Occupied Palestinian Territories, including Arab East Jerusalem 
and the West Bank.383 However, on January 26, 2012, during a session at the 
World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, with Palestinian Prime Minister 
Salam Fayyad and Israel’s President Shimon Peres, Israel laid out a vision 
“that would closely follow the line of Israel’s controversial security barrier 
leaving all of Jerusalem inside Israel”384 and basically proposed the current 
Gaza barrier as an international border between Israel and Palestine.385 
Although Palestinian officials seem to be ready to accept minor 
adjustments, they described the proposed border as “impossible” and Israel’s 
position as “less than what was offered by Netanyahu’s predecessors, Ehud 
Barak and Ehud Olmert, who were willing to discuss a partition of Jerusalem 
as well.”386 In this sense, although Netanyahu is still firm in his position of 
continuing “Israeli presence on the eastern border of a future Palestinian 
state as part of any peace deal,” Israeli officials have said that “any presence 
in the Jordan Valley could be reviewed over time.”387 Both sides continue to 
blame each other for the failure of the talks.  Recently, Palestinian President 
Mahmoud Abbas accused Israel of spoiling the low-level talks by failing to 
                                                          
  382 Id. 
  383 This Week in Palestine: Week 4, 2012, IMEMC.ORG (Jan. 27, 2012), 
http://www.imemc.org/article/62913. 
  384 Agence France Presse, Israel Proposed “Impossible” Borders: Palestinians, 
VANCOUVER SUN (Jan. 29, 2012), 
http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Israel+proposed+impossible+borders+Palestinians/60688
90/story.html  (“‘They said to us, Jerusalem is out of the question. Large numbers of settlers 
will stay in the West Bank. They were talking about impossible borders,’ the official said. 
‘They didn’t specifically mention the wall, but the details can be interpreted as them using the 
wall for the border,’ he added. The Palestinians have long complained that Israel built the 
barrier with the intention of eventually turning it into an international border. Israel says the 
barrier is designed to prevent attacks and cites a decrease in the number of deadly bombings 
since construction began in 2002. When the 709-kilometre (435-mile) barrier is complete, 85 
per cent of it will have been built inside the occupied West Bank.. The official said that the 
Israeli presentations, made during a final round of talks on January 24 and 25, revealed wide 
gaps between the two sides.”). 
  385 Id. See also Mohammed Daraghmeh & Dan Perry, Israel Proposes West Bank Barrier 
as Border, BOSTON.COM (Jan. 27, 2012), 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2012/01/27/ap_exclusive_barrier_prop
osed_as_israel_border/?page=full 
  386 Agence, supra note 384; Daraghmeh & Perry, supra note 385. 
  387 Daraghmeh & Perry, supra note 385. 
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present detailed proposals for borders and security requested by international 
mediators, while Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has stated that 
the “Palestinians ‘refused to even discuss’ Israeli security needs.”388 
The Quartet asked both sides to continue the talks and to present 
detailed proposals on borders and security arrangements. However, the 
Palestinian negotiators argue that the period set aside for the contacts ended 
on January 26, 2012, and Israeli negotiators argue that the original intention 
was to have three months of talks and therefore meetings should continue.389 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who is certainly unlikely to consider 
a proposal that keeps East Jerusalem under Israeli control, stated that he 
would consult with senior officials from the PLO, the Arab League, and his 
Fatah movement on whether or not to continue the talks.390 However, the 
Palestinian negotiators have already expressed that “they will not hold talks 
while Israel builds on land they want for a future state, and they want 
negotiations on borders to be based on the lines that existed before the 1967 
war.”391 As a result, the Palestinians decided to step up their diplomatic 
campaign at the United Nations, sidelining Israel.392 
V. INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR PARTIES 
We would like to suggest that respect for the international rule of law, 
and especially human rights norms is the best alternative for all the parties 
involved and the international community as a whole. We address the 
particular interests of the parties individually, in turn. 
 
A. U.S. Interests and Ultra-Nationalist Politics in Israel 
A useful starting point for an appraisal of U.S. policy and interests in 
the Middle East is the Camp David Accords, which were originally 
negotiated by President Jimmy Carter.393 The Accords, which included 
                                                          
  388 Agence, supra note 384. See also Palestinian President Abbas Says Israel Spoiled 
Latest Round of Talks on Border, Security, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-president-abbas-says-israel-
spoiled-latest-round-of-talks-on-border-security/2012/01/29/gIQAXscHZQ_story.html. 
  389 Id.; see also Agence supra note 384; Daraghmeh & Perry, supra note 385. 
  390 Daraghmeh & Perry, supra note 385. 
  391 Id. 
  392 Palestinians Blame Israel for Failure of Amman Talks, TIMES LIVE (Jan. 31, 2012), 
http://news.monstersandcritics.com/middleeast/news/article_1688245.php/Palestinians-blame-
Israel-for-failure-of-Amman-talks 
  393 Camp David Accords (Sept. 17, 1978), ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
available at 
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secret negotiations between the parties, resulted in two framework 
agreements. The first dealt with the status of the Palestinians and their 
territorial rights under international law.394 The second, which was a 
separate agreement, was a framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty 
between Israel and Egypt.395 
The first of these two framework agreements made at Camp David put 
U.S. foreign policy squarely behind the international law stipulations and 
provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which were 
particularly relevant as a foundation for the U.S. to align its foreign policy 
with international law with regard to the international status of the 
Palestinians.396 The U.S. has a clear foreign relations interest in settling the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and those interests also implicate sensitive and 
vital national security interests. The U.S., as a member of the Middle East 
“Quartet,” is involved with other major international players whose interests 
are not necessarily the same.397 However, the U.S. has also had to formulate 
its foreign policy objectives to ensure that they reconcilable with the 
positions of the other three members of the Quartet. 
Additionally, the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict has now 
become a much more immediate national security concern, after the attacks 
on the World Trade Center by Al Qaeda operatives on September 11, 2001. 
One of the purported justifications for the attack was the unconditional 
support of the U.S. government for Israel and its policies vis-à-vis the 
Palestinians.398 The U.S. response to 9/11 involved the nation in high 
intensity conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. The belief that Israel and its 
policies of occupation represent simply an extension of U.S. policy has been 
                                                          
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Ca
mp%20David%20Accords . 
  394 Id. 
  395 Id. 
  396 A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David, Sept. 17, 1978, 17 
I.L.M. 1466, 1467. See generally Richard A.  Falk & Burns H. Weston, The Relevance of 
International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the 
Intifada, 32 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 129 (1991). 
  397 See, e.g., David Singer, Quartet Quartered, Road Map Thwarted, Palestine Aborted, 
AM. THINKER (July 18, 2007), 
http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/07/quartet_quartered_road_map_thw.html;  see also 
KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH, EUROPEAN VIEWS AND POLICIES TOWARD 
THE MIDDLE EAST (Mar. 9, 2009), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/44134.pdf. 
  398 See Douglas Kellner, Globalization, Terrorism, and Democracy: 9/11 and Its 
Aftermath, in FRONTIERS OF GLOBALIZATION RESEARCH 243 (Ino Rossi ed., 2007). See 
generally DAVID JONATHAN ALBERT, THE ROLE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S.-ISRAEL “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP” AND THE LOST 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACHIEVING MIDDLE EAST PEACE (2007). 
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a central motivating tool for the alienation of radical Muslims, and their 
deployment as terrorists.399 Unquestioning support of Israeli military policies 
continue to fuel a dangerous ostensible justification for anti-Americanism 
and a collapsed assumption that U.S. policy itself is anti-Muslim.400 Given 
that there is a global population of close to two billion Muslims, the Israeli-
Palestinian occupation continues to be a dangerous touchstone which can 
catalyze a move from alienation to extremist terrorist activity.401 
It appears that the Obama Administration and the U.S. security 
establishment are aware of these issues. When the Obama Administration 
came to office, they were confronted by concerns that the continuing Israeli-
Palestinian conflict served as a recruiting tool for alienated jihadist 
extremists and terrorists.402 In response, the Obama administration brought a 
team of talented negotiators to press for the restart of negotiations toward a 
settlement. The President even went to Cairo to address the billions of 
Muslims who may have experienced some alienation due to the polarizing 
nature of the international Israeli-Palestinian debate.403 
However, the over twenty-five ultranationalist pro-Israeli lobby groups 
in Washington, D.C. continue to hold tremendous influence in the 
development of U.S. foreign policy regarding Israel.404 These groups are 
attentive to the needs of Israel’s ultranationalist political interests. For 
example, for several months, domestic Israeli lobby groups pressured the 
U.S. government and Congress to block the recognition of a Palestinian state 
by ensuring the U.S. would veto any Resolution to that effect which would 
come before the UN Security Council. 
The influence of “The Lobby”405 in the United States can be seen in the 
recent House Resolution No. 1765, which reaffirmed “strong opposition to 
any attempt to establish or seek recognition of a Palestinian state outside of 
                                                          
  399 See generally Kellner, supra note 398. 
  400 Id. See generally JAMES F. PETRAS, THE POWER OF ISRAEL IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2006); Barry Rubin, The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism, 81(6) FOREIGN AFF. 73 
(2002). 
  401 See generally Catalyst for Great American Tragedies: Pandering U.S. Politicians and 
Militant Zionists, DEFRAUDINGAMERICA.COM,  
http://www.defraudingamerica.com/israel_palestine_index.html (last visited April 17, 2012); 
Nathan W. Toronto, Forty Years of COIN: The Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories, 50 JOINT FORCES Q. 79 (2008). 
  402 Alan Elsner, Hamas, Islamic Jihad Reject Obama’s AIPAC Address, ISRAEL PROJECT 
(Jan. 29, 2012); see also Ahmed M. Soliman, President Obama: A New Hope for 
Israel/Palestine?, STRATEGIC FORESIGHT GROUP (Dec. 2008), 
http://www.strategicforesight.com/President_Obama.htm. 
  403 Obama Egypt Speech: Video, Full Text, HUFF. POST (June 4, 2009), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/04/obama-egypt-speech-video_n_211216.html. 
  404 See supra, notes 179, 210, 269, 270 & 284. 
  405 See supra notes 180, 211, 268, 270, 283, 284, 371, 372, 410 & 415. 
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an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.”406 This 
resolution emphasized the principle that a lasting peaceful solution will only 
come about through the negotiations of both parties, i.e., the state of Israel 
and the representatives of the Palestinian people. What the resolution does 
not address is the inability of the Palestinian representatives to negotiate any 
solution with Israel where the parties bear such inequality in political and 
economic status. Moreover, in condemning efforts of the Palestinian people 
to seek statehood—even by purely peaceful and legal means—outside of 
negotiation with Israel, the U.S. House undermines U.S. treaty obligations to 
support the achievement of Palestinian self-determination, independence and 
statehood.407 
This successful lobbying effort on behalf of the state of Israel reveals 
two characteristic aspects of the ultraconservative U.S. Israeli Lobby. First, 
it can powerfully refocus the attention of the U.S., even during holidays with 
a “lame duck” Congress –and even when the PA has committed no 
indiscretion to justify the U.S. behaving contrary to its international law 
obligations and its own national interests.408 Second, “The Lobby” does not 
have in mind the best interests of the United States, but rather, those of 
Israel; this arguably works to the detriment of U.S. foreign relations and 
security interests.409 Here, the simplistic idea, which some U.S. 
Congressional Representatives have uncritically accepted, is that Israeli and 
U.S. interests are one and the same. A more discriminating view would see 
that Israel, as an independent state, has unique and discreet interests.410 It has 
been reported that well-placed neoconservative political appointees and 
elected officials pass on sensitive information to Israeli officials on the 
                                                          
  406 H. Res. 1765, 111th Cong. (2010). 
  407 S. Res. 185, 112th Cong. (2012). 
  408 See supra text and sources accompanying notes 180, 211, 268, 270, 283, 284, 371, 372, 
410 and 415.. 
  409 See, e.g., Max Blumenthal, The Bibi Connection, AL-AKHBAR.COM (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/bibi-connection. See generally text and sources 
accompanying notes 32, 210-212, 214, 284, 345, 348, 376-80, 412, 417 and 440. 
  410 See, e.g., Robert C. Lieberman, The “Israel Lobby” and American Politics, 7 
EXCHANGE 235 (2009); see also Robert D. Blackwill & Walter B. Slocombe, Israel: A True 
Ally in the Middle East, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/31/opinion/la-oe-blackwill-israel-20111031  (“Israeli 
contributions to U.S. national interests, underappreciated by many, include enhanced counter-
terrorism, intelligence and technology useful in urban warfare.”); Ilan Pappe, Clusters of 
History: US Involvement in the Palestine Question, 48 RACE CLASS 1 (2007); cf. Gli Cohen, 
Top U.S. General: We Have Many Joint Interests with Israel in Middle East, HAARETZ.COM 
(Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/top-u-s-general-we-have-
many-joint-interests-with-israel-in-middle-east-1.408342. See generally James F. Petras supra 
note 403. 
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assumption that, since there is no difference between Israel and the U.S., by 
definition they are not really passing on state secrets.411 
Finally, the breakdown in talks between the Palestinian and Israeli 
negotiators and the effort to undermine U.S. mediation efforts have also 
prompted some of the United States’ most distinguished public servants to 
issue a widely publicized document under the title “A letter to President 
Obama.”412 The authors of this letter are extremely disquieted by the failure 
of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East  – they see the current situation as 
exacerbating Israeli isolationism, undermining moderation and the prospects 
for peace with an Israeli state among Palestinians. They also warn that the 
political vacuum is dangerous for all parties, and urge for a renewed effort to 
revive a dynamic role for the U.S. in Middle East diplomacy.413  
The letter provides a profoundly realistic summation of the central 
problems that confront the concerned parties and recommends a framework 
for a permanent status accord. These principles provide a promising starting 
point for the Palestinians; yet present issues that may be anathema to the 
current right-wing policies of President Netanyahu and his acolytes.414 One 
of the issues highlighted in the letter is the vexing problem of borders: 
But it is not the State of Israel within its 1967 borders that is 
being challenged. It is Israel[i] occupation, the relentless 
enlargement of settlements, its dispossession of the Palestinian 
people in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the 
humanitarian disaster caused by its blockade of Gaza that are the 
                                                          
  411 See, e.g., NOAM KOCHAVI, NIXON AND ISRAEL: FORGING A CONSERVATIVE 
PARTNERSHIP (2009); Sami E. Baroudi, Arab Intellectuals and the Bush Administration’s 
Campaign for Democracy: The Case of the Greater Middle East Initiative, 61(3) MIDDLE E. J., 
390 (2007); Obama Secretly Sold Israel Bunker-Busting Bombs (VIDEO), JSPACE (Sept. 26, 
2011); see also Youssef M. Ibrahim, Israeli Spying On US Unravels - Franklin Sings Like 
Canary, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2004). 
  412 Letter from Lee H. Hamilton et al. to Barack Obama, U.S. President (Jan. 24, 2011) 
(hereinafter “Hamilton Letter”), available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jun/23/letter-president-
obama/?pagination=false. 
  413 Id. 
  414 Id.; see also Natasha Mozgovaya, Netanyahu: Palestinians Making ‘Terrible Mistake’ 
By Not Resuming Peace Talks, HAARETZ.COM (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-palestinians-making-terrible-
mistake-by-not-resuming-peace-talks-1.386955; Barak Ravid, Netanyahu: Palestinian 
Statehood Bid at UN Bound to Fail, HAARETZ.COM (Sept. 18, 2011); 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-palestinian-statehood-bid-at-un-
bound-to-fail-1.385131; Netanyahu: Palestinians Want State Without Peace, YNETNEWS.COM 
(Sept. 23, 2011),  http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4126626,00.html 
NAGAN - MACRO(FINAL) JCI (1).docx (DO NOT DELETE) 10/25/2012  2:15 PM 
2012] Palestinian Statehood 419 
target if international anger and condemnation.415 
Israeli peace scholar Uri Avnery, holds a pessimistic view of the current 
Israeli leadership in this regard: 
Netanyahu, of course, has no peace plan. His declared position 
is that the Palestinians must return to direct negotiations without 
prior conditions, but only after they officially recognize Israel as 
“the state of the Jewish people” (or, in another version, as a 
“Jewish and democratic state”.) It is clear that the Palestinians 
cannot be expected to agree to any such prior condition.416 
                                                          
  415 See Hamilton Letter, supra note 412. A summary of what is proposed in the letter 
includes recommendations that: 
The U.S. staunchly defend the legitimacy of Israel, as qualified by the phrase 
“within internationally recognized borders.” 
The U.S. must support the establishment of a Palestinian sovereign State based on 
the 1967 borders. Territorial adjustments are to be made by agreement only. 
Unilateral acquisitions of territory in violation of international borders would not 
be recognized nor given the legitimacy. 
The U.S. will work towards adjust a fair solution to the refugee problem. U.S. 
commitment is based on the realism of the unlimited flow of refugees, which 
would dramatically affect the demographics of Israel. 
The U.S. will have a crucial role to play in appropriate security policy for both 
Israel and Palestine. Here, the U.S. supports a demilitarized Palestinian State 
with security mechanisms that address Israel’s concerns and still respect 
Palestinian sovereignty. This could include the stationing for multinational force 
as appropriate. 
The policy on the emotive issue of Jerusalem, recommending a form of complex 
shared control and unimpeded access to holy places. 
The U.S. supports the reconciliation of Fatah and Hamas on terms compatible 
with the above principles and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338. 
Id. These writers concluded their letter with a strong paragraph and a recommended 
framework for a permanent status accord: 
We understand, Mr. President, that the initiative we propose you take to end the 
suffering and statelessness of the Palestinian people and the efforts to undermine 
Israel’s legitimacy is not without political risks. But we believe that if the 
American people are fully informed by the President of the likely consequences 
of the abandonment of U.S. leadership in a part of the world so critical to this 
country’s national security and to the safety of our military personal in the 
region, he will have their support. Id. 
  416 Uri Avnery, Interim Forever, GUSH SHALOM (Jan. 03, 2011), http://zope.gush-
shalom.org/home/en/channels/avnery/1293896699 
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According to Avnery, the Palestinians would never agree to accept 
Israel as an exclusively ethnic Jewish state when there are over a million 
Israeli Arab citizens living there.417 The Israeli demand for the recognition 
of Israel as a Jewish State has no coherent intellectual cohesion, and is used 
by Netanyahu “as a trick to obstruct the establishment of the Palestinian 
State”.418 Avnery adds that to deny “the Jewish character” of the state is 
tantamount to the worst of all political felonies, according to the to the right 
wing doctrines, in claiming that Israel is a “State of all its citizens”.419  
Avnery also explains how Netanyahu’s Foreign Minister Lieberman 
amplifies his position to excess.420 If Lieberman sees no final agreement, 
Netanyahu would likely hold out for an interim agreement which may be of 
indefinite duration. The idea of an interim agreement simply means, as a 
practical matter, that settlement expansion will occur and East Jerusalem 
will ultimately be incorporated into Israel.421 Most recently, Netanyahu had 
a telephone conversation with Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, to 
rebuke her for Germany’s vote in favor of the Security Council resolution 
condemning the settlements – a resolution blocked by U.S. veto.”422 
In 2010, Lieberman spoke before the UN General Assembly and 
indicated that, contrary to Netanyahu’s statements in Washington D.C., there 
was no chance for a peace treaty, not within a year or several generations. 
This statement implied a multigenerational interim agreement and an Israeli 
occupation without end in sight.423 Because of the importance of Israel’s 
                                                          
  417 See generally Kurt Rene supra note 26. 
  418 Uri Avnery, Deny! Deny!, GUSH SHALOM (Jun. 18, 2011), http://zope.gush-
shalom.org/home/en/channels/avnery/1308345669/ 
  419 Uri Avnery, The Dwarfs, GUSH SHALOM (Mar. 12, 2011), http://zope.gush-
shalom.org/home/en/channels/avnery/1299886464/ (indicating that the radical move to the 
extreme right under Netanyahu has accelerated). 
  420 Avnery, supra note 419 (noting that Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman holds 
out even less hope for a settlement as it is his belief that Palestinians cannot be a peace partner 
because they do not want peace); see also Jonathan Kay, Avigdor Lieberman: Palestinian 
Statehood Would Set a Dangerous Precedent, NAT’L POST (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/09/20/avigdor-lieberman-palestinian-statehood-
would-set-a-dangerous-recedent; Barak Rabid, Lieberman: Palestinians Want to Take Over 
Israel from Within, HAARETZ.COM (Aug. 27, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
defense/lieberman-palestinians-want-to-take-over-israel-from-within-1.381011. See generally 
Jonathan Lis, Lieberman: Palestinians Were Dragged into Negotiations, Breakthrough 
Impossible, HAARETZ.COM (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
defense/lieberman-palestinians-were-dragged-into-negotiations-breakthrough-impossible-
1.406302. 
  421 See sources cited supra note 361. 
  422 Uri Avnery, Wrong Side, GUSH-SHALOM (Mar. 5, 2011), http://zope.gush-
shalom.org/home/en/channels/avnery/1293896699). 
  423 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Lieberman Addresses the U.N. 
General Assembly (Sept. 28, 2010), 
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Foreign Minister, Lieberman, in influencing Israeli foreign policy, and 
particularly over the promise of negotiating a settlement, it is unclear 
whether Lieberman’s solution to radically press for an Israeli state free from 
Arabs, implies an illegal policy of ethnic cleansing with regard to non-
Jews.424 Recently, he summoned Israel’s 107 senior diplomats to provide 
them with a firsthand account of his thinking.  
Lieberman holds to a view that is arguably more concrete and more 
radically right-wing than Netanyahu; he firmly believes that the Palestinians 
do not want peace. According to Lieberman, “Even if we offer the 
Palestinians Tel Aviv and a withdrawal to the 1947 borders, they will find a 
reason not to sign a peace treaty.”425 Finally, Lieberman stressed that 
moving purposefully with peace negotiations would split the right-wing 
coalition such that the conservative coalition government in the Knesset 
would not survive.426 
It seems to us that only sufficiently strong pressure would compel him 
to shift his position. A significant number of U.S. Congressional 
Representatives would need to support the Obama Administration, and 
secure the critical support of the major Jewish religious, social, and political 
organizations in the U.S., towards a realistic peace process, because a 
sustainable peaceful resolution is in the national pragmatic interests of both 
the U.S. and of Israel. So long as pro-Israeli support groups in the U.S. 
provide support only to narrow ultranationalist Israeli political factions and 
                                                          
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2010/FM_Liberman_
Addresses_UN_General_Assembly_28-Sep-2010.htm. 
  424 Ian Deitch, Avigdor Lieberman: Cut Ties With Palestinians, HUFF. POST (Aug. 7, 
2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/07/avigdor-lieberman-west-
bank_n_920429.html. 
  425 See sources cited supra notes 423-427. Mr. Netanyahu’s visit to the U.S. was arguably 
designed to lay a political foundation for a complete rejection of the two-state solution which 
represents broadly the official U.S. perspective. Consider the following words from Dr. Erekat: 
 The Israeli government is implementing its vision for the destruction of a two-
state solution presented by Prime Minister Netanyahu to the American Congress. 
This settlement is not only another obstacle to returning to negotiations, but it 
also raises tensions, institutionalizes discrimination, and brings those with 
extremist beliefs in close proximity to Palestinian residential areas.  
Press Release, Negotiations Affairs Department, Palestine Liberation Organization, Dr. Erekat 
on Ma’ale Hazetim Settlement (May 26, 2011), available at http://www.nad-
plo.org/print.php?id=292.  Dr. Erekat asserts that Israel’s action in implanting settlers in 
Palestinian neighborhoods is an attempt to destroy the social fabric of Palestine. “What it has 
done in places such as Hebron, Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah has broken families apart, terrified 
children, and left people homeless.” Id.  See also Kevin Clarke, Mr. Netanyahu Goes to 
Washington, AMERICA MAGAZINE (May 26, 2011) available at 
http://www.americamagazine.org/blog/entry.cfm?blog_id=2&entry_id=4255 
  426 See sources cited supra notes 423-427, 368. 
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policies, the greater the intransigence of these entrenched ultranationalist 
political interests against a realistic peace settlement. This is not to say that 
ultranationalist Israeli political advocacy is the exclusive stumbling block to 
a final resolution; but as it stands today, it certainly is a crucial threshold 
barrier. 
A continuation of conflict may favor the ultranationalist political 
factions in Israel in the long haul, however; 400 lethal nuclear arsenals 
remain at the ready, in the custody of the IDF.427 These arsenals are 
themselves a destabilizing force, and become even more dangerous when the 
levels of conflict sporadically spiral out of control.428 They also create an 
incentive for the states surrounding Israel to acquire nuclear weapons 
capabilities. Thus, the conflict has both regional and global implications. 
Our sense is that a majority of Israeli citizens would opt for a reasonable 
settlement with a reasonable adjustment of territorial interests.429 We 
therefore do not believe that a majority of Israelis are opposed to a 
Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. While it is currently in a position 
of power, unfortunately, like most ultranationalist groups, the Israeli 
ultranationalist contingent is engaged, energized, and occasionally 
fanatical.430 
Israel and the United States have divergent interests regarding military 
intervention in the Middle East and sustaining the role of international law 
regarding such interventions. The Bush Administration unfortunately allied 
itself with Israeli interests in the Middle East and ultimately ended up 
embroiled in military interventions and wars both of questionable benefit to 
U.S. interests and of questionable legal right under international law.431 U.S. 
policy leaders at the time invested in extravagant security ideas, many of 
which were originally generated by the Likud, such as the “Clean Break” 
doctrine.432 This doctrine was ultimately mutated after 9/11 into the “Bush 
Doctrine,”433 a claim to preemptive military intervention.434  
                                                          
  427 See sources cited supra notes 438 and 442. 
  428 See sources cited supra notes 438 and 442. 
  429 Dov Waxman, Israel’s Palestinian Minority in the Two-State Solution: The Missing 
Dimension, 18 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 68 (2011) available at http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-
east-policy-archives/israels-palestinian-minority-two-state-solution-missing-dimension; see 
also Dr. Moises Salinas-Fleitman & Theodore Bikel, Buy Israel – Don’t Buy Settlements 
(They’re not the Same), MERETZ USA (February 15, 2011), http://meretzusa.org/buy-israel-
%E2%80%93-don%E2%80%99t-buy-settlements-they%E2%80%99re-not-same. 
  430 SASSON SOFER, PEACEMAKING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY: ISRAEL AFTER RABIN, (2001); 
see also NADAV G. SHELEF, EVOLVING NATIONALISM: HOMELAND, IDENTITY, AND RELIGION 
IN ISRAEL, 1925-2005 ( 2010), 
  431 Mitchell Plitnick, Did Israel Lead the U.S. into the War on Iraq?, JEWISH VOICE FOR 
PEACE (Dec. 20, 2011), http://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/content/did-israel-lead-us-war-iraq. 
  432 RICHARD PERLE ET AL., A CLEAN BREAK: A NEW STRATEGY FOR SECURING THE 
REALM (1996), available at http://www.israeleconomy.org/strat1.htm (Prepared in 1996 by a 
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Nevertheless, the roots of the desire to attack Iraq came from the 
Likud’s Clean Break Doctrine, and the Likud’s interest in regime change 
emerged from a view of Saddam Hussein as a serious security challenge to 
Israel. With Saddam gone, there has been a relentless campaign for regime 
change Iran.435 We would submit that it is actually not in the national 
security interest of the United States at this time to start a new war in the 
Middle East. Notwithstanding the unpopular attitude of the Iranian regime, it 
is not probable that the majority of the American people would support a 
new neoconservative adventure, given the outcome of the last two military 
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.436 In this sense, it would be of value 
for the Obama Administration to repudiate those aspects of the Bush 
Doctrine that are controversial and that challenge international law. 
The U.S. supplies Israel with the best military technology; but in the 
future, such support may not be in the best interest of the United States. 
Despite the history of good relations in the past, Israel and the U.S. have 
been on rocky footing in recent years.437 The U.S. could not influence the 
                                                          
study group led by Richard Perle for Benjamin Netanyahu, the then Prime Minister of Israel. 
The report explained a new approach to solving Israel’s security problems in the Middle East 
with an emphasis on “Western values”. It has since been criticized for advocating an 
aggressive new policy including the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq); see also 
ADAM SHAPIRO ET AL., NEOCON MIDDLE EAST POLICY: THE “CLEAN BREAK” PLAN 
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (2005). 
  433 See discussion supra note 432. See generally MARK GERARD MANTHO, THE BUSH 
DOCTRINE: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, ALTERNATIVES (2004), available at 
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0404mantho.pdf. 
  434 Mantho, supra note 432. See generally Hichem Karoui, “Conservative Revolution” 
Against America: The Bush Legacy: Debate About a Doctrine and its Tributaries, 1 SOC. SCI. 
& HUMAN. 3 (2010), available at http://www.social-sciences-and-
humanities.com/journal/?p=3569; W. Patrick Lang, Drinking the Kool-Aid, 11 MIDDLE E. 
POL’Y 39 (2004), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1061-
1924.2004.00152.x/abstract. 
  435 See generally ROGER HOWARD, IRAN IN CRISIS?: NUCLEAR AMBITIONS AND THE 
AMERICAN RESPONSE (2004); Gawdat Bahgat, Iran and the United States: The Emerging 
Security Paradigm in the Middle East, 37 PARAMETERS 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/07summer/bahgat.pdf; Patrick J. 
Buchanan, Whose War?, THE AM. CONSERVATIVE (2003); Sukumar Muralidharan, Israel: An 
Equal Partner in Occupation of Iraq, 39 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 4517 (2004), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4415643?uid=3739560&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&ui
d=4&uid=3739256&sid=56001684803. 
  436 See, e.g., JOHN R. KRISMER, OUR PUPPET GOVERNMENT (2008);  JUSTIN VAÏSSE, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, WHY NEOCONSERVATISM STILL MATTERS (2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/05_neoconservatism_vaisse/ 
05_neoconservatism_vaisse.pdf. See generally discussion supra note 435. 
  437 Rennert, supra note 33; see also Casey L. Addis, Israel: Background and U.S. 
Relations; Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE (Feb. 14, 2011); 
Blumenthal, supra note 409; Max Blumenthal, Netanyahu’s war against Obama (Jan. 12, 
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Israeli government to halt settlements, for example, no matter how many 
highest-grade fighter planes the U.S. offered the state of Israel.438 Nor could 
the U.S. induce Israel to behave with transparency in conformity with 
international standards regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons.439 
Indeed, Israel has a significant trade market selling weapons.440 There is a 
potential possibility that, should the U.S. break politically with the 
ultranationalist project, that Israeli weapons technologies could be deployed 
against U.S. troops in the future. 
The state of high-security crisis in Israel, regarding Jerusalem and the 
West Bank, is funded, in large part, by U.S. assistance.441 In addition to 
sources of funding from private U.S. individuals and organizations, there is 
enormous pressure on the U.S. government to increase economic aid to 
Israel from 10 billion to at least 20 billion a year.442 It is estimated that Israel 
                                                          
2012), http://warincontext.org/2012/01/12/netanyahus-war-against-obama/; Helene Cooper & 
Mark Landler, U.S. Trying to Balance Israel’s Needs in the Face of Egyptian Reform, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2011); U.S.-Israeli Relations and the Drastically Changing Middle East, 
ISRAEL POLITIK (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.israelpolitik.org/2011/03/10/u-s-israeli-relations-
and-the-drastically-changing-middle-east/. 
  438 See generally Barak Ravid & Natasha Mozgovaya, U.S. offers Israel warplanes in 
return for new settlement freeze, HAARETZ (Nov. 13, 2011), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/u-s-offers-israel-warplanes-in-return-for-
new-settlement-freeze-1.324496; Israel buys more fighter planes to USA, COMUNICAS (Oct. 8, 
2010), http://en.comunicas.org/2010/10/08/israel-buys-more-fighter-planes-to-
usa/#axzz1rGzxZSqW; Time To Tell The Truth About Israel ..Without Fear Of The Mind 
Police, DAVID ICKE (Jan, 2, 2009), http://www.davidicke.com/headlines/18750-time-to-tell-
the-truth-about-israel-without-fear-of-the-mind-police- (2009). 
  439 See sources cited supra notes 271 & 438. See generally WARNER D. FARR, THE THIRD 
TEMPLE’S HOLY OF HOLIES: ISRAEL’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Sept. 1999), available at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/farr.htm; Louis Rene Beres, Implications of a 
Palestinian State for Israeli Security and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment, 17 
DICK. J. INT’L L. 229 (1998-1999); Ivo Daalder & Jan Lodal, Logic of Zero - Toward a World 
without Nuclear Weapons, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 80 (2008); Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 
NUCLEAR WEAPON ARCHIVE (Dec. 10, 1997), 
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Israel/index.html;  Israel – Nuclear Weapons, FEDERATION 
OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (2007), https://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/. 
  440 See generally The Dangers of a US Sponsored Nuclear War, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2005), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OPhDRI44dTI. 
  441 See generally JEREMY M. SHARP, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. Foreign 
Aid to Israel, Congressional Research Service (Mar. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf; Mitchell Bard, U.S. Aid To Israel, JEWISH 
VIRTUAL LIBRARY (last updated Jan. 2012), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-
Israel/foreign_aid.html. 
  442 Israel may ask U.S. for $20 billion more in security aid, Barak says, HAARETZ (Mar. 8, 
2011), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-may-ask-u-s-for-20-billion-
more-in-security-aid-barak-says-1.347866. 
NAGAN - MACRO(FINAL) JCI (1).docx (DO NOT DELETE) 10/25/2012  2:15 PM 
2012] Palestinian Statehood 425 
has received some 2 trillion from the American taxpayers since 1967.443 As 
vast billions of U.S. dollars are being borrowed to fund the security needs of 
the state of Israel, this debt is being passed on to future generations in the 
U.S., along with mounting unrest in a region under occupancy, in large part, 
through U.S. financial assistance.444 A dramatic move toward the 
recognition of Palestinian statehood as a step toward an accelerated peaceful 
settlement would reduce Israel’s security anxieties and the need for near 
economically dependent assistance from U.S. taxpayers.445 
U.S. policy and the interest groups involved in the Middle East should 
be very discriminating about which groups they decide to support in Israel, 
to ensure that no one political party or group, including the ultranationalist 
political interests, do not hold the U.S. interest in peace and security hostage. 
In terms of contemporary international relations, Israeli ultra-nationalism has 
proven to be an ongoing danger to regional peace and security. It is quite 
possible that greater Israeli interests and U.S. interests share much in 
common, but the interests of the current Israeli leaders are distinctively 
different. The critical challenge for pro-Israel individuals, communities, and 
lobby groups in the U.S. is to undertake to determine which of their 
activities actually support U.S. interests – particularly national security 
interests, and longstanding peace in the region – and which activities, in fact, 
undermine them. 
 
B. Israeli Interests in the Recognition of Palestinian Statehood 
and the “Arab Spring” 
Israeli interests are complex on the question of the recognition of a 
Palestinian state. We are rejecting the idea that the majority of Israelis will 
opt for a state of continual insurrectionary, low-level conflict, which is 
precisely the danger of undermining the political development of appropriate 
democratic, transparent institutions of good governance in the Palestinian 
Territories. It is therefore in Israel’s interest that to recognize a Palestinian 
state because it will diminish the prospect of any precarious governing 
authority fomenting instability if controlled by third party forces. This type 
of government will provide the Israelis with the highest level of security, 
something most Israelis, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, agree is as an 
                                                          
  443 Bollyn, supra note 269; see also Thomas R. Stauffer, The Costs to American Taxpayers 
of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: $3 Trillion (June 2003), 
http://www.ifamericansknew.org/stats/stauffer.html. 
  444 Mitchell Bard, U.S. Aid To Israel, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY (updated Jan. 2012) 
  445 Bollyn, supra note 269. 
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important part of settlement.446 In short, constitutional good governance for 
the Palestinians with the prospect of enterprisory freedoms could produce a 
stable and important political entity, which would significantly stabilize the 
prospects for peace and security in the region.447 The alternative is simply to 
deny any right to self-determination, which will most certainly carry 
destructive consequences in the long term.448 
There are two fundamental Israeli interests in the success of a 
negotiated settlement with Palestinian leadership. The first is Israeli security 
interests, an interest that is still dependent on U.S. support and could be in 
jeopardy if U.S. efforts at mediation are sabotaged by the extreme right wing 
political forces in power within Israel. Failure in this regard would 
compromise both U.S. and Israeli security interests. The second major 
interest of Israel is the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and promotion of the 
legitimacy of the state of Israel. This is an issue that is extremely sensitive to 
the current Israeli leadership and their supporters in the Diaspora 
community. The issue of legitimacy emerged in part by the effort on the part 
of Israeli detractors to suggest that Israeli policy regarding non-Jewish 
inhabitants of the State were being subjected to policies that were analogous 
to some aspects of the grand design of apartheid in South Africa.449 
Opponents expressed that Israeli policy and practices with regard to the 
Palestinians had vulnerabilities ominously close to the policies and practices 
of South African apartheid.450 For example, Israel vigorously opposed 
efforts to create a boycott of Israeli trade and cultural changes.451 However, 
the problems of legitimacy seem now to be tied to the beliefs, the ideology, 
and the policies of the extreme right wing political factions in Israel. These 
policies, which carry significant racial overtones, are committed to the idea 
                                                          
  446 Full Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu Address to UN General Assembly, YOUTUBE 
(Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebOsg9CCj6c; see also Natasha 
Mozgovaya, supra note 212. 
  447 John Graham et al., Principles for Good Governance in the 21st Century (2003), 
available at http://iog.ca/sites/iog/files/policybrief15_0.pdf. 
  448 Cf. The Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice for the 21st Century, supra note 236. 
  449 Abigail B. Bakan & Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Israel/Palestine, South Africa and the ‘‘One-
State Solution’’: The Case for an Apartheid Analysis, 37 POLITIKON 331 (2010); see also 
MARWAN BISHARAH, PALESTINE/ISRAEL: PEACE OR APARTHEID: OCCUPATION, TERRORISM 
AND THE FUTURE (2002);  JIMMY CARTER, PALESTINE: PEACE NOT APARTHEID (2006); D. 
Glaser, Zionism and Apartheid: a Moral Comparison, 26 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 403, 403-
21 (2003);  Mark Marshall, Rethinking the Palestine Question: The Apartheid Paradigm, 25 J. 
PALESTINE STUD. 15, 15-22 (1995). 
  450 See Bakan & Abu-Laban, supra note 450. 
  451 Id. at 346; see also  Abbie Bakan, Israeli Apartheid: A Socialist View, BULLET (Mar. 7 
2011), http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/477.php; Israeli anti-boycott bill approved for vote 
by Knesset plenary, J NEWS (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.jnews.org.uk/news/israeli-anti-
boycott-bill-approved-for-vote-by-knesset-plenary. 
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of an Eretz Israel, an idea which, as discussed supra Part I.A, seems to be 
wedded to a repudiation of the boundaries supported by international law452 
and to a repudiation of the idea that sovereigns cannot acquire territory as a 
consequence of conquest, because these only exacerbate the problems of 
legitimacy.453 
Any important Israeli security interest could be clarified and advanced 
with the recognition of Palestinian statehood. Israel has argued that rocket 
and terrorist attacks from the Occupied Palestinian Territories gives it a right 
to self-defense to respond to such attacks.454 However, this claim has not 
met with an approval that carries global consensus. The technical argument 
against Israel’s claim to assert the right of self-defense is necessarily based 
on the principle that the Occupied Palestinian Territories under PA control 
are not recognized as a nation state.455 It is maintained, however that Israel 
cannot assert its right of self-defense against an entity that is not a sovereign 
state in international law. The U.S. Congress has enacted legislation, 
however, to suggest that Israel does have a right of self-defense under these 
circumstances.456  
The U.S. Congress may of course declare international law; but the 
currency of its declaration (which is essentially unilateral) would seem to 
require more multilateral acceptance for it to be seen as a reflection of 
positive international law. If the Palestinians were granted status as citizens 
of a sovereign nation, there would be no ambiguity regarding the assertion of 
                                                          
  452 G.A. Res. 181(II), supra note 4. 
  453 See generally discussion supra notes 265, 328 and 454. In 1919, the Versailles 
Convention outlawed the notion of “By right of conquest” and that notion was affirmed by the 
League of Nations in 1935 and later reaffirmed by the UN after WWII. In this regard, the 
Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza is illegal under international laws going back to 
1919. See generally KORMAN, supra note 328. 
  454 Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit 
from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 62, 62-76 (2005). 
  455 INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory: Summary of the Advisory Opinion, at 12 (July 9, 2004), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1677.pdf. (“Under the terms of Article 51 
of the Charter of the UN: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. 
Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in 
the case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does not claim 
that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State. … Consequently, the Court 
concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case.”). 
  456 Congress Affirms Israel’s Right to Self-Defense, NEAR E. REP. (July 12, 2010), 
http://www.aipac.org/NearEastReport/20100712/SelfDefenseLetters.html. 
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the right of self-defense.457 At the same time, the right to self-defense in 
international law telegraphs clearly the corresponding obligations, of 
proportionality and others, on the Palestinian state, as well as the 
consequences to follow if those obligations were unmet.458 To the extent that 
the right of self-defense is clarified by Palestinian sovereignty, the mutual 
security interests of each body politic are significantly enhanced.459 
One of the arising concerns in Israel is the emergence of racism in 
official Israeli policies, which is fueled by the extremist right wing political 
factions.460  The first point here is that this embarrasses Israeli intellectuals 
and human rights campaigners because the Jews in the Diaspora had been 
millennial victims of vicious racism, which has expressed itself as an 
ideological structure of “anti-Semitism.”461  
The practices against Jews fueled by the banner of anti-Semitism 
culminated in the worst racist disaster the international community has ever 
experienced. That disaster, in which Jews were the primary victims, was the 
Holocaust of the Nazis. It is therefore a great embarrassment, to many Jews, 
that some extremist groups in Israel feel free to exhibit and perpetuate the 
worst forms of pathological racism.462 The non-settlement of matters with 
the Palestinians fuels this level of insecurity. It therefore seems to be a 
matter of some national urgency in Israel that a settlement be expedited. We 
would hold that a sound settlement would serve as powerful antidote to the 
insipient pathologies of racism fueled by right wing fanaticism. The two 
state solution seems to be one of the most achievable objectives in a 
                                                          
  457 See supra discussion notes 106, 455, 452, 459-460. 
  458 See William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol in Conventional 
Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91 (1982);  Michael Franck, The Future of Judicial 
Internationalism: Charming Betsey, Medellin v. Dretke, and the Consular Right Dispute, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 515 (2006);  Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in 
International Law, 102 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 715 (2008); Mikael, Nabati, International Law at a 
Crossroads: Self-Defense, Global Terrorism, and Preemption (A Call to Rethink the Self-
Defense Normative Framework), 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 771 (2003). See 
generally Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804) (The Charming Betsy doctrine is a 
canon of statutory interpretation, stating that, absent clear congressional intent to the contrary, 
or where fairly possible, courts should construe statutes in order to avoid violations of 
international law). 
  459 Yaroslav Shiryaev, Circumstances Surrounding the Separation Barrier and the Wall 
Case and their Relevance for the Israeli Right to Self-Defense, 14 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 1  (2011) 
  460 See generally Edy Kaufman, The Intifadah and the Peace Camp in Israel: A Critical 
Introspective, 17(4) J. PALESTINE STUD. 66, 66-80 (1988) 
  461 See Michel Wieviorka, Racism and Diasporas, 52 THESIS ELEVEN 69, 69-81 (1998); 
see also JOHN G. GAGER, THE ORIGINS OF ANTI-SEMITISM: ATTITUDES TOWARD JUDAISM IN 
PAGAN AND CHRISTIAN ANTIQUITY, (1985); Daniel Boyarin & Jonathan Boyarin, Diaspora: 
Generation and the Ground of Jewish Identity, 19 CRITICAL INQUIRY 693, 693-725 (1993). 
  462 See generally NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN, THE HOLOCAUST INDUSTRY: REFLECTIONS 
ON THE EXPLOITATION OF JEWISH SUFFERING (2003). 
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settlement and therefore is a matter of important national interest for the 
state of Israel.463 
This past summer, Israel was wracked with internal social justice 
protests. Commentators suggested that Israeli protests were, at least in part, 
inspired from the lessons generated in the “Arab Awakening.”464 These 
protests have caused apprehension on the part of the government coalition in 
Israel. Israel’s alliance with the Mubarak regime in Egypt significantly 
buttressed its strategic influence in the Middle East,465 and the collapse of 
Mubarak removed a core pillar that supported its strategic posture.466 The 
rise of a populist democratic movement in Egypt, which sees the Mubarak 
legacy as decrepit and corrupt, and its fledgling government are therefore 
cautious about Israeli overtures. Additionally, Israel’s northern border with 
Lebanon is still recovering from the recent Israeli attack on Lebanon.467 And 
Israel’s long time ally in the region, Turkey, has now largely rejected Israeli 
ties after the Israeli attack on a Turkish humanitarian mission.468 
In an odd twist of fate, Netanyahu, the primary author of the Clean 
Break Doctrine, which argues for regime replacement and the imposition of 
democracy as a pathway to peace, has now seen his objective close to 
realization, but without using the methods of regime replacement that he 
may have originally had in mind.469 The emergence of a popular democratic 
                                                          
  463 See generally Richard Falk, International Law and the Peace Process, 28 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 331 (2004-2005) 
  464 See generally KENNETH M. POLLACK ET AL., THE ARAB AWAKENING: AMERICA AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (2011); Antony Lerman, ‘The people want 
social justice’? On ‘people’ and ‘justice’ in the Israeli protests, INDEPENDENT JEWISH VOICES 
(Aug. 30, 2011), http://ijv.org.uk/2011/08/30/the-people-want-social-justice-on-people-and-
justice-in-the-israeli-protests/. 
  465 See Barak Ravid, Israel urges world to curb criticism of Egypt’s Mubarak (Jan. 31, 
2011), http://www.cpgb.org.uk/article.php?article_id=1004520; see also Ben Lynfield, Israel 
worried as Mubarak teeters, GLOBAL POST (Jan. 29, 2011), 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/israel/110129/egypt-mubarak-netanyahu. 
  466 ROBERT SPRINGBORG, MUBARAK’S EGYPT: FRAGMENTATION OF THE POLITICAL 
ORDER (1989); see also MAHA AZZAM, EGYPT: THE ISLAMISTS AND THE STATE UNDER 
MUBARAK, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM (1996). 
  467 See, e.g., Efraim Inbar, How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War, 14 MIDDLE E. Q. 
57, 57-65 (2007), available at http://www.meforum.org/1686/how-israel-bungled-the-second-
lebanon-war . 
  468 See discussion supra note 317; see, e.g., The Palmer Report into the Gaza Flotilla, 
AUSTRALIA/ISRAEL & JEWISH AFFAIRS COUNCIL (Sept. 7, 2011), 
http://aijac.org.au/news/article/the-palmer-report-into-the-gaza-flotilla . 
  469 P. David Hornik, Netanyahu’s One-Year Report Card - Government rebuilding Israel’s 
strength on many fronts, FRONTPAGE MAGAZINE (Feb. 28, 2011), available at 
http://bibireport.blogspot.com/2010_02_01_archive.html; see also Anthony Lewis, Israel can 
no longer act alone, STAR NEWS (Oct. 22, 1996) available at 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1454&dat=19961002&id=C6osAAAAIBAJ&sjid= 
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movement within Israel will make it difficult for Israel to resist the 
Palestinian push for self-determination. There is a perspective emerging that 
the current elite will simply not have the vision, the tools, or the will to help 
Israel confront with the changing environment in the Middle East.470 In sum, 
the greater the success of the democratic “Arab Spring,” the more 
diminished Israel’s strategic options for avoiding a settlement with the 
Palestinians. The essential reality is a radically new regional political 
environment, which values basic human rights and dignity. Israel therefore 
must adjust its position or risk becoming characterized as a regime that is a 
throwback leftover from the debris of the dictators of Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Libya.471 
                                                          
QxUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=4634,321957; Carlo Strenger, Israel’s right have eyes but do not see, 
have ears but do not hear, HAARETZ.COM (Jan. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/strenger-than-fiction/israel-s-right-have-eyes-but-do-not-see-
have-ears-but-do-not-hear-1.336224. 
  470 See Kathleen Christison, “The Insane Brutality of the State of Israel” Atrocities in the 
Promised Land, RADIO ISLAM (2006), available at 
http://www.godlikeproductions.com/forum1/message263751/pg1  (“A nation that mandates 
the primacy of one ethnicity or religion over all others will eventually become psychologically 
dysfunctional. Narcissistically obsessed with its own image, it must strive to maintain its racial 
superiority at all costs and will inevitably come to view any resistance to this imagined 
superiority as an existential threat. Indeed, any other people automatically becomes an 
existential threat simply by virtue of its own existence. As it seeks to protect itself against 
phantom threats, the racist state becomes increasingly paranoid, its society closed and insular, 
intellectually limited”); What Are You Willing to Die For? (Feb. 18, 2010), 
http://shrinkwrapped.blogs.com/blog/2010/02/what-are-you-willing-to-die-for.html. 
  471 Daniel Levy, Israel and the Arab Uprisings: Challenges in a Changing Middle East; 
NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION (Jan. 20, 2012), 
http://newamerica.net/publications/resources/2012/israel_and_the_arab_uprisings_challenges_
in_a_changing_middle_east; see also Daniel Levy, Israeli Democracy in Peril: Why Daniel 
Levy thinks Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians is poisoning the Jewish state from within 
(Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/intelligence_squared/2012/01/why_daniel_le
vy_will_argue_for_palestine_s_admission_as_a_u_n_member_state_at_the_slate_intelligence
_squared_debate_on_jan_10_.html; Daniel Levy, Same Netanyahu, Different Israel; The 
Demographic Challenges to Peace (Mar. 24, 2011), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67863/daniel-levy/same-netanyahu-different-israel. In 
these pieces, scholar Daniel Levy lists some central challenges for Israeli policy in light of the 
new Middle East environment. First, he addresses the context of cooperation with leaders from 
popular democracy is not going to be founded on cooperation as in the past with strong 
authoritarian personalities like Mubarak. Working in cooperation with the changing political 
culture of the Palestinians will also be more complex. What would be required is a change, not 
only in policy, but in the psychological orientation of Israeli’s leadership which is often seen 
itself as superior and condescending in its communications with Palestinians. Second, the new 
arena of action makes it extremely difficult for Israel’s reliable allies to support it uncritically 
in the new environment. Since the dominant opinion of the West is to support democracy for 
the Arabs it is impossible not to support it for the Palestinians too. The future will not be a 
settlement of terrorists, but with nonviolent democratic social activists. Third, the security with 
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It would be of special importance that the supporters of Israel in the 
Jewish Diaspora be heard as a constructive force in shaping a new, more 
democratic, multilateral strategic outlook, one that is consistent with the 
values the Israelis themselves expressed in their Declaration of 
Independence.472 Additionally, it would be of great value if the U.S. could 
step back and encourage a freer and less ideological discourse in Israel to 
emerge as a constructive response to the new challenges of a new 
environment. It is our belief that, in the long run, Israel will be better off 
embracing the values of democratic entitlement expressed in the Arab 
Spring rather than engaging in cynical backdoor alliances for the purpose of 
undermining the democratic moment. 
 
C. Palestine’s Role and Interests in Democratic Statehood 
One of the foremost advantages of a recognized Palestinian state is that 
a duly recognized state would sharpen the legal question of Israel’s 
continued occupation. The occupation in the face of recognized statehood 
would be tantamount to the occupation of territory by the use of force in 
violation of UN Charter Article 2(4).473 Thus, Resolution 242,474 which calls 
                                                          
regard to contiguous borders will not be as stable and reliable as they were under Mubarak. 
The choice for the Israeli authorities is massively more military spending and a massive 
depreciation of spending on social justice issues, or, alternatively, a change of outlook in a 
progressive direction that will involve less defense expenditures, more social expenditures and 
more flexibility on the fundamental rights of Palestinians. These are serious policy questions 
that all Israelis must now consider. Fourth, the Israeli authorities must also consider how they 
would respond to increased nonviolence social activism and whether the use of unlimited force 
is simply a strategy that is no longer of value in a changed environment. The Middle East 
always generates a wild card which can undermine the most fundamental of secular values. 
Democratic values will of course require a tolerance of religious Islamic movements into the 
fabric of the Arab Spring. However, such tolerance might well be required at a time when the 
intolerance of Israel’s extremist religious fundamentalists are most vocal on Israel’s political 
stage. The use of religious rhetoric can be a deal-breaker and a harbinger of tragedy. Clearly 
one of the most important tasks of the public opinion and media in Israel is to better prepare 
the community for a significant and important change in the way it structures its new strategic 
outlook. 
  472 Israeli Declaration of Independence, supra note 19. 
  473 See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4 (“Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2: The 
Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in 
accordance with the following Principles…(4) All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations”). 
  474 See S.C. Res. 242, supra note 126. Following the June ‘67, Six-Day War, the situation 
in the Middle East was discussed by the UN General Assembly, which referred the issue to the 
Security Council. After lengthy discussion, a final draft for a Security Council resolution was 
presented by the British Ambassador, Lord Caradon, on November 22, 1967. It was adopted 
on the same day. This resolution, numbered 242, established provisions and principles which, 
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for the end of occupation, in light of legally recognized statehood, would 
bring into focus the illegality of occupation under the assumption that the 
IDF’s occupancy is now that of an aggressor. A fully recognized state would 
therefore make it difficult for Israel to negotiate or discuss matters, which is 
a matter of state responsibility, as violations of international law. 
The creation of a democratically elected, regularly constituted 
parliament, administrative agencies, and courts, as well as the organization 
of the professions with state regulation and backing and the organization of 
education and social services would bring untold advantages in official 
recognition of Palestinian statehood. Hopefully, these would progress with 
the security of established and definable democratic institutions.475 Most 
importantly for the Palestinians, the structures of good governance require 
transparency, responsibility, and accountability, and respect for the rule of 
law.476  
To the extent that authority is relatively informal at present, third party 
forces exercise easy influence over the government, likely contributing to 
coercion and violence. Thus, transparent, democratic and good governance 
principles, practically applied in the context of an independent Palestinian 
state, could usher in greater peace and security in the region.  It is usually in 
the period before formal institutionalization, where governance is 
unformulated and loosely organized, that there is an opportunity for 
penetration by terrorist operatives. A state’s constitutional ideology could 
stress the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. All 
Palestinians would benefit from this.477 
The recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state would improve the 
negotiating stature of Palestinian negotiators478 regarding the complex map 
                                                          
it was hoped, would lead to a solution of the conflict. Resolution 242 was to become the 
cornerstone of Middle East diplomatic efforts in the coming decades. 
  475 See generally MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL.,  HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC 
ORDER 161 (1980); McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative 
Decision, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73-154 (1969). 
  476 See Lichta et al., supra note 200; see also Graham et al., supra note 448. 
  477 The remarks of Dr. Saeb Erakat, the Chief negotiator of the PLO articulates the 
Palestinian interest in terms of the problem that it experiences: “We are marking 44 years of 
settlement-colony expansion. Israel’s illegal and discriminatory policies have led to the 
displacement and dispossession of our people, and are aimed at making the establishment of a 
Palestinian state impossible. Dr. Erakat added that “if the members of international community 
are serious about the two-state solution they must, at the very least, recognize the State of 
Palestine on the 1967 borders. This will send a clear message to Israel that in the 21st century, 
borders are determined by international law and not by settlement colonies that are built on 
land that was acquired by force.” Negotiations Office  Press Release, PALESTINE LIBERATION 
ORGANIZATION (June 4, 2011), http://www.nad-plo.org/print.php?id=293 . 
  478 The Status of Negotiations: Looking Forward and Looking Back, CHURCHES FOR 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.cmep.org/content/status-negotiations-
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of Israel and Palestine, including, settlements, the “wall” in Jerusalem479 and 
other issues of geographic complexity.480 They would also have to work to 
complete a peaceful settlement with the state of Israel, which raises issues 
involving Jerusalem, settlements, borders, and related issues, water, 
refugees, political prisoners, missing persons and the remains of fallen 
persons, economic and trade relations, monetary affairs, and claims 
resolution.481 
Water resources are a major sought-after asset in the Middle East. The 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank reinforces a strange incentive for Israel 
to continue to attempt to control water resources in the West Bank. The 
importance of water to the viability of a Palestinian state is critical, and an 
important aspect of Palestinian political competence would be the ability to 
control and regulate a vital resource, critical to the survival and well-being 
of a new state. If Palestine gains competent control over the distribution of 
these resources, there would have to be a separate agreement or understating 
for the channeling of water resources to the settlements. Below are a map 
and a table that illustrate the distribution of water, which  underline its 
importance to both the Israeli occupying forces and illegal Israeli settlement 
outposts as well as the occupied Palestinian people who live in the West 
Bank. 
 
  
                                                          
looking-forward-and-looking-back. The main Palestinian negotiators include Palestinian 
President Mahmoud Abbas, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Chief Negotiator Dr. Saeb 
Erekat. 
  479 See supra discussion notes 28-31, 53, 173, 176, 177-179, 181, 213, 281, 321, 325, 349, 
356, 372, 374, 429, 438 and 477. 
  480 Press Release, PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, Israeli Human Rights Violations 
Within The Occupied Palestinian Territory (June 2011), http://www.nad-
plo.org/userfiles/file/fact%20sheet/Israeli%20violations%20within%20the%20occupied% 
20Palestinian%20territory%20(oPt)%20January%20%20May%202011.pdf; Press Release, PLO 
Negotiations Affairs Department, Israeli Policies in Occupied East Jerusalem: Colonizing the 
Land and the People (June 2011), http://www.nad-
plo.org/userfiles/file/media%20brief/Jerusalem%20Media%20Brief%20May%202011.pdf. 
  481 G.A. Res. 62/75, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/75-E/RES/2007/13 (May 3, 2007); see also 
TANYA REINHART, THE ROAD MAP TO NOWHERE: ISRAEL/PALESTINE SINCE 2003 (2006); Eyal 
Benvenisti & Haim Gvirtzman, Harnessing International Law to Determine Israeli-
Palestinian Water Rights: The Mountain Aquifer, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 543 (1993) . 
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Map of the water resources of Israel/Palestine, and water utilization 
along the Jordan River.  From the Palestinian Academic Society for the 
study of International Affairs (PASSIA) 2002482 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
482 Map of the water resources of Israel/Palestine, and water utilization along the Jordan River.  
From the Palestinian Academic Society for the study of International Affairs (PASSIA) 2002 
(www.passia.org)  
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Abstraction from the three shared aquifers within West Bank and Israel 
1999 (MCM)483 
  Abstractions Excess over Article 40 allocation 
Aquifer “Estimated 
potential” 
    Total 
Palestinian
Total 
Israeli
     Total 
Abstracted
Palestinian 
           26 
Israeli Total over- 
extraction 
Western 362.0 29.4 591.6 621.0 7.4 251.6 259.0 
North 
Eastern 
145.0 36.9 147.1 184.0 (5.1) 44.1 39.0 
Eastern 172.0 71.9 132.9 204.8 (2.6) 92.9 90.3 
Total 679.0 138.2 871.6 1,009.8 (0.3) 388.6 388.3 
 
The above diagram and table must be understood in the current 
geopolitical context: that water resources are a major political issue in the 
Middle East.484 Indeed, Israel receives most of its water from two aquifers 
which are underground and which extend into Palestinian territory.485 This 
generates conflict which remains unresolved. The West Bank aquifer is 
considered a major water resource.486 While Israelis use approximately 800 
liters of water per day, Palestinians are allowed to use only an approximate 
of 200 liters per day.487 Besides that, Israel prohibits Palestinians from 
drilling into the West Bank aquifer without permits and likewise prohibits 
Palestinians from constructing cachement basins to collect rainwater.488 
In Part III.A of this article we addressed a significant number of 
deprivations experienced by Palestinians. These include deprivations 
relating to land ownership and rights, deprivations from defense emergency 
regulations, military abuses from occupation policy, limits on movement, on 
doing business and trade and the prohibition of access to goods and other 
                                                          
  483 WORLD BANK REP., ASSESSMENT OF RESTRICTIONS ON PALESTINIAN WATER SECTOR 
DEVELOPMENT 11 (2009), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WaterRestrictionsRepo
rtJuly2009.pdf. 
  484 See generally Gamal Abouali, Natural Resources Under Occupation: The Status of 
Palestine Water Under International Law, 10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 411 (1998). 
  485 Id. 
  486 Id.; see also  Miriam R. Lowi, Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource Disputes 
and the Case of West Bank Water, 18 INT’L SEC. 113, 138 (1993). 
  487 See Abouali, supra note 484; see also WORLD BANK REP. supra note 483; see also 
WORLD BANK REP., WEST BANK AND GAZA - GAZA WATER SUPPLY REHAB AND EXPANSION 
PROJECT (2007); U.S. NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ET AL., WATER FOR THE FUTURE: THE 
WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, ISRAEL, AND JORDAN (1999); Dan Izenberg & Ehud Zion 
Waldoks, Mekorot: Water Supply to West Bank is High, JERUSALEM POST (June 30, 2008), 
http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=106052. 
  488 See World Report 2012: Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories Events of 2011, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (Jan. 2012), http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-
israeloccupied-palestinian-territories. 
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deprivations relating to settlement activities in Palestinian lands.489 
Palestinian state sovereignty will certainly increase Palestinian negotiating 
power to effectively redress these disabilities and deprivations in 
negotiations with the Israeli state. The promise of equitable distribution of 
land and water resources also represents an important incentive for 
Palestinians to secure recognition for statehood. 
 
D. The Impact of Popular Democratic Movements in the Middle 
East and North Africa on The Development of Palestinian 
Statehood 
Finally, the assertion of Palestinian interests in self-determination, 
independence, and statehood comes at a time when there is a remarkably 
progressive, democratically-inspired movement in the Arab world loosely 
called the “Arab Spring”.490 The ideals of human rights, democratic 
independence, and essential human dignity have inspired every day people 
living in traditional Arab nationalist states to shed the vestiges of 
authoritarian dictatorship. In a nutshell, the Palestinian territories under 
occupancy fall within elements of “emergency rule” that are analogous to 
the permanent states of emergency that sustained autocratic leaders in 
several countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa.491 In many 
ways, the claim to self-determination and independence of the Palestinians is 
functionally equivalent to the claims that had emerged in the Middle East for 
the replacement of autocracy with democracy. The current political climate 
favors the progressive development of democratic, self-determined 
independence for the Palestinians under the rule of law. 
It would be useful to examine the elements that fueled the Egyptian 
“Arab Spring” or Political Revolution. Egyptian society is complex and 
segmented. The very conservative Muslim community known as the Salafis, 
which is influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and shares some sympathies 
with Al Qaeda – is the largest group claiming to represent conservative 
Islamic values in the country.492 Egyptian society is also composed of 
Muslims who are politically and religiously moderate, as well as Muslims 
                                                          
  489 See supra Part III.A. 
  490 See generally Vincent Cannistraro, Arab Spring: A Partial Awakening, 22 
MEDITERRANEAN Q. 36, 36-45 (2011). 
  491 Id.; Noura Erakat, Emergency laws and the Arab Spring (July 5, 2011), 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2051/emergency-laws-the-arab-spring-and-the-
struggle-ag; see also Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Tunisia: Exemplar or Exception?, FOREIGN 
POL’Y RES. INST. (Jan. 2011), http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201101.maddy-
weitzman.tunisia.html. 
  492 See generally QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ, THE MANAGEMENT OF ISLAMIC ACTIVISM: 
SALAFIS, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AND STATE POWER IN JORDAN (2001). 
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who maintain a secular outlook.493 There is also a significant Christian 
minority of Coptic Christians.494 The intellectual and scientific elite also 
comprise a distinct segment of Egyptian society.495 Further, there are those 
who work as functionaries in the Egyptian bureaucracy, in the legal 
profession, or with military and security.496 A very strong and efficient 
dictator, Hosni Mubarak, controlled the Egyptian state for over thirty 
years.497 Under Mubarak, the rigor with which the regime maintained its 
level of control and dominance kept in check the identifiable segments of 
Egyptian society.498 The regime was skilled at insulating itself from the 
larger Egyptian social process while at the same time maintaining effective 
security and control.499 Its insulation meant that it was out of touch with a 
vast number of its polity. The government provided only nominal services to 
the lower classes, and in many instances, none at all.500 
For those Egyptians able to acquire higher education and professional 
skills under Mubarak, increased access and economic opportunity was 
limited, resulting in intellectual and professional frustration and waste.501 
The deal the government struck with Israel and U.S. provided the regime 
with sufficient financial lubrication to ensure that those within the circle of 
privilege and power were cared for.502 The regime remained very insensitive 
to the frustrations of its skilled and intellectual class and to the suffering of 
                                                          
  493 See generally SANA HASSAN, CHRISTIANS VERSUS MUSLIMS IN MODERN EGYPT: THE 
CENTURY-LONG STRUGGLE FOR COPTIC EQUALITY (2003). 
  494 Id. 
  495 See generally NAZIH N.M. AYUBI, BUREAUCRACY & POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY 
EGYPT (1980). 
  496 Id. 
  497 See generally ROBERT SPRINGBORG, MUBARAK’S EGYPT: FRAGMENTATION OF THE 
POLITICAL ORDER, (1989); MAHA AZZAM, EGYPT: THE ISLAMISTS AND THE STATE UNDER 
MUBARAK (1996). 
  498 Jason Brownlee, The Decline of Pluralism in Mubarak’s Egypt, 13 J. OF DEMOCRACY 
1, 6-14 (2002), available at 
https://webspace.utexas.edu/jmb334/www/documents/article.JOD.2002.pdf. 
  499 Id. 
  500 See generally Stephen Maher, The Political Economy of the Egyptian Uprising (Nov. 1, 
2011), http://monthlyreview.org/2011/11/01/the-political-economy-of-the-egyptian-uprising; 
Solava Ibrahim, A Tale of Two Egypts: contrasting state-reported macro-trends with micro-
voices of the poor, 32 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 1347 (2011); Thesis: Neoliberal policies, 
urban segregation and the Egyptian revolution, ANTROPOLOGI.INFO (July 29, 2011, 1:16 
AM), http://www.antropologi.info/blog/anthropology/2011/gated-communities; Tales of Arab 
Democracy from Egypt, ZEN DIPLOMAT (Feb. 28, 2011), 
http://zendiplomat.blogspot.com/2011_02_01_archive.html. 
  501 See generally discussion id. 
  502 Duncan L. Clarke, U.S. Security Assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically 
Untouchable?, 51 MIDDLE E. J. 200 (1997). 
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the underclass.503 It could maintain this posture because it had an extremely 
efficient security apparatus,504 which had adequate resources to police 
dissidents inside Egypt.505 
The events in Tunisia, which rapidly led to the exodus of its dictator, 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, as a result of a popular democratic uprising among 
every day people, resonated with Egyptians and helped spark the Egyptian 
“Arab Spring”, or Democratic Revolution.506 This ultimately led to 
Mubarak’s resignation and began an investigation into his conduct, for 
which he is now on trial.507 Given the segmentation and divisions inside 
Egypt, it is not clear how these interests will be reconciled or moderated to 
provide the foundations of a new constitutional democracy. There appears to 
be a critical mass of Egyptians who want a real democratic revolutionary 
transformation. However, it is not clear how developed the procedures are 
that touch on transitional justice.  
What is clear is that the outcome –  whether it be religiously moderate 
and secular leaning in the direction of the Egyptian professional, intellectual, 
and skills community or whether it leans in the direction of the Salafis –  is 
still an open question. It is additionally clear that the emergent governing 
elite from both sides will not seek to replicate the rigid understandings of 
Mubarak with Israel and the U.S. regarding the democratic, universal 
aspirations of Palestinians with respect to human rights. It is indeed very 
likely that Egypt play a major role in promoting the cause of Palestinian 
Statehood, or at least, that it will not work to impede its progress. 
One of the most important issues concerning Palestinian interests is an 
appraisal of the extent to which Palestinian perspectives and operations have 
stimulated the events in the Middle East that are collectively called the Arab 
Spring. An Egyptian activist, Hossam-el Hamalawy, maintains that the seeds 
of the Arab Spring in Egypt emerged in September 2000 in an expression of 
solidarity with the second Palestinian Intifada.508 The Intifada mobilized 
                                                          
  503 See generally Fouad Ajami, The Sorrows of Egypt, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 72 (1995); 
Mamoun Fandy, The Tensions Behind the Violence in Egypt, 2 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 1, 25-34 
(1993). 
  504 See Jack Shenker, Inside Mubarak’s security apparatus: Eyewitness account of arrests 
and beatings (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.jackshenker.net/egypt/inside-mubaraks-security-
apparatus-eyewitness-account-of-arr.html. 
  505 See Virginia N. Sherry, Commentary: Security forces practices in Egypt, 12 CRIM. 
JUSTICE ETHICS 2 (1993). 
  506 See generally Kirsten Saloomey, First Tunisia, Then Egypt, Next Palestine? (June 2, 
2011), http://blogs.aljazeera.net/middle-east/2011/06/02/first-tunisia-then-egypt-next-palestine. 
  507 Maggie Michael, Egypt: Hosni Mubarak Trial Resumes, HUFF. POST (Sept. 5, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost. Com/2011/09/05/egypt-hosni-mubarak-trial_n_949099.html. 
  508 Intifada refers to the uprising of the Palestinian Arabs of the Gaza Strip and West Bank 
in protest against continued Israeli occupation of these territories beginning in late 1987 and 
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thousands of Egyptians in street demonstrations in Egypt; these 
demonstrations in support of Palestinian interests “soon gained an anti-
regime dimension.”509 In addition to the Intifada, other Egyptians point to 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.510 Protests against the U.S. presence in 
Iraq also implicated the Egyptian regime, which was a strong U.S. ally.511 
The central importance, however, of the Palestinian struggle for statehood 
was that it created an activist space, which the Egyptian government 
tolerated so long as it was directed at Israel.512 The Palestinian solidarity 
movement in Egypt also learned organizational techniques of protestant 
resistance from Palestinians.513 The level of political awareness of 
Palestinian exiles and their demonstrations abroad against Israel provided 
further stimuli to the growth of protest movements inside the different Arab 
States.514 
                                                          
continuing sporadically into the early 1990s. See generally DON PERETZ, INTIFADA: THE 
PALESTINIAN UPRISING (1990). 
  509 Nadia Hijab, The Rise of the Intifada Generation, NATION (Aug. 25, 2011). 
  510 Id. See also Patrick J. Buchanan, Whose War?, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Mar. 24, 2003); 
Sukumar Muralidharan, Israel: An Equal Partner in Occupation of Iraq, 39 ECON. & POL. 
WEEKLY 4517, 4517-20 (Oct. 9, 2004); Mitchell Plitnick et al., Did Israel Lead the U.S. into 
the War on Iraq?, JEWISH VOICE FOR PEACE (Dec. 20, 2011), 
http://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/content/did-israel-lead-us-war-iraq. 
  511 See generally Patrick J. Buchanan, Whose War?, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Mar. 24, 2003); 
Sukumar Muralidharan, Israel: An Equal Partner in Occupation of Iraq, 39 ECON. & POL. 
WEEKLY 4517, 4517-20 (Oct. 9, 2004); Mitchell Plitnick et al., Did Israel Lead the U.S. into 
the War on Iraq?, JEWISH VOICE FOR PEACE (Dec. 20, 2011), 
http://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/content/did-israel-lead-us-war-iraq. 
  512 David D. Kirkpatrick, Islamist Victors in Egypt Seeking Shift by Hamas, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 24, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/24/world/middleeast/egypts-
election-victors-seek-shift-by-hamas-to-press-israel.html?pagewanted=all; see also Harriet 
Sherwood, Israel faces worst crisis with Egypt for 30 years as diplomats flee, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 10, 2011), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/10/israel-egypt-
embassy-crisis; Egypt supports recognition of independent Palestinian state, MIDDLE E. 
MONITOR (Aug. 16, 2011), available at http://www.middleeastmonitor.org.uk/news/middle-
east/2726-egypt-supports-recognition-of-independent-palestinian-state. 
  513 See Kristen Sall, First Tunisia, then Egypt, next Palestine?, AL JAZEERA (Jun. 2, 2011); 
see also Joshua Stacher, Egypt’s Democratic Mirage, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Feb. 7, 2011); 
Popular Uprising in Egypt Topples Mubarak Regime, World GEOGRAPHY (2011). 
  514 See sources cited supra notes 31, 106, 135, 274, 279, 333, 364, 396, 437, 466, 467, 494, 
496, 498, 499, 501, 504, 504, 506-508 and 513; Rania Abouzeid, Bouazizi: The Man Who Set 
Himself and Tunisia on Fire, TIME (Jan. 21, 2011); Aryn Baker, Yemen’s Uprising: The 
Families on the Front Lines, TIME (Oct. 10, 2011); Kareem Fahim, Yemeni Uprising Opens a 
Door to Besieged Rebels in the North, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2011); Tom Finn, Yemen 
uprising: Sana’a rocked by night of fierce fighting, GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2011); Libya’s 
uprising: Time to leave, ECONOMIST (Feb. 22, 2011); Timeline: Libya’s uprising against 
Muammar Gaddafi, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2011); Brian Whitaker, How a man setting fire to 
himself sparked an uprising in Tunisia, GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2010). 
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It is clear that a new generation of Palestinian and Arab activists are 
mutually influenced and inspired by the vibrant exchange of ideas and 
strategies for democratic change.515 In turn, Egyptian activists began to 
organize learning sessions for Palestinian activists examining different 
strategies and tactics of resistance.516 This has also increased the 
expectations within the PA for more transparent, democratic ways of doing 
business.517  
Palestinians may employ the nonviolent and democratic transformations 
of the Arab Spring as a pathway to assuming a higher moral status in 
negotiating a settlement with the Israelis. The popular democratic 
movements that characterize the Arab Spring have also reduced the 
credibility of the ultranationalist right-wing Israeli propaganda machine to 
demonize the expectations of freedom and self-determination for 
Palestinians—particularly because those expectations are built on the 
foundations of nonviolence and a deep commitment to popular democratic 
values.518 These developments coalesce at a time when the Palestinian 
leadership is making a serious effort to secure the international recognition 
of Palestinian sovereignty and statehood.519 
The peace constituencies inside Israel whose stand in opposition to the 
extremist right wing agenda of the Netanyahu’s ultraconservative 
                                                          
  515 See MARC LYNCH, VOICES OF THE NEW ARAB PUBLIC: IRAQ, AL-JAZEERA, AND 
MIDDLE EAST POLITICS TODAY (2006). See generally Marina Ottaway & Julia Choucair-
Vizoso, Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INT’L PEACE (2008). 
  516 Hijab, supra note 510, at 34-35(“The Egyptians advised the Palestinians to study the 
work of people like Gene Sharp, the American theorist of the nonviolent insurrection. 
Palestinian youth are also thinking about ways to adapt and expand the tactics of the six-year 
popular struggle of West Bank villages against Israel’s separation wall, and they are devoting 
renewed study to the massive, overwhelmingly nonviolent civil resistance of the first intifada 
(1987-1993). ‘We focus on nonviolence because we studied Palestinian history since 1936 and 
saw that the biggest successes were achieved through nonviolence,’ explains Fadi Quran. 
Indeed, the Arab Awakening has helped revalidate nonviolent resistance not only for many 
Palestinians but throughout the Arab world.”). 
  517 Noura Erakat, Roundtable on Occupation Law: Part of the Conflict or the Solution?, 
JADALIYYA.COM (Sep. 22, 2011), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2705/roundtable-on-
occupation-law_part-of-the-conflict-. 
  518 See supra notes 161 and 173. 
  519 See supra notes 161 and 173; see also Paul Flesher, Palestinian Statehood and the Arab 
Spring, Religion Today (Sept. 20, 2011), http://religion-
today.blogspot.com/2011/09/palestinian-statehood-and-arab-spring.html; Awrad Saleh, 
Waging Peace: Palestinian Statehood: Sovereignty And a New Reality at the UN (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.wrmea.com/component/content/article/372-2011-september-october/10680-
waging-peace-palestinian-statehood-sovereignty-and-a-new-reality-at-the-un.html; Palestine 
statehood: A strategic mistake by everyone, ECONOMIST (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/09/palestine-statehood-0?page=4. 
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government will doubtless welcome the developments of the Arab Spring.520 
Nadia Hijab concludes that “the greatest promise of the Arab Awakening is 
that Arabs will reclaim the vision of a larger body within which they can 
operate, an Arab region built not on ethnic or religious purity but bond by a 
common strident for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”521 Arab 
opinion leaders also believe that democracy in a number of Arab States will 
energize the Palestinian struggle for freedom because there is a strong 
foundation of support amongst people who identify as Arab themselves.522 
Netanyahu had early on expressed his desire for regime replacement in 
the Arab world, because he felt that peace would be sustainable when Arab 
States are truly democratic.523 While his wishes appear to be on the horizon, 
Netanyahu does not seem to have responded strategically, intelligently or 
constructively, at least on a practical level, to these changes.524 The greatest 
challenge for the Palestinians is to remain true to the core policies and values 
which continue to animate the struggle for democracy: self-determination, 
rights of refugees, and the vindication of freedom and equality. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The global community only stands to gain from the establishment of a 
Palestinian state that could coexist peacefully with the state of Israel.525  
However, current international law frameworks regarding stateless 
individuals have proved unable to deal effectively with the current problem 
                                                          
  520 See also Harriet Sherwood, Binyamin Netanyahu attacks Arab spring uprisings (Nov. 
24, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/24/israel-netanyahu-attacks-arab-
spring; Yossi Verter, The Arab Spring turned Netanyahu into the national fearmonger, (Dec. 
16, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/the-arab-spring-turned-netanyahu-
into-the-national-fearmonger-1.401760 (“In the last year, Middle Eastern leaders have been 
ousted and denounced, have been slaughtered or have engaged in slaughter. The response of 
Israel’s premier has been to become more entrenched in his own views”). 
  521 Hijab, supra note 510, at 35. 
  522 Id. 
  523 Aron Heller, Netanyahu Al Arabiya Interview: Israeli Prime Minister Tells Arab World 
He Wants To Negotiate, HUFF. POST (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/21/netanyahu-al-arabiya-interview_n_905672.html 
(“‘If there’s genuine democracy in the Arab world, in the Arab countries, then there will be 
genuine peace. Because a genuine democracy reflects the desires of the people, and most 
people Arabs, Jews, anyone they don’t want their sons and daughters dying on battlefields’”). 
  524 See generally discussion and sources cited, supra notes 24, 27, 174, 177, 179, 181, 185, 
287, 291, 414, 425, 437, 447, 470, 472, 521 and 524. 
  525 The Israeli-Palestinian Initiative: Framework for a Public Peace Process; Toward a 
Peaceful Israeli-Palestinian Relationship, http://globalcommunity.org/ipi/; see also 
Establishing a peaceful Palestinian State next to Israel long overdue, UN NEWS CENTRE 
(Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40550&Cr=palestin&Cr1=. 
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of Palestinian statelessness. While treaties attempt to redress some the 
problems faced by stateless individuals, the reality is that customary 
international law affords little protection to stateless people who suffer 
continuing abuses by other states.526 Moreover, the UNSC veto system has 
been used to undermine the efforts to establish a Palestinian state, against 
widely held global opinion.527 It would strengthen the force of the UN –and, 
consequently international law—to reinstitute the UNSC bypass mechanism 
yet again to give practical power to the voice of the UN General 
Assembly.528  
The united “nations” ought to include a Palestinians state; the 
Palestinian people possess all, or nearly all, the traditional Montevideo 
characteristics of a traditional state, yet still have not been recognized.529 
The Israeli right wing and its conservative political allies have in fact been 
waging a relentless war against the UN as an institution.530 This is not good 
for Israel, the U.S., or the UN as governing bodies, nor is it good for a long-
term, sustainable global peace. The recognition of the Palestinian state holds 
within it the promise of moving all parties past this period of international 
acrimony and impasse.531 
To conclude, we wish to reassert our firm belief in human rights and 
essential justice for all. As scholars, jurists, and human rights practitioners, 
our ultimate loyalty lies not with any state, organization, or even 
community— but instead with the values of peace, wellbeing, and freedom 
from fear for all individuals. Our position is that the recognition of the state 
of Palestine is essential for achieving the wider realization of these values, 
for the people of Palestine, for the people of Israel, and for the people of the 
United States. It is possible that there are other paths Israel and Palestine 
                                                          
  526 See sources cited supra notes 26, 151, 291, 299-302. 
  527 See generally discussion supra notes 214, 215, 283 and 277. 
  528 Christopher C. Joyner, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: 
Rethinking the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation, 11 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 445 (1981); 
see also Richard A. Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 
AM. J. INT’L L. 782 (1966). 
  529 See generally discussion supra notes 79, 84 and 145. 
  530 Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu, Muslim Student Attacks UN Rights Council for Anti-Israel Bias 
(Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/143367 (“Why is Israel 
condemned while Arab violators are ignored?”) ; see also Mitchell Bard, The United Nations 
and Israel (last updated Feb. 2012), 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/israel_un.html;   Israel at the UN: Progress 
Amid A History of Bias, HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL ANTI-DEFAMATORY LEAGUE (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.adl.org/international/Israel-UN-1-introduction.asp; A biased UN “finding” on 
Gaza could also apply to Afghanistan, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 23, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204518504574423652321177372.html. 
  531 See, e.g., Iain Scobbie et al., Recognizing Palestinian Statehood  (Aug. 25, 2011), 
http://yalejournal.org/2011/08/recognizing-palestinian-statehood/. 
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could take in the quest for peace. However, we hope that our analysis offers 
a shared backdrop against which the deliberations of Palestinians and 
Israelis – and the global community – may continue toward the universal 
goals of achieving self-determination, independent stability, widespread 
peace, and essential dignity. 
 
